Airports As Seen Through The Eyes Of The Landside–Airside Boundary by Marquez Cravioto, Victor
	  AIRPORTS AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF THE LANDSIDE–AIRSIDE 
BOUNDARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Victor Oscar Marquez Cravioto 
August 2013  
	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Victor Oscar Marquez Cravioto 
 
	  AIRPORTS AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF THE LANDSIDE–AIRSIDE 
BOUNDARY 
Victor Oscar Marquez Cravioto, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2013 
 
Can we challenge the way we have written the history of airports and the form in 
which we understand them today and perhaps tomorrow? In this work I use the 
landside–airside boundary as a lens to see through the airport and its history. In doing 
so, I try to look for new answers that may throw some light on the obscure (vaulted) 
sociotechnical processes of change that have turned the airport into an “unresolved 
problem.” In this regard I frame the discussion of boundaries from several 
perspectives including security, permeability and containment, invention and 
reinvention, culture and imposition, literature and scholarship, its physical and non-
physical representations, technological change, and so forth.  
Just the identification of these “entities” may also add to Thomas Hughes’s 
model of Large Technological Systems, because the landside–airside boundary shows 
how systems are constructed in a different sequence from Hughes’s model. As I show 
in this study, only three cases have altered the “linearity” of standard airport design: 
New York LaGuardia, Washington Dulles, and Tampa International Airport. These 
cases sum up the only full reinventions of airports through history, and by unfolding 
their own unique stories, I try to reveal how an airport gets born. Can we prove that 
the landside–airside boundary is the single most important feature that shapes an 
airport?  
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PREFACE: 
Current Definitions of the Landside and Airside 
The Collins English Dictionary (“Landside, Airside,” 2003) defines the terms 
“landside” and “airside” succinctly: “Landside” (noun) is the part of an airport farthest 
from the aircraft, the boundary of which is the security check, customs, passport 
control, and so forth. “Airside,” on the contrary, is the part of an airport nearest the 
aircraft, the boundary of which is the security check, customs, passport control, and so 
on. Both definitions help to show that only an austere idea exists of what these terms 
mean, and that little research has been done to define them more accurately. In the 
general civil engineering and architecture lexicon, airside represents buildings and 
facilities on the side of the planes, and landside refers to the same but on the side of 
passengers, a definition similar to the one mentioned above. For the more specialized 
jargon of airport designers, engineers, and specialists, airports should be divided into 
two control sectors: the landside, referring to all areas allowing the free flow of 
passengers, visitors, and vehicles; and the airside, areas restricted for the sole use of 
authorized personnel, aircrafts, and service vehicles.1 However, in terms of airport 
planning, security, and regulatory codes, the landside–airside boundary represents the 
different frontiers between the “sterile” and the “non-sterile” zones, a through area 
where passengers move along “filters” in order to be “cleared” and “segregated.” 
 
                                                
1 Facilities at airports are generally described as either airside, which commences at the secured 
boundary between terminal and apron and extends to the runway and to facilities beyond, such as 
navigational or remote air-traffic-control emplacements; or landside, which includes the terminal, 
cargo-processing, and land-vehicle approach facilities (Evans, 2006).  
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the airport seems to be rather different from that of its relative: the train 
station. While both aircraft and rail served as mass means of transport during most of 
the 20th century, it is remarkable to see how similar train stations are around the world 
and to witness how most of them work really well. They are practical, easy to 
understand, and efficient in expediting multiple convoys of trains, with precision down 
to the second. Most of these facilities share a similar configuration, which has been 
proved right for a long time, creating a sort of basic design pattern for rail 
transportation planners. One may infer that in socio-technical terms, train stations 
rapidly reached a “design closure” (or when experts agree that the basic problem of 
planning has been solved and thus left behind). In contrast, since their origins, the 
development of airports seems to be full of uncertainties. Just a glimpse of the last 
eighty years of airport design showcases a surprisingly wide catalog that does not 
seem to have two similar boundaries. Although hundreds of airports share a similar 
layout, today there is hardly such a thing as a typical airport; instead, each one of them 
is so puzzle-like, so aesthetically diverse, that problem-solving skills are demanded of 
passengers and visitors. Figuring out where to go, what to do, and how do it on time is 
the norm of contemporary air travel. Clearly, airports have become much more 
complicated than rail stations, and this is still fairly inexplicable. And while this 
question has remained unresolved for decades, the so-called level of service that rules 
both the aviation and airport industries has fluctuated decade by decade, year by year, 
just like the stock market, ranging from the true excitement of many to the more 
exaggerated air-rage syndromes of some. Rail stations have successfully sorted out 
congestion and delays, whereas airports have historically undergone serious jam 
crises, and we as passengers have paid the price of these inefficiencies. 
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I personally became concerned with this matter, or at least aware of it, when I 
started working as an airport designer in 1998. Since then I have become increasingly 
involved in both airport and transportation planning projects and have developed an 
interest in their historical development. But it was not until my second year as a 
graduate student in the Science & Technology Studies program at Cornell that I 
realized that almost no two airports looked the same. Further inquiry suggested that 
most airports needed to be tailored-designed, thus making difficult the creation of 
standard models. This condition also seemed to contradict the very stable 
technological change in aircraft—including the change from propellers to jet engines 
after the Second World War. Indeed, one may argue that aircraft innovation was 
mainly invisible to users and related less to aircrafts’ shapes than to their technical 
specifications, safety systems, and speed. Throughout history, airports have 
successfully increased and adapted the capacities of the airside in order to meet 
dimensional changes that are the product of technological change. But it was not until 
I became more aware of the mechanisms that allow a social construction of technology 
and of the ways that social historians put them in context that the invisible started to 
become not just visible but evident. There seems to be a single obstacle to airport 
standardization or patterned-continuity: the serious conflict that arises in defining the 
frontier between the landside and the airside. 
In 2006, while I was in charge of designing a new international terminal for an 
airport, I noted that most of the planning meetings stalled when we were trying to 
define the overlapping of zones between the landside and the airside. In those 
meetings, everyone had an opinion about how to draw the line between the two, so 
consensus was hardly reached. At the time, I became more attentive to these issues 
and tried—unsuccessfully—to find references in the available literature on airports. 
But every path became a dead end; sadly, there was scant record of the frontier as an 
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object of scholarship. In a search to amplify the concept, I borrowed some key S&TS 
concepts and methods for my inquiry. Perhaps it was Star and Griesemer’s (1989) 
concept of “boundary objects,” a classic within the field, that became the closest 
reference on my way to figuring out what a landside–airside boundary could be. 
Although the concept was not necessarily applicable in the same way, I found some 
interesting common threads; in practice, just as “boundary objects” function—working 
as a point of linkage between diverse specialists—landside–airside boundaries are 
right at the crossroads of not just specialists but institutions, the state, the prevailing 
ideology, and the larger discourse of society. However, they lack integrity because the 
concept of the landside–airside boundary is not necessarily used indistinctly on a 
regular basis as a means of expert communication. Thus I learned that although they 
are always present in every negotiation, these boundaries are slippery entities, 
potentially hard to trace, identify, or even make visible. However, as I suggest through 
this work, they are often tangible objects. 
In hindsight, it all started making sense. I gathered my own recollections and 
notes starting from the days I worked as a project architect with Moshe Safdie and 
Associates in Boston; some colleagues and I were in charge of developing the 
expansion of Lester B. Pearson’s Toronto International Airport. Indeed, most of the 
time we worked—rather than with the architecture or with the endless technicalities—
using simple, colored diagrams to represent jurisdictional zones. Some of these zones 
were symbolically owned by different entities or showed the status of passengers and 
employees, others marked the functional separation between retail and seating areas, 
and yet others represented flow patterns, restrictions, and codes. We would pin up and 
overlap those diagrams and then hold meetings, often packed with consultants and 
experts; we always up ended trying to sort out the near-to-impossible task of pleasing 
everyone with an integrated diagram. I clearly recall that the need for a double 
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segregation flow—unique to Canada, according to which U.S. passengers are split 
from Canadians and again split from all other nationalities—seemed literally 
insurmountable. We spent months zoning and eventually designing the three-
dimensional boundaries that will end up “segregating” those passengers. We devoted 
most of our energy to defining what I now call the landside–airside boundary, but back 
then, we were not even aware of it. 
By Fall 2008, I decided to move on to formally researching this topic. After 
several months of reading, I could confirm that landside–airside boundaries were not 
discussed in most airport literature, so I felt compelled to investigate whether other 
groups of colleague planners, designers, and experts had had the same experience and 
trouble in defining them as physical entities. My first approach was historical, but 
instead of following a chronological order, I forced myself to randomly select airports 
and, reading the subtext of both text and image, try to reveal what was behind the 
surface, pushing hard to identify in each case where the landside–airside was. As some 
cases led to others, everything pointed to a few bundles of airports that were truly 
innovative. What happened next became the core of this work: a fascinating journey 
into the past, seen through the eyes of the boundary, where airports reveal a new side, 
full of the traces of those who shaped them, and why. But what if—as I try to show in 
this dissertation—the landside–airside boundary is the single most important feature 
that shapes an airport? Can we challenge the way we have written the history of 
airports and the form in which we understand them today and perhaps tomorrow? This 
question is precisely what this investigation tries to answer. 
For the purpose of this inquiry, the landside–airside boundary will work as a 
filter or a lens that may help us build a different notion of what airports are. At the 
beginning of my search, it seemed clear that the first challenge was to come up with a 
comprehensible definition; but in this case, just establishing the parameters of what to 
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look for would build up the foundations for a research hypothesis. I was disappointed 
to find that most available definitions are reduced to flat descriptions of the physical 
condition of a landside area or an airside area. Not even in the milestones of planning 
such as Froesch and Prokosch’s Airport Planning (1946) are the terms mentioned. 
Therefore, I have opted to weave together from a variety of technical threads, ranging 
from my own interactions with specialists in the practice of planning and designing 
airports to books and other texts (mainly old ones), some interesting definitions 
contained in airport codes, and so forth. 
First I would suggest that landside–airside boundaries are socio-technical 
objects that are often materialized physically as a line or a fence, or as an artifact such 
as a net, chain, or queue divider; they sometimes appear as a wall, as signage, or as a 
glass panel. They also shape as scanners, or ID documents, or metal detectors. These 
boundaries may also take non-material shapes such as routines, procedures, 
jurisdictional limits, the containment or “segregation” of passengers, or control 
demarcations of higher entities such as agencies, customs, or an assortment of police 
divisions. Boundaries may even be embodied in psychological emotions such as the 
public perception of fear, scrutiny, or the invasion of privacy. But they are all socio-
technical objects that have as their ultimate purpose the enforcement of the separation 
of entities, mainly between the realm of aircraft and the realm of persons. In any of 
their variations—or multiple disguises, to say it a bit more theatrically—landside–
airside boundaries also mark the frontier between the local and the regional, or the 
national and the international. Therefore, these boundaries have multiple functions of 
mediation and containment, and in consequence, they usually impose some sort of 
mechanism of control. 
At the outset of this study, I tried to hypothesize the representation of an 
objectual landside–airside boundary—mainly because in practical terms I needed to 
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make it visible and classifiable. However, as the research moved forward I learned 
what makes the boundary so hard to trace: on one side, its immutability as a socio-
technical interface, and on the other, its constant and enigmatic change of skin. 
Why is the boundary relevant, and to whom? I suspect there are two ways of 
answering this question. On the one hand, there is an imperative need to better 
understand how to plan and expand airports, reducing the huge economic risk that is 
implicit in such monumental investments (a new airport costs between 6 and 14 billion 
dollars; Rodrigue, Comtois, & Slack, 2009, p. 2). Thus, the need to learn from the past 
seems obvious, and I believe we have not done so very successfully. Therefore, we, as 
scholars, need to expand not only the literature of airports just for the general public 
but also the specialized literature that is used by airport planners and designers, 
engineers, sociologists and psychologists of transport, politicians and airport 
managers, and others. Historians of technology should try to unthread airport history 
and make the invisible visible, and thus part of a wider body of knowledge. On the 
other hand, let’s imagine for a second how a historical evolution of airports might 
have occurred. Had airports moved along a technical progression—through years of 
refining layouts and learning by using (Rosenberg, 1982)—probably sooner than later 
planners would have been able to nail down the right airport, or at least an ideal way 
to expand airports. But this has not been the case, and the history of airports has been a 
collection of beautiful, even whimsical buildings—or, paraphrasing Perlman (2004), 
alongside museums, the highest trophy for star architects. This may explain why 
books of airport history are less text and more illustration: there seems to be little to 
say about airports beyond architectural critique. Besides the natural expert audience 
for this text, I think the identification of the landside–airside boundary may be relevant 
to the scholarship of S&TS, because it is only through understanding how these 
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artifacts and systems are socially constructed that we can conceive an unconventional 
history of airports. 
Among the various obstacles to the identification of the landside–airside 
boundary as a key element in airport history, outstanding is that consulting firms, 
particularly airport planning companies, have jealously vaulted most evidence and 
accounts of any negotiation related to its formation.1 This would partially explain why 
there is virtually no public access to these sorts of records and why the task of 
unveiling these internal processes is so hermetic to outsiders. Thus it is not until 
researchers try to become fully immersed in a kind of participatory research (or until 
the researcher has somehow managed to join the negotiation processes) that these 
“black boxes” may be finally opened up for inquiry. However, the researcher must be 
cautious about discussing this knowledge, which companies often seek to protect in 
order to charge high consulting fees. But even supposing that a researcher has sorted 
out this conflict, it would be necessary to breach confidentiality agreements. This 
tortuous chain of steps has made this task an almost impossible one. 
In regard to this study, though, several things lined up in my favor. From the 
time I began thinking about landside–airside boundaries at Cornell until the final days 
of typing this text, I have had the chance to participate professionally in both new 
airport projects and airport expansions. Within that context, I was fortunate to design, 
under my own office, the new Monterrey International Terminal B in Mexico. We 
have planned, designed, and overseen the project’s full time line—which spanned 
from drawing the first concept sketch to helping to put it into operation. This became 
an invaluable opportunity, because I could act as a participant in being two different 
                                                
1 Planning companies have treasured this information basically because it is critical for developing any 
sort of airport master planning involving terminals. Thus, it is one of the justifications for the high fees 
of these experts.  
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roles (designer and researcher) throughout the full negotiation process for, 
implementation of, and early use of the landside–airside boundary. 
Although airports as we know them today were “invented” around 1920, there 
were no archetypes for the new architectural genre. During those years a myriad of 
architects and urban designers—including high-caliber figures such as Le Corbusier, 
Tony Garnier, Frank Lloyd Wright, Antonio Sant’Elia, and Erich Mendelsohn—all of 
whom were excited by the new possibilities of flying, launched a cascade of science 
fiction proposals that tried to envision airports of the future. However, all of these 
hypotheses were eventually proved wrong and became no more than wonderful 
visions of dystopia. In a different arena, the rising market of aviation pushed less 
fancy names into the spotlight and became finally responsible for bringing about 
down-to-earth buildings such as Tempelhof, Croyden, Le Bourget, Liverpool, and 
Dublin. Consequently—with the notable exception of Berlin’s flughaven—these air 
terminals were far from grandiose and spectacular. Since their outset, airports faced 
problems that were somehow unexpected. Three key conditions separated the train’s 
speedy service from its relative, the airplane: first, the uncertainties and complications 
of human maneuverability (extremely limited in 20th-century train systems); second, 
the slow time for embarking, preparing, and disembarking of each aircraft (also called 
turnaround time); and, last but not least, the dangers involved in allowing people 
proximity to propellers. 
The most spectacular airport seen before the Second World War was certainly 
Tempelhof. Airport historian H. J. Braun (1995) also describes it as a technical and 
cultural feat: “from a symbol of efficiency in air transport in the rationalization period 
of German industry in the latter half of the 1920s, it changed to a symbol of Nazi 
grandeur in the 1930s” (p. 45). Its fame has prevailed to the present, making 
Tempelhof a silent witness to German history. The Berlinese airport was unequaled in 
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many ways. In plan, the complex was organized along the edges of a gigantic elliptical 
plot, quite uncharacteristic of today’s standards. The layout divided the airfield with a 
hangar-like, semicircular overhanging roof, where aircrafts uploaded and downloaded 
passengers as on a loading platform, which bled into the apron. Within this 
monumental space, stair ramps divided the flow of passengers from service personnel. 
At the landside, sets of endless severe Art Deco buildings held offices and vestibules 
articulated by Albert Speer–like colonnades,2 also surrounded by immense parking 
bays and road systems. The layout of the airport was so characteristic that it became a 
cultural icon (Zukowsky, 1996, p. 28; see photograph on p. 59). During the early 
1930s most terminals were simple, symmetrical buildings housing centralized 
functions of ticketing, waiting, and services. The immediate consequence of growth 
was a need for larger, longer aprons in order to park more and more aircraft. Between 
1934 and 1937 George Labro, who was in charge of expanding Paris Le Bourget, did 
the most obvious and foresaw one long building, centrally divided by a core, 
expandable at both ends. However, the structure ended up being a quarter of a mile 
long. This idea would become a paradigm and thus the more common way to expand 
existent airports worldwide, even before the Second World War. This should have 
been the end of this story, but two facts changed the historical trajectory of this neat 
technological scheme: first, passengers were unhappy with the discomfort produced by 
walking such long distances, and second, the linear growth of airports was limited to 
their total land property (especially given that these facilities were located relatively 
near to city centers). In consequence most early airports became rapidly obsolete. I 
argue, then, that it is right when airports “needed to be reconceived” that we might be 
able to understand their lack of technological stability (we may compare the genre of 
                                                
2 An evocation of the Zeppelintribune by Albert Speer.  
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the airport with cinema halls, and see how much theaters’ layouts have remained 
stable through the same last century). 
With the previous idea in mind, and after reviewing the international history of 
airports from the late 1930s until the 1990s, I found that only three airports have been 
rethought from the ground up: the 1939 NY–LaGuardia Airport, the 1961 
Washington–Dulles Airport, and the 1971 Tampa International Airport, all of which 
happen to be in the U.S. I also found that all three share a common thread: a higher 
entity specifically ordered a full reinvention of the airport. Interestingly, these three 
reinventions reached only a temporary closure—meaning that the problem of the 
airport was never totally solved. This historical “irresolution” brought the landside–
airside conflict into the light. Hence, these three cases became rich queries for 
understanding how a reinvention of the airport consists in a full reformulation of the 
landside–airside boundary.  
Thus, in each chapter of this dissertation, I have carefully analyzed, 
unthreaded, and unfolded all three cases in order to make visible actors, their interests, 
and the negotiations that took place in shaping their own frontiers. I have divided this 
research into four chapters. In chapter one I present early examples of the landside–
airside boundary and comment on its origins and representations. I also discuss the 
emerging complexities that turned airfields into airports, and airports into systems. 
Here, I argue that along the transition from the aerodrome’s leisure character to the 
more utilitarian airport, a deep gap was drawn between Corn’s characterization of 
people’s “airmindedness” and the rise of a new technical culture that arrived nested 
within the official discourse of modernity. In those years and from the point of view of 
users, the romantic borderline—or the earliest representation of the landside–airside 
boundary—was in danger. As aircraft grew more sophisticated, airports became a 
technology of their own; they turned into political artifacts and powerful mechanisms 
	  11 
of publicity and propaganda. To cover its need for a new airport, in 1939 New York 
City officials commissioned a new kind of airport that could surpass its rival, Newark 
Airport, in New Jersey. Not surprisingly, the design incorporated a never-seen-before 
landside–airside boundary scheme. In this chapter the NY Municipal Airport, later 
known as LaGuardia, is analyzed in depth, with a special emphasis on the larger 
discourse and its conflicts of interests. In addition, this section also discusses the 
details of the creation of the “Skywalk,” or the birth of the first techno-political 
landside–airside boundary. In analyzing the phases of funding, planning, design, and 
construction, I discuss the technical and political rhetoric of the time, which evidences 
a complex negotiation between the interests of users, machines, and the state. I suggest 
that the “Skywalk” became a soft frontier between two collapsing ideologies (soft as a 
synonym of mediated, or avoiding a drastic rupture). 
Chapter two introduces the airport culture of the post–World War II period as a 
framework for understanding the growing demands of aircraft innovation (jet 
propulsion) and the implications of the air travel boom of commercial aviation during 
the 1950s and 1960s. As the number of airplanes grew, so did the number of 
passengers, in the same proportion, pushing the terminals to lengthen endlessly as long 
docks. Passenger discomfort became a constant; thus, saturation and delay problems 
took over the airport. Designers and experts responded with all sorts of mechanisms 
such as the 1952 “Loadair System” by Whiting Co., the 1954 “Air dock” prototype by 
United Airways, and the installation of the first “Jetway” by JBT Co. in 1959. 
Meanwhile, politicians and investors were more concerned with the public image of 
the airport as an icon of progress. Terminals were identified as city gates, rapidly 
turning into the new urban cathedrals our time. The iconic TWA terminal in New 
York was inaugurated and instantly praised as an architectural masterpiece. A few 
years later the building’s sound public success as an urban landmark placed Eero 
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Saarinen at the forefront of the new Washington airport’s public search for an 
architect. This time, the recently created Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) pushed an 
initiative to develop new ways to deal with a severely congested landside–airside 
boundary, and Saarinen was chosen for this task. The Finnish architect faced the 
question of how to reduce delay, and his answer was to rethink the airport as a system. 
Chapter two in particular emphasizes the experimental planning behind the new 
Washington Dulles Airport in the late 1950s. In this chapter I also recount how the 
era’s faith in technology as a vehicle for progress was the main force behind the 
invention of the “Mobile Lounge” and how this artifact was seen as the ultimate 
solution for the ideal airport. Using primary and secondary sources, this study goes 
deep in search of the causes of and ideas behind a radical reformulation of the 
landside–airside boundary. Finally, I try to answer the question of why the FAA 
pushed this change at such enormous cost. 
In chapter three I discuss changes in the landside–airside boundary as a result 
of the world’s massification of air travel and the new availability of planning experts. 
Beyond pressures from the market and the ever-changing technological conditions of 
the airport, the fact that airport planning became a well-established specialty in 
universities and technological institutes had a strong impact on the way airports were 
conceived. For example, at Tampa International Airport, or TIA (1971), some of the 
first qualified airport planners pioneered the way the landside–airside boundary could 
be set in a different spatial dimension, which they called the “Landside Airside 
Concept” (1963). In this case, one of the leading airport-planning consultants in the 
country, Leigh Fisher and Associates (LF&A), and not the FAA, would persuade the 
officials of Hillsborough County to re-study the “quantifiable inefficiency” (LF&A, 
April 1963, p. 38) of current airport terminals. The outcome was a radical innovation 
that became an instant airport-planning touchstone and a model adopted worldwide. 
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The landside was physically separated from the airside but linked through a “People 
Mover,” shortening the long walks and avoiding the so-called delay. For the first time 
ever, buildings were referred to as “airside” or “landside.” In the mind of Marge Brink 
Coridan, Tampa’s head planner, airside included both the apron and the satellite 
buildings split from the center; landside referred to a central facility that would work 
as a transportation node. In fact, LF&A rapidly copyrighted the revolutionary scheme. 
This section collects and analyzes the key voices of those experts who intervened in 
the conception of TIA. 
In chapter four I develop two themes: first I draw the line between airport 
reinventions and airport innovations, and thus help the reader by clearing up any 
blurriness on this matter created by discussing the previous case studies. Second, and 
foremost, I try to answer the following question: Are boundaries repeatable pieces of a 
mechanism, or are they autonomous entities, subject to the absorbing of cultural 
practices? In the first section, “Airport Reinventions,” I discuss how congestion can be 
highlighted among the causes that prompted full airport reinventions. I also comment 
on the consequences of my previous three case studies: LaGuardia, Dulles, and 
Tampa. The second section, “Airport Innovations,” speaks of historical changes, 
departing from what is commonly known in airport planning as the standard, “linear 
model.” I present two iconic cases in which airport layout ideas were introduced that 
were perceived as new: the 1974 Terminal 1 at Paris’s Charles de Gaulle Airport, and 
the 1960 Pan Am Terminal 2 at New York’s Idlewild Airport (later known as JFK). 
Last, in the third section I argue that airports are not clones, or even repeatable copies, 
as many people may think. I support this claim by showing that the frontier between 
the airside and the landside captures many cultural differences that make each airport 
unique. These distinctions produce a mirror effect that reflects either local customs or 
the way these local forces reacted against foreign or global models. Toward that end I 
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speak of three topics: the causes and legacies of airport reinventions, the process of 
landside–airside boundary innovation, and how these boundaries add transparency and 
allow us to glance at the cultural mirror. In addition, I address the differences between 
planning new airports and expanding them in phases, and finally, I compare 
boundaries at regional and international airports. 
The increased flow of global passengers, and the governmental obsession to 
control each one of them, may help to explain why airports resemble liquid’s 
containers and, how according to location and culture, they may feature certain 
degrees of permeability. In chapter five I discusses the growing relevance of the 
landside–airside boundary as a fine-grained filter that controls the density of airport 
terminals, and eventually, the flows of those liquids that try to pass through. If it is 
true that passengers and employees need to flow through an airport like liquids—in 
addition to the infrastructure’s natural porosity—designers who were increasingly 
pushed to look for separation and new strategies of containment started envisioning 
the airport as a system of control valves. 
But are there any features that become visible only through the use of a 
landside–airside boundary as a lens? In trying to answer this simple question I bumped 
into some interesting methodological speculations. First, the identification of these 
boundaries opens imaginary windows that may be described as technological 
“viewports.” These portals allow us to see the in-between space, which is usually 
otherwise inaccessible and marks the territorial border between us and the hardware of 
technological systems. Second, I have also found that in order to make visible what 
has remained hidden within those contained boundaries, viewports should meet some 
conditions. At least in the case of airports, I have found at least five features that 
characterize these portals. Viewports should be discursive, normative, objects of 
knowledge, transitory, and intangible. 
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Each aspect has been developed separately: the boundary is discursive because, 
for example, it becomes a representation of the rise of international security concerns 
in the mid-1970s, and as internal and external need for security grows, so does the 
need to filter, sort, and split more efficiently and perhaps even more drastically. It is 
normative, because alongside the national-security discourse came a new set of rules 
that specifically placed the boundary at the center of the debate; the boundary is also 
an object of knowledge because in the context of the events of 9/11, a new literary 
production on airports arose, one much more committed to a social, political, and legal 
agenda that questions the very nature of the airport and its limits, past and future use 
of technologies, the regulatory frames, and the rising pressures of retail. The boundary 
is also transitory because, although wait time has greatly increased during recent 
decades, the “passing” nature of these spaces turns every effort to make it look 
permanent, as architecturally themed or artificial. These “stretched” frontiers have 
been described as areas of “placelessness.” For retail purposes this illusion of 
autonomy has been priceless. Airports have created micro-worlds in which people 
could even live, as in the case of Sir Alfred (see anecdote in chapter five). Last, 
boundaries are intangible, because as security requirements that had to be attached 
to—or often forced into—existing terminal buildings, new virtual technologies were 
introduced to compensate for those buildings’ physical limitations (such as 
surveillance systems or scanning devices). Because the construction of an immaterial 
borderline was ominously imminent after 9/11, new security measures came equipped 
with psychological constructs, the informatics frontier, and the establishment of non-
material mechanisms of control. 
Perhaps airports inherited from aircraft their aura of mystery. Because airports 
have grown as complex systems contingent on a larger system, as Douglas (1995) has 
argued before, they have developed a sort of augmented complexity that is often 
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labyrinthine and hard to unthread. Since the early days of aviation, airplanes have 
disappeared every now and then for unexpected reasons, including flocks of birds, 
terrorism, and human error—or, as any with other technology, simply because they are 
subject to malfunctions and accidents. Often this happens in hard-to-reach areas of a 
diverse geography. Therefore, engineers of the post–World War II era decided to build 
bright orange boxes—metaphorically called black boxes—which were able to record 
all human and plane activity as voice and data, in order to grasp the causality of 
incidents. Aircraft manufacturers usually feedback from these black boxes and inform 
their new designs and innovation processes. Perhaps Rosenberg (1994) would have 
labeled this idea “learning by using.” In general, the timeline of technological change 
of aircraft has been characterized by secrecy and uncertainty—especially in the way 
things have been communicated to the public. This is due perhaps to the intimate 
relationship between aviation and war, and to the public and private (governmental 
agencies, contractors, and war-gear fabricants) idea of seeing planes more as weapons 
than as means of commercial transport. 
During the last years I have opened a mesmerizing conversation with some of 
the brightest historiographers of airports and aviation. Out of this meaningful and 
often mentorship relationship, I have learned how airports were invented and why, 
how people reacted to the magic of aviation, how distant worlds came together 
through the speed of airmail, and how modern airports became a reality. I owe much 
of this work to my candid talks with Debbie Douglas, Marc Dierikx, Peter Lyth, Joe 
Corn, Nathalie Roseau, Grace Torre, and Gordon Pririe. Other authors and historians 
such as Bednarek, Wohl, Gordon, Stoff, Holden, Szurovy, Zukowsky, Greif, Bosma, 
Brodherson, Bruemann, Stunkel, Lockhart, Rau, Voigt, Meisse, During, and 
Przychowski have also enlightened me with their personal depictions of airport 
history. From S&TS’s body of literature, authors such as Vincenti (1976) have tried to 
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show an intellectual, engineering culture responsible for developing aeronautics; 
Gallison (Gallison & Roland, 2000) has gone in depth inside the mechanism of the 
production of flight technology; Weber (1997) has questioned women’s access to 
military aircraft thanks to the design of physically gendered cockpits; and, more 
recently, Downer (2006) has unthreaded the secret testing of airplane turbines, 
shooting frozen turkeys at them with homemade cannons. 
In S&TS, scholars adopted the concept of black boxes to describe the inputs 
and outputs of technological devices, or the “inner workings of which need not be 
known for it to be used” (Sismondo, 2009, p. 97). But rather than focus on the outputs, 
such as facts and objects, according to Sismondo (2009), “S&TS investigators pay 
particular attention to controversial stages in their histories” (p. 98). Thus, my study of 
the landside–airside boundary focuses precisely on those critical moments of 
controversy when actors found only a temporary closure to the problem of reinventing 
the airport. The three case studies analyzed further in the following pages share the 
connection of being historical successes and failures at the same time. 
On the one hand, actors may have shown both frustration at not being able to 
reach a definitive new model to solve the airport (closure) and pride at being the minds 
behind newer airport models that gained a larger consensus, as in the case of Tampa’s 
team of planners and designers (rhetorical closure). The world of airport planning in 
particular seems to be plagued with black boxes. As I mentioned before, the art of 
planning airports has shown an exponential level of complexity, usually spinning 
around the experts’ race towards the perfect airport layout. Encouraged by this 
competition, planning firms have jealously vaulted expert knowledge. In the 1960s, 
Leigh Fisher in the U.S. and ADP in France (Aéroports de Paris) were positioned at 
the forefront of this race; under public financing, both firms researched and speculated 
on the new whereabouts of future airports, thus gathering enough theoretical and 
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practical information to consolidate them as world leaders in airport design 
consultation. The idea of opening black boxes in airport planning is based on the 
initial assumption that most of the landside–airside negotiation processes have been 
archived for different reasons throughout time, rendering the boundary hardly visible 
to non-expert eyes and, furthermore, to the non-participant at these tables. 
It was precisely when I managed to interlace both my own participation as a 
design professional in planning meetings (which made me aware of the relevance of 
landside–airside boundaries) and my first approach to some key S&TS concepts such 
as the principle of symmetry (or a fair account of histories in order to understand and 
open black-boxed knowledge), large technological systems, and boundary objects, that 
I conceived of the idea of using landside–airside boundaries as socio-technical 
constructions. 
Finally, it was when I witnessed myself how complicated and painful was the 
process of fixing a specific solution for a landside–airside boundary that I massaged 
the question of why, after a century of trial and error, we have not reached agreement 
on how an airport should be. Although I was already familiar with the history of 
airports, I decided to embark on a comprehensive revision of it, but this time looking 
for relevant cases of controversy or change precisely at the frontier between the 
landside and the airside. It was then that I suggested that if we use these boundaries as 
windows (or viewports, in the conclusion), we would be able to see airport history in a 
whole different way. 
I maintain in this dissertation that airport planning and design have moved 
along a straight line for more than a century. This pattern of linearity has been 
supported by what planners call “standard airport design,” and it basically consists of 
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learning from what is established3 as modestly successful (airport typology) and 
introducing small, superficial changes to the selected scheme (finger, satellite, pier, 
unit, etc.). The historiography of the airport is most often pictured in terms of 
spectacular achievements, mostly architectural and spatial, but this interpretation could 
be deceptive and misleading. Why? Because most airports are based on the same 
standard airport layouts of the past (sometimes almost a century old). This “standard 
airport design” may be seen as a linear path of development, wherein some 
irregularities (social responses) have protruded, forming what Hughes defines as 
“reverse salients.” Throughout the dissertation I make specific use of S&TS ideas and 
theoretical concepts, such as Nye’s interpretation of the “technological sublime” in 
chapter one; in the case of Dulles Airport I used Hughes’s (1983a) model of “large 
technological systems” and its concept of the “system builder.” Throughout other 
sections I use two of Akrich’s (1992) concepts: the “heterogeneous technical object” 
and her idea of how technological designs become “imprinted.” Last, in the case of 
Tampa’s airport, I have used Bijker’s (1987) theoretical concept of the technological 
frame in order to understand the interactions among the relevant social groups.4 
Finally, in SCOT’s terms, I have argued that all three reinventions of the airport are 
part of a process of rhetorical closure. Throughout the chapters I have also 
paraphrased some of Scott’s (1998) ideas about how the vertical powers of the state 
and other institutions prostrate social interests, and so forth. As I explain in the last 
remarks of this dissertation, finding the landside–airside boundary without an S&TS 
framework would have been a nearly impossible task. 
                                                
3 “Established” by experts and administrators, not necessarily by users. 
4 Methodologically speaking, both the ‘systems’ approach and the ‘technological frame’ approach can 
be used indistinctly in analyzing either Dulles or Tampa. However, Saarinen’s role as a “systems 
builder” in the case of Dulles makes Hughes’s model more compelling and clear; on the contrary, the 
existence of multiple actors in the case of Tampa suggests that technological frames could help out in 
bringing those actors’ interests to the surface. 
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In the present day we often transit through the boundary’s limits without 
realizing it; however, its psychological dimension is indeed present in any airport. 
This condition has complicated the identification of the landside–airside boundary and 
the challenge to trace it back into the past even more so. But just a glimpse at the first 
years of aviation may evidence a radical departure from our tactile relationship with 
airplanes towards our present physical divorce. This condition clearly suggests the 
existence of a story that has not yet been told. Our right to enjoy the world of aircraft 
has been strangely denied, but maybe in the shadows of the war against terrorism this 
is not so unexpected. However, back in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
lack of a boundary between the landside and the airside captured the romantic days 
when an “airminded” public enjoyed visits to airfields just for mere entertainment, 
although the portrait of this remarkable moment in time may suggest the first clues in 
the understanding of a growing divide between the airside and landside. Sadly, in our 
days the airport terminal is a sort of Bentham’s Panopticon,5 where surveillance and 
tension are omnipresent, passengers are treated as potential criminals, and people are 
not allowed to make jokes or laugh. A century ago, however, airports were something 
radically different, and that is where we now turn the page. 
 
                                                
5 I am referring to Jeremy Bentham’s prison model “the Panopticon,” where prisoners could never know 
when they were being surveilled. Foucault described the implications as a crucial instrument of mental 
discipline in his classic Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975).  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
“The Romantic Borderline”— 
From Fences to the Skywalk: Landside–Airside Space in an Early American 
Airport: New York LaGuardia Terminal, 1933–1939 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Two-level split at LaGuardia Airport, separating for the first time 
departures and arrivals. See also the interesting inter-modality scheme towards the 
street. Non-credited photograph. Travelfreak (1939) “LaGuardia Airport celebrates 73 
years.” http://www.travelfreak.com/2012/12/03/nycs-laguardia-airport-celebrates-73-
years/ 
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When the word “airport” was first used in 1919, there was no established 
body of knowledge or technological practices associated with airplane landing 
fields, no experts who claimed this work as their own, no “normal technology” 
as historian Edward Constant would put it. 
—Deborah G. Douglas, “Spectacle of System: Making of the Modern Airport,” 
unpublished paper presented at Society for the History of Technology 
Conference in Tacoma, WA, October 2010, p. 1.  
I. Introduction 
Only after the Second World War were airports laid out the way they are now. 
However, between 1937 and 1944 a small number of projects helped to redefine our 
historical relationship with planes and with the fascinating world of aviation in 
general. Among these examples, at least two stand out: the 1937 Paris Le Bourget 
Airport’s terminal expansion and the brand-new 1939 New York Municipal Airport, 
also called North Beach and years later better known as LaGuardia Airport (see Figure 
1.1). The French expansion was clearly a sound success and rapidly became a 
paradigm for how to grow existing buildings. Its architect, George Labro, imagined his 
building as a long pier alongside which aircraft might be comfortably parked. 
However, in terms of dealing with the landside–airside boundary, it retained the 
concept of the classic airport of the interwar years. 
In contrast, New York’s LaGuardia represented a radical departure from its 
contemporaries. Just as Moncure Robinson transferred back to England the first 
steeped railway1 in 1867 (Stapleton, 1987), Americans sent back a new airport scheme 
to Europe and the rest of the world. LaGuardia distinguished itself from the rest, 
perhaps because it was the first of its kind and literally the first modern airport in 
America. Unanimously, its contemporaries considered it to be an exemplary technical 
                                                
1 A steeped railway is an American innovation that literally tilts a railway track over an inclined plane.  
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innovation in airport functionality (airport planning did not yet exist), although its 
architectural aesthetics was always strongly criticized. As I suggest in this chapter, 
some specific features of this airport’s layout captured, for the first time, the growing 
conflict between humans and machines, the irrevocable breaking-off of spectators 
from airplanes, an innovative layout that remained as a silent witness of an era, until 
the terminals were finally demolished in 1960 (Arend, 1979, p. 78). At LaGuardia two 
innovations were evident: first, thanks to the spectacular Skywalk, visitors were split 
from passengers at the apron; and second, for the first time ever, inbound and 
outbound passengers were separated on two levels. This very American solution came 
from the hand of the airport designer, the distinguished architect of the rich and 
famous, William Delano, who had great expertise in designing beautiful mansions and 
social clubs. 
Delano privileged the need for an efficient way to drop off and pick up 
passengers with great comfort. Thus he conceived the fancy idea of attaching an ample 
double-deck motor lobby, which he would call later the arrivals and departures 
curbside. Nonetheless, LaGuardia’s breakthrough is only visible as a reaction against 
the early airport of the first third of the century. So why did airport terminals became 
necessary, and why did they become congested so quickly? 
II. Pilots Are Gods Descending from Heaven 
Public perception of aviation during the first four decades of the twentieth century was 
diametrically opposed to our present views. In the earliest days, flying machines were 
an instant technological sensation. In this vein, Marcel Proust wrote in his In Search of 
Lost Time, 
I was as moved as a Greek would be who saw for the first time a semi-god . . . 
The aviator seemed to hesitate in choosing his way; I felt there lay open before 
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him—before me, if habit had not held me prisoner—all the routes of space, of 
life; he flew away, glided for a few instants above the sea, then brusquely 
making his decision, seeming to surrender to an attraction the opposite of that 
of gravity, as if returning to his homeland, with a light movement of his golden 
wings, he ascended straight up toward the sky. (Proust, 1954, p. 1029) 
Proust’s awe of the supra human character of the pilot poetically transforms into 
clairvoyance and reverence. 
The unparalleled idea of navigating across the skies gave these men and 
women a mythical and almost ethereal proportion; the high risk involved before 
aviation became a stable system made spectators praise them as the bravest of people. 
The chronicles of war combat, acrobats, and unimaginable explorations gave them the 
status of heroes. The myth of the winged men forged a culture of reverence and 
unlimited veneration that even reached a metaphysical level. The machine was a 
means of reaching those “higher and deeper goals” that Nietzsche had placed above 
the Darwinian struggle for existence as a motive for human life and effort (Wohl, 
2005, pp. 277–278). Yet the dialogue between spectators and airplanes represents only 
the temporary celebration of the sublime. For Nye, 
the technological sublime does not endorse human limitations; rather it 
manifests a split between those who understand and control machines and 
those who do not. In Kant’s theory of the natural sublime every human being’s 
imagination falters before the immensity of the absolutely great. In contrast, 
sublimation based on mechanical improvements is made possible by the 
superior imagination of an engineer or a technician who creates an object that 
overwhelms the imagination of the ordinary men. (1994, p. 60) 
Controlling aircraft was not an easy task. The flying machines were always 
accompanied by the bravery of piloting, and therefore strongly related to the implicit 
dangers of injury or death. In most cases fame was inversely proportional to the 
masculinity of the accomplishment. In fact, most expeditions and trips were 
encouraged by public challenges and financed with juicy rewards offered only to the 
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most intrepid. This became a common way to advertise, for example, when a New 
York restaurant sponsored the famous transatlantic crossing challenge in the 1910s. 
During the first decades of the century, airplanes had a certain meaning for 
people. The flying machines elevated the imagination and awakened higher ideals for 
a better world. In this regard, beyond being considered as mere equipment, they 
represented a binomial relationship between “men and machines.”2 The plane and the 
pilot were inseparable parts of an equation; they signified the bridging into a new era 
of unlimited progress. Spectators idolized the object, using their five senses to 
appropriate some of its essence.3 
It became common to see people staring at the sky in search of an aircraft or 
desperately trying to touch airplanes when they had landed or were parked at an 
airfield. The classic example is the massive reception of Charles Lindbergh at the 
Paris Le Bourget Airfield after his Atlantic crossing in 1927. Hundreds of thousands 
of people gathered at the apron, jumping at the plane while it was still in motion, eager 
to tear off a souvenir from the plane or the pilot himself. Before a tragedy could occur, 
the guards miraculously rescued Lindbergh (Wohl, 2005, p. 12). Throughout time 
people’s love affair with aviation became, not surprisingly, a continuum. The worship 
of pilots as brave heroes started in tandem with the diffusion of aviation and continued 
up until the Second World War. Airfields were transformed into airports, but people 
still flocked to view the planes; the early dreams of a better world driven by the new 
possibility of flying did not stop but grew stronger up until the days of the 1939 
                                                
2 Hence they experienced flight vicariously through forms of mass culture: bestselling books, 
newspapers, popular magazines, comic strips, radio, and, above all, motion pictures. Aviators, like 
sports figures and actors, became celebrities, and subsequently the early history of aviation must be 
understood within the framework of the rise of a certain type of mass culture (Wohl, 2005, pp. 4–6). 
3 In terms of technological meaning and my own interpretation of Heidegger’s “The Question 
Concerning Technology,” the man-machine reveals to the audience the supra human, just as the 
miracle does to the devoted. 
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World’s Fair in New York City and the renewed dreams of “Futurama.” At the fair, 
perhaps the most popular exhibition was GM’s pavilion, designed by Norman Bel 
Geddes. Ten million people, an average of twenty-eight thousand daily, took the 
“magic, Aladdin-like” (Gordon, 2004, p. 116) ride that simulated an air trip across the 
United States in the year 1960 (a ride into the future, of course!). 
“Futurama was at that time the largest animated model ever made. After a long 
wait that sometimes extended to two hours as they made their way along serpentine 
ramps on the outside of the building, spectators were seated in luxurious six-feet-high 
armchairs contained within compartments that held two people. They were then 
moved along a conveyer of over a third of a mile through different levels of the 
building that gave the illusion of flying over the land and cityscapes of the future at 
low altitude” (Wohl, 2005, p. 295). “At various points across the countryside, Geddes 
placed dirigible stations and small, regional airports that were connected to cross-
country train lines. In the middle of the continent was a circular airport with three 
giant elevators that carried airplanes down to subterranean hangars. The Futurama ride 
ended at a city of glass towers and a giant airport three miles in diameter. ‘Its entire 
area is paved,’ said the narrator’s voice, making it possible for planes to land or take 
off in any direction and in large numbers” (Gordon, 2004, p. 116). The door that 
aviation was opening became a great source of inspiration and debate for many 
thinkers of the epoch. Visionary projects by planners and architects such as Le 
Corbusier, Antonio Sant’Elia, and Tony Garnier, and several airport competitions such 
as the one sponsored in 1929 by Lehigh Portland Cement, urged the development of 
the airport’s integration with the city (Brodherson, 1996, p. 68). “The airplane, in Le 
Corbusier’s mind, represented clearness of function and the daring required to break 
with the past. New machines, new men. They [the aviators] are filled with enthusiasm, 
the pleasures of daring, of breaking with current stupidities . . . In aviation everything 
	  27 
is scrapped in a year. Le Corbusier accompanied bold statements like these with an 
ambitious program for rebuilding many of the world’s major cities” (Wohl, 2005, pp. 
294–301). In his radical view, Le Corbusier envisioned great urban centers that were 
openly subordinated to vehicles, almost thought entirely for them, and, most 
particularly, for the aircraft. His designs relied so much on the new technologies that it 
made them look like scenes of science fiction; hence most of the projects remained 
unbuilt and were often seen as unbounded and delirious.  
As seen in competition schemes and panels, the proposals ranged from utopian 
floating airports in front of Manhattan or sets of skyscrapers linked at the top with 
aerodrome-like runways to the more grounded but still eccentric proposals of 
incredibly long buildings equipped with runways on the top floor. Others were slightly 
more pragmatic, with monumental roundabouts for aircraft takeoffs and landings in 
any direction or “drive-in”-like arrangements. In a few cases the landside–airside 
boundary was addressed and designers envisioned the first facilities with arrival and 
departure differentiation in levels. However, this innovation remained on paper until 
the construction of LaGuardia. For a number of reasons, “even the least ambitious of 
these structural and architectural proposals to meet the airport needs of the metropolis, 
was never realized. Too many obstacles stood between vision and reality. For one 
thing, even in 1930 urban dwellers were sensitive to the noise of aircraft and would 
have protested mightily were such landing facilities ever built in their vicinity. That 
they did not reflect economics was a second serious problem” (Corn, 1983, p. 105).  
At the birth of commercial aviation, pilots and aircraft were considered an 
indivisible entity. Particularly in mass media, the echoes of this link resounded up 
until the 1950s. In an implicit manner, this relationship was established on the premise 
of having no boundaries between men and machine. Our “affair” with aviation was an 
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open contract with endless possibilities, and a good part of the public had faith in the 
platform of the future and relied on its future developments. 
III. The Fence 
If “wherever an airplane takes off or lands, there is an airfield,” what is an airfield? 
(Douglas, 1995, p. 55). During the first decades of the century, landing fields were 
developed on grassed parcels or hardened runways equipped with simple buildings 
and maybe a few wooden or iron hangars. These flat strips of land were usually found 
on the fringes of urban areas or in the countryside and, according to Clack (1998), 
often were “laid out in the form of a Wind Rose” (p. 3). Airfields “handled only a few 
small planes each day. Airline companies had their headquarters downtown, where the 
few passengers who traveled by air assembled for their journey. They were taken to 
the airfields by a special car. They walked across wet grass to reach their plane, shook 
hands with the pilot, then as air travelers-became heroes of a new age of mankind” 
(Chadeau, 1995, p. 17).  
As we see in this quotation, it was clear that no boundary separated passengers 
or visitors from aircraft. This intimate relationship materialized in the concept of 
“aerodromes,” where planes performed acrobatics for spectators. Like horse races in 
hippodromes, air races were organized and several airfields were transformed into 
aerodromes equipped with platforms and fancy restaurants for the upper class. In 
tracing the origins of airports, Voigt (1996) has suggested that the “architectural 
language was rooted in the world of sports and racing, with airplane hangars modest 
wooden buildings replacing the racing stables. The terms aerodrome and airdrome, 
used early on in the history of airports, owe their creation to their relationship with 
hippodrome and its more recent variant, autodrome (coined about 1900)” (p. 28). 
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Nonetheless, the democratic spirit prevailed, and the general public remained welcome 
to draw closer to the aircraft. These policies speak of the existence of an unwritten 
“right to access airplanes” that made aviation available to many, at least as a spectacle. 
Thanks to this way of thinking, families visited airfields on weekends not merely to be 
entertained, but to be awe-inspired. I think these facts are particularly interesting to an 
understanding of why aviation became so popular, although airfields became the 
favorite place to go, mainly for white people. 
 
Figure 1.2. An example of the early landside–airside boundary. Notice how the 
different areas for spectators and vehicles are separated with railings. Non-credited 
photograph, “View of the active flight line at Roosevelt Field,” reproduced from Long 
Island Airports, by J. Stoff, 1935, Charleston, SC: Arcadia, p. 104. 
Photographs of the time capture the earliest version of the landside–airside 
boundary. Just as in hippodromes, a fence divided planes and their airfield from cars 
and their parking areas. The haphazard flow of vehicles at the apron or even at the 
runway became a growing danger. For the sake of safety, two types of fences were 
typically installed. The first was usually a wire mesh fence separating automobiles, as 
parking areas were in full proximity to the apron. The second was a chain fence, 
clearly less formal, which prevented the invasion of the apron by large crowds during 
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special events. Interestingly, some of these images also show special access doors and 
download areas for vehicles transporting luggage and food; these sections were also 
demarcated by railings, as in the case of Roosevelt Field in Long Island, NY, in 1928 
(see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.3. Another example of the early landside–airside boundary. Spectators are 
separated and contained in fenced corrals. N/A. Photograph of East Boston Airport, 
reproduced from The American Airport, by G. Szurovy, 1930, USA: MBI, p. 61. 
In a 1930s photograph of East Boston Airport (see Figure 1.3), people crowd 
the apron but are contained by iron fences forming corrals. Access is limited through a 
number of buildings, and only passengers, aviators, and service people are next to the 
aircrafts. However, some planes are parked within the corrals, and people are 
inspecting them closely or even touching them. But would airplanes and airfields ever 
be part of our everyday lives? As Corn (1983) commented, “Of all the predictions 
Americans made about the airplane, most of them expressed that sooner or later 
everybody would fly. Indeed, the expectation that democracy would prevail in the sky 
and that flying would become as common as riding or even walking was the 
cornerstone of the winged-gospel. Without universal flight, prophets could not 
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imagine a transformed society. In the coming air age, therefore, people would take to 
the air, it was predicted, not merely as a means of travel but for their health, for 
recreation, and even to perform their jobs” (p. 32). 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, the writer and radical theorist of the turn-of-the-
century women’s movement, even posited the emergence of an “aerial” person. In an 
article in Harper’s titled “When We Fly” (Perkins, 1907, p. 1664), she predicted that 
the new type would possess a wholly different value system. Unlike inferior “earthy” 
man, the new “aerial” man “cannot think of himself further as a worm of the dust, but 
[only] as butterfly, psyche, the risen soul.” The new attitude would bring about human 
“intercourse on a new plane,” she predicted buoyantly. For nearly half a century 
preceding the Popular Mechanics article cited by Corn, “millions of Americans 
expected to own a flying machine in the near future. Like most Americans who gazed 
into their crystal balls to glimpse the future air age, these prophets were not excited 
just because people would fly tomorrow. It was rather the way of life that flying would 
make possible that sent them into rapture. Instead of ‘rushing like moles’ into dark 
subways and breathing ‘foul subterranean air,’ wrote a 1922 enthusiast, tomorrow’s 
sky commuter would escape the ‘push and struggle’ with the urban ‘masses’ and 
whisk swiftly and pleasurably though the clean, clear air alone or with a few friends. 
Inevitably, prophets envisioned the coming aerial lifestyle as a rural one. The airplane 
‘would create countryside,’ just as the automobile had created the suburb. As the 
comparison to suburb suggested, air-car prophets envisioned the further spread of 
commuting. The future would see thousands of city workers air day in ‘rising like 
homing birds’ and flying off ‘to cool mountain retreats’” (Corn, 1983, p. 91). Aircraft 
would become the means not only of linking rural residences and the urban workplace 
but also of shopping, making social calls, and taking vacations. Rather than once-a-
year outings to favorite lakeside or mountain retreats, waxed an advertisement during 
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the Second World War, the “family car of the air” would facilitate “vacations every 
week end” and “magic trips to everywhere” (Corn, 1983, pp. 91–92). 
Hence, in the case of the relationship between people and aviation, the 
diffusion of the innovation spread across the country and helped to spread the idea that 
airplanes would have the same reach automobiles did, and therefore the dream of 
having an airplane in every house would become a reality. In that sense both urban 
and rural societies would finally be modernized. These ideas were clearly based on the 
widespread assumption that “autonomous technological forces drive social change” 
and in this regard are quite similar to the culture of the automobile. The dream of a 
motorized age was then transforming into a dream of an air age. Kline and Pinch’s 
(1996) essay on the “social construction” of the automobile sheds light on how diverse 
social groups, especially in rural areas, became strong “agents” that literally helped to 
reshape these emerging technologies (p. 764). In the case of aviation the modernizing 
efforts on the home scale became futile in both city and rural environments for a 
simple technical reason: airplane technology required a runway of considerable length 
for takeoffs and landings. In this sense rural America had an advantage—the 
availability of space—but this condition resulted in a new paradox: aircraft were never 
mass produced for that same reason (runways) and therefore remained expensive and 
inaccessible. However, during the 1930s and with the birth of commercial aviation, the 
idea of building an airport for every town grew stronger. 
IV. The Romantic Borderline 
In this section my interest is in discussing the birth of an airport as a concept, the early 
stages in the formation of systems of airports, and how they were funded. These 
aspects are relevant to understanding the forces that shaped the modern airport. In this 
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regard I will comment on the identification of the agents of change, particularly on 
how the increasing demands of new aircraft technology would become critical aspects 
of the soft transition of the landside–airside divide. But in this sense the “idealized 
‘tomorrow’ never comes. The airport is at once a place, a system, a cultural artifact 
that brings us face-to-face with the advantages as well as the frustrations of 
modernity” (Gordon, 2004, pp. 4–5). 
It is commonly believed that the military played the leading role in the creation 
of the “modern” airport; new studies of the social history of technology, however, 
contradict this. Well-documented research shows that it was in fact the U.S. postal 
system, along with the rapid establishment of commercial aviation, that defined the 
future of airports in the early 1930s. However, “airfields had been built all over the 
world with military funds” (Higham, 1995, p. 21). In fact, just after the war, 
“commercial aviation—the transport of paying passengers in converted bombers, was 
born” (Berlin Tempelhof, 2000, p. 12), and with it the wide popularization of air 
travel. Many of the terms commonly used to describe airports have their origins in the 
iconology of maritime, rail, and racetrack facilities. Voigt (1996) has written that 
“aircrafts derived from the iconology of sailing, which had shaped the idea of manned 
flight as early as the seventeenth century, when a writer such as Francesco Lana di 
Terzi dreamed up imaginary airships, in which bold aeronauts sailed across the sea of 
air” (p. 27). In a relatively short period the literature reflects the use of 
interchangeable terms; landing fields or airfields became aerodromes and later air-
ports; even the distinct term air-terminals appeared. Interestingly, the military did 
play a critical role in this differentiation. Air Service drew a “distinction between 
simple landing fields and what they called airdromes” (Bednarek, 2001, pp. 17, 19, 
73). There is no clear indicator in the literature, but one could logically assume that the 
Air Service favored that word as a result of its wartime experience in Europe, where it 
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was one of many terms used to describe aviation facilities. Surprisingly, relevant 
figures like Samuel Langley, a member of the Smithsonian and a real pioneer of 
American aviation, used to call them aerodromes. 
But not everyone agreed on the terminologies. For B. Russell Shaw, 
interchangeable names were often assigned incorrectly: “A landing field was an area 
designed to, or simply large and flat-enough to allow the arrival and departure of 
airplanes. An airdrome was a more fully developed facility including hangars and 
refueling equipment in addition to an adequate landing area” (Bednarek, 2001, pp. 11, 
18, 19). In his opinion, a landing field was “a tract of land comprising less than 100 
acres, level but without accommodations except small hangars, gasoline servicing 
facilities, telephones, pilots’ quarters, rest rooms and a passenger station” (Bednarek, 
2001, p. 73). According to Shaw, an airport also provided “night lighting, first aid, 
maintenance equipment, fire fighting apparatus” and other equipment. An air terminal 
was a facility that had the highest quality airport equipment for established airlines. In 
fact, “it would match in quality and comfort the best railroad terminal facilities in the 
nation’s largest cities” (Bednarek, 2001, p. 73). 
By the end of the interwar period an airport turned into a site with multiple 
acting and interacting technological subsystems. But it was not until two decades after 
the Second World War “that both the facility we have come to know as an ‘airport’ 
and a national ‘system of airports’ was developed” (Douglas, 1995, p. 55). With the 
exception of Deborah Douglas and a few other authors, airports have not been studied 
as large technological systems. Douglas (1995) suggests that in addition to Thomas 
Hughes’s classic model, Chandlers’s modern industrial enterprise model should be 
incorporated and viewed as complementary. Airports are technological devices just as 
aircraft are, although on a different scale. In addition, they are complex systems 
themselves, and when they interact with other facilities of their kind, form networks of 
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airports. Historian of science Rachel Laudan maintains that “the distinction between 
devices and systems, while useful for analysis, is to some degree arbitrary; a complex 
technology can be often regarded as a device” (quoted in Vincenti, 1976, p. 201). 
When airports became regulated by the CAA, they were still notably disarticulated in 
between. Following Hughes’s (1983, pp. 6–17) technological systems model, in terms 
of regulation, financing, and engineering problem-solving, airports seem to be still a 
bit far from constituting systems. 
During the 1920s and early 1930s the government created a number of 
commissions that gradually issued general regulations for airport construction. In 
addition, the Air Service pioneered the promotion of the establishment of municipal 
landing fields and also offered cities “advice on where fields should be located, their 
size and shape, the character of the ground, the approaches, markings, and 
accommodation” (Bednarek, 2001, p. 34). In the name of safety these federal 
commissions started regulating planning issues in order to give uniformity to the 
process of airport construction. Among these initiatives, none was as influential as the 
point system used by the Secretary of Commerce’s Air Branch. Airports would range 
from A to D, from the best equipped to the most basic. Counties across the country felt 
the need to modernize and build their own airports (to increase commerce, perhaps), 
although resources were limited.4 In this regard, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s arrival as 
president sped up the allocation of federal funds for airport development. According to 
Corn, President Roosevelt “understood the importance of aviation as being a practical 
as well as symbolic necessity in the nation’s recovery. He established the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA), and among its expenditures were $11.5 million for airport 
construction. Federal support increased further in 1935 when the Work Projects 
                                                
4 Paraphrasing Bednarek (2001, p. 40). 
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Administration (WPA5) came into being and Division of Airways and Airports was 
established under the WPA’s chief engineer” (Gordon, 2004, p. 98). (Roosevelt’s 
more intimate environment was highly influential in drawing his interest towards 
aviation.)6 
The 1930s also saw the introduction of an important new airplane and a change 
in the rules of the airmail game. In 1933 the Douglas Aircraft Company developed the 
DC-1 as competition for the newly introduced Boeing 247 (Bednarek, 2001, p. 98). As 
suggested before, the new concept of airport is clearly based on the increasing 
complexity of its functions. The understanding of airports as systems and also as part 
of larger systems increased the interest in standardization of features and routines. 
The major concerns in this regard were to improve safety, to maximize efficiency 
(technical), and to speed up processes (commercial). In this section, I attempt to 
answer this question in terms of technological innovation: Did new airplanes really 
demand new airfields? For Bednarek new aircraft played a critical role in the ways 
airmail was organized. According to the author of American Airports, “the 
introduction of an important new airplane and a change in the rules of the airmail 
game marked a milestone in technological advancement. In 1933 the Douglas Aircraft 
Company developed the DC-1 as competition for the newly introduced Boeing 247” 
(Bednarek, 2001, pp. 98). The open competition between the two models sparked off 
the rapid development of aviation technology. As planes became larger and faster new 
technological demands came up.  
                                                
5 According to Bednarek (2001), “help first came in the form of federal work relief programs. Federal 
aid thus provided airport with manpower but little in the way of materials or the latest equipment. 
Critics charged that mandating a link between airport aid and work relief limited the value of the 
program” (p. 98). 
6 According to Corn (1983), Mrs. Roosevelt showed an unbounded enthusiasm for aviation that fell in 
the “airmindedness” of the epoch (p. 57). 
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The U.S. airmail company system was by far the largest user of air services in 
the country. Only one year after the launch of the DC-1, according to Bednarek, 
Postmaster General James Farley convened a meeting for the newly reorganized 
airlines, and the bidding for routes began anew. With new contracts and new types of 
aircraft, airport technology also underwent a period of innovation and development. A 
“dramatic increase in size and range of landplanes won the day” (Higham, 1995, p. 
21). In 1934 the DC-3 was at least twice as heavy as the majority of its competitors. 
Heavier aircraft required longer runways with a more stable surface than sod or 
cinders. The growth of passenger traffic (from 500,000 in 1933 to 1.2 million in 1938) 
put enormous pressures on existing terminal facilities. Consequently, an increased 
number of passengers required more efficient transfers between air and ground 
transport. New airports required all operations to be scaled up to accommodate the 
new demands of commercial air transport. The fact that aircraft innovation produced 
increased technical ramifications was a consequence of the growth of aviation as a 
system. (It is important to remember that during these years, there were no hubs, and 
airlines have monopolized certain routes.) 
Now the romantic borderline was in danger. As aircraft became more 
sophisticated, the airport devices became a technology of their own. The simplicity of 
the aerodrome’s fence was under evident pressure when the rise of the new airport 
technology “now necessitated careful studies of traffic circulation and ground 
movement of aircraft” (Bednarek, 2001, pp. 68). New designs were proposed that 
featured parallel hard-surfaced runways allowing simultaneous takeoff and landing 
operations. Zoning laws became much stricter as airport managers became 
increasingly vigilant of any obstructions. 
The premonition of a gloomy future was embedded in a simple, technological 
maxim: “The heavier the aircraft, the longer the runway,” and this idea affected 
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assumptions about airport size and location. “Planners argued that additional land 
should be purchased and held in reserve” (Douglas, 1995, pp. 69). Engineers took this 
relationship too seriously; thus, airports first responded to aircraft innovation. They 
responded to these requirements, and in doing so, they started to break the implicit 
pact between people and their aircrafts; the days of the flying-man-machine were 
numbered. 
Just a few years ago, Robert van der Linden7 brought to light an alternate 
explanation for the conventional historiography of early aviation and airport 
transformations in the decade of the 1930s. Traditionally, historians of aviation have 
credited the efforts of the FDR Administration with “bring[ing] order to chaos” thanks 
to the establishment of a number of commissions, agencies, and regulatory bodies at 
the federal level. Although van der Linden (2002) credits this fact in part, he builds a 
counter-argument (pp. xi–xii). He regards Herbert Hoover as a pioneer in promoting 
the aviation industry, thanks to the establishment of the economic incentives of 
airmail’s subcontracting. He focuses especially on General Postmaster W. Fogle 
Brown’s role as the instigator behind the creation of a complex network of air routes 
and his business instinct to promote the newborn aviation companies. For others (e.g., 
Gordon, 2004, p. 28), Hoover’s legacy for Roosevelt consisted of a number of 
unregulated monopolies such as the same U.S. airmail subcontractors. This had a high 
cost for President Roosevelt, as history will later tell. A new generation had made 
fortunes from monopolizing aviation after the war, with great thanks to the unabashed 
favoritism of the Postmaster General. For example, the Navy pilot (Urwin, 2002, p. 
27) and Yale graduate Juan Trippe8 was only twenty-six years old when he assumed 
                                                
7 Robert van der Linden is the curator of Air Transportation at the Smithsonian Institution’s National 
Air and Space Museum.  
8 As I will explain in the next section, Mr. Trippe plays an interesting role in this study. 
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control of Pan American Airways in 1925 and confessed to his friends his aspiration to 
become the JP Morgan of aviation (Gordon, 2004, p. 30). 
The strong presence of the postal service is also evident in the imagery of the 
time. I have been particularly interested in observing historical photographs and airline 
promotional posters. For example, United Airways publicized its technological 
vanguard with a striking photo of a 247 Boeing flying over a caravan of horse-pulled 
carts on the prairie. Its official purpose was to show the increased speed in mail 
delivery, but its underlying meaning was clearly to show the divide between two new 
worlds: the aerial and the terrestrial, the wealthy and the poor, the modern and the 
obsolete. In other plates we can see passengers board aircrafts labeled “US Mail 
Express,” or 1930s tickets and menus printed on postal paper and envelopes (including 
the characteristic blue-red rivet along the edge) (Garvey & Fisher, 2002, pp. 194, 40, 
35). In addition, poster iconography was incredibly rich and complex. Several designs 
of those days show the strong link between the aerial mail and commercial aviation; 
some posters advertise air travel but at the same time include tables with estimated 
delivery times for correspondence (Szurovy, 2002, p. 66). 
Back in 1928 Hoover’s commission favored Newark’s airport as the best 
alternative for New York City, causing a constant flow of resources to solidify its 
infrastructure through the years. By 1933, Newark was well established as the 
transcontinental hub for U.S. airmail. Although the facilities were still rooted in the 
tradition of airfields, its solid profitability and the flow of federal funds kept it 
relatively up to date and meeting all post office requirements. As the trend of its 
operations forked into airmail and commercial airlines, Newark focused on promoting 
itself as the airport of New York City. Unexpectedly in November of 1933, as an 
airplane was approaching Newark airport a passenger loudly complained, arguing that 
his ticket clearly said arriving at New York and not New Jersey. Fearing a lawsuit, the 
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pilot continued the trip up to Bennett Field in Brooklyn. The passenger was no less 
than the Major himself, Fiorello LaGuardia. LaGuardia was called “Major” for two 
reasons: the first was because he was promoted from Captain to Major after his 
contributions as a U.S. pilot in combat on the Italian front in the First World War 
(Manners, 1976, p. 62); the second was because he was elected Mayor of New York 
City in 1933. His public “airmindedness,” or, in other words, his unbounded passion 
for aviation, overcame the fact that he was injured “after a crash in his first solo flight” 
(Bayor, 1993, p. 38). Even after suffering this accident he never stopped loving 
aircraft. 
One of LaGuardia’s greatest challenges was to bring New York into the air 
age: Aviation is established, he said. Nothing can stop it. The city needed an airport 
that was worthy of this importance. “And for this he had a loyal friend in the White 
House. ‘Our Mayor is the most appealing man I know,’ said President Roosevelt. ‘He 
comes to Washington and tells me a sad story. The tears run down my cheeks and the 
tears run down his cheeks and the first thing I know he’s wangled another $50 
million’” (Gordon, 2004, p. 107) (I shall remind the reader that a portrait of 
LaGuardia’s political ability is key in understanding what comes next, which is the 
realization of his dreams). LaGuardia offered to invest money in Bennett Field. But 
there was no prospect in imagining a remodeled airport without the support of the U.S. 
Post Mail service, and even with presidential support it was a mammoth task. Post 
officers declared the idea of moving to another airport economically unviable, and 
without them, air carriers would not move either. The battle was led by the Mayor 
himself and took place on different fronts between 1933 and 1935. The biggest debate 
was proximity to the city. In March 1936, Postmaster General James Farley 
announced his decision. Airmail operations, because of easier access to Manhattan and 
the costs involved in the transfer, would remain at Newark and would not result in 
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improved or less-expensive service. This was a big setback for the Mayor’s initiative 
(Bednarek, 2001, p. 109). 
LaGuardia’s next move resembles a classic chess strategy. When the 
challenger (New Jersey Airport Authority) was prematurely celebrating this defeat, the 
Mayor counterattacked by launching the construction of a full new airport in Queens. 
Thus, Newark’s turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. New Jersey politicians were 
scandalized. As technology was moving fast, they knew the disadvantages of 
competing against a state-of-the-art facility. It would clearly be a losing battle. New 
York City ensured an initial funding from the WPA, which eventually increased to 
more than $13 million, making it the first airport in the country to receive such a level 
of financing. Even without the support of Farley, LaGuardia managed to convince 
three of the four major airlines operating at Newark to move into the new airport. In 
1938, the Civil Aeronautics Authority held hearings and voted in favor of the requests 
by American Airlines, TWA, and United Air Lines to relocate to North Beach. One 
factor had key importance in this decision: the beach. Even against the advice of city 
planners, LaGuardia and his advisors chose the tiny airfield of North Beach9 and the 
contiguous garbage dump on Riker’s Island, simply because it had access to water. 
The airlines clearly foresaw the impact of operating Clipper airplanes10 (luxurious 
flying boats) in trans-oceanic routes from New York. 
From the conceptual stage, it was advertised as a landside–seaside facility. 
Strangely, this fact has been overlooked by airport historians and is rarely mentioned 
in the literature.11 Two other good reasons to convince not just the airlines but the 
                                                
9 Formerly a mini Coney Island, North Beach became a favorite private land field serving the wealthy 
Long Island sport flyers, called Glenn Curtiss Airfield.  
10 The name “clipper” was borrowed from fast sailing boats from the 19th century.  
11 Maybe with the exception of Geoffrey Arend’s brief comments on page 10 of his book LaGuardia 
1939–1979 in the collection Air World Greatest Airports (1979).  
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WPA itself were that North Beach was indeed twenty minutes closer to Manhattan 
than Newark and that reliable surveys showed that more than half the passengers at 
Newark originated in New York City. According to the Secretary of Commerce’s Air 
Branch policy,12 each municipality was entitled to have its own airport, so why not 
New York? 
V. Reinventing an Airport in 1937: “Country Club” or “Rail Station”? 
This section comments on two specific aspects: the first is devoted to having a better 
understanding of the designers, engineers, and experts behind LaGuardia’s airport; and 
the sources, the references, and the organization of work. The second aspect discusses 
the technological transfer from rail technology and rail stations. Both of these aspects 
form the basis for understanding the final design and materialization of New York’s 
Municipal Airport and what I later call “the soft transition” between the landside and 
the airside. 
After presidential approval, LaGuardia vowed that the new airport would be 
ready for use for the upcoming World’s Fair of 1939. Planning a modern airport 
without knowing exactly what that meant was already a serious challenge, along with 
such a close deadline. Although it was a joint effort of the municipal and federal 
levels, the airport planning fell on the shoulders of the WPA. Perhaps LaGuardia’s 
promise “to bring New York’s crumbling infrastructure up-to-date to build new 
highways, bridges and parks” (WPA, July 1, 1939. p. 1) made him surround himself 
with the finest of military engineers. And certainly Lieutenant Colonel Brehon B. 
Somervell was one of them. The Works Projects Administrator was a prominent 
                                                
12 Paraphrasing. Air Branch policy is fully discussed on page 46 of Bednarek’s America’s Airports 
(2001). 
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soldier, a radical conservative,13 a West Point graduate, and a well-known 
businessman with proven political abilities.14 According to the requirement spatial 
program (New York Municipal Airport, 1938), two facilities were needed: a landplane 
terminal and a seaplane terminal. The landplane referred to the airport itself, and the 
seaplane to the maritime terminal for transatlantic clippers. (It is interesting to notice 
that great emphasis was always put on the airport as a terminal, as I will expand on 
later.) Surprisingly, Colonel Somervell established the division of work in not two but 
three large fronts. 
The first front was relative to what the WPA called the field or the field side, 
which covered the air functions such as the airport layout; the planning of runways, 
lightings, and signals; the hangars and all the related civil infrastructure projects such 
as the site infill and the sanitation of the garbage dump. In this regard Somervell 
declared that in “laying out the airport the best experience in the country in this branch 
of engineering was called upon” (WPA, July 1, 1939, p. 2). 
(In this quote I find revealing the fact that the WPA did not employ the word 
experts, as if the aeronautical consultants of the time did not have enough experience 
in laying out airports.) The design of the field was the task of the Bureau of Air 
Commerce, but contributions from the U.S. Army and engineers of the airlines were 
also credited. The construction plans, though, were drawn by the WPA Planning 
Department and overseen by engineers from Parsons, Klapp, Brinckerhoff, and 
Douglas, and a general from the U.S. Army. 
                                                
13 Colonel Brehon B. Somervell’s anticommunist feelings sent the “History of Aviation” mural in Floyd 
Bennett Field to the garbage, simply because several characters appeared to be “strangely un-American 
in expression and thick mustaches that made them look like Joseph Stalin” (Gordon, 2004, p. 99). 
14 Somervell later became a key military figure during the Second World War. He took part in the 
Manhattan Project, was a member of the Army Corps of Engineers, and has been credited as the author 
who conceived the idea of building the Pentagon.  
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The second front was referred to as the seaside, and included the planning of 
the docks and hangars corresponding to the seaplane “port.” For this purpose the 
cooperation of Jon McKenzie, Commissioner, and Joseph Meehan, Chief Engineer, 
from the Department of Docks was required. Additional engineering was necessary to 
design the system that hauled up the Clippers onto rail tracks, aided by dollies and 
electric winches. Both fronts were the charge of engineers and aviation specialists. 
 
Figure 1.4. Aerial view of LaGuardia Airport showing the “Landside” terminal in the 
background. Photo from Port Authority Archive, (1939), “LaGuardia Airport Airday 
Military Celebration.” Retrieved from http://www.portauthorityarchive.com/shop/ 
aviation/laguardia-airport-airday-military-celebration-1939-print 
The last front was called the landside and was the responsibility of the 
architectural firm Delano & Aldrich of New York (see Figure 1.4). This front included 
the design of the buildings, including the landplane terminal and the marine terminal, 
the road system, and the landscaped and parking areas. In addition, Alexander Crosett 
was in charge of the structural design, A. F. Brinckerhoff of the landscape, and Syska 
& Hennessy of the mechanical engineering. Somervell’s distribution of the work 
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scheme would be enormously influential in the future of airport design development 
(New York Municipal Airport, 1938, pp. 3, 4). The divide not only separated 
engineers and specialists from architects and planners but also, perhaps indirectly, split 
the needs of aircraft from the needs of passengers and visitors. The airport was not 
designed by one mastermind, but was a negotiated solution along the way. Fronts one 
and two were well integrated by the WPA, but different interests meant that front three 
began to act independently. 
The reasons for hiring Delano & Aldrich have not been made public, or at least 
not in the specialized literature of airports. Comments are usually a reiteration of the 
official version: Delano & Aldrich’s firm was contracted because they had six airports 
in their portfolio (five, according to other publications). I find this explanation rather 
shallow and not necessarily realistic, and for the purpose of this chapter this is a 
relevant matter. Hence, further investigations into Delano’s personal correspondence 
and the firm’s archives, as well as interconnections with LaGuardia’s archive and 
other links, allows a better understanding of this decision. William Delano was a 
wealthy son of a New York banker, Eugene Delano. 
Delano attended Yale College and later graduated as an architect from 
Columbia University. After graduating, he spent five years in Paris and received a 
diploma from the École des Beaux Arts. Like many of his contemporaries, Delano 
became a classicist. In 1927 he started a parallel political career as a consultant to the 
U.S. Treasury Department. Two years later, at President Hoover’s request, he became 
the architectural representative of the National Park Planning Commission, and held 
that position until 1946, when he resigned.15 During his career he became an important 
ally and mediator between France and the U.S. 
                                                
15 From the biographical notes on William Delano at the Archives of Yale University Library.  
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William Delano’s lifetime achievement as a “Beaux Arts” designer was 
notably rich and prolific, ranging from a large portfolio of exquisite residences 
(Cortissoz, 1924) and private clubs to the American embassy in Paris, the Military 
Academy at West Point, and Willard Straight Hall at Cornell University. His neo-
classical palazzos across the Rhode Island gold coast included clients such as the 
Rockefellers, the Vanderbilts, and the Mellons. However, none of these merits seemed 
to me to be significant enough to win him the airport commission, so further inquiry 
was necessary. Delano grew up surrounded by a very influential social circle. In his 
early youth, President Theodore Roosevelt described him as a guy with a “little 
mustache and genial smile,” as the Roosevelts and the Delanos were neighbors in 
Orange Mountain. His contact with power was ever present throughout his life 
(Pennoyer & Walker, 2003, p. 14). 
During Hoover’s Administration, William’s cousin Frederic Delano was a 
member of the Committee on the Regional Plan of New York and its Environments. 
The main task of the group was to study the airport needs for the New York City 
metropolitan area (Bednarek & Bednarek, 2003, p. 109). Besides being relatives, 
Frederic and William were good friends and used to spend vacations at the Delano 
Hotel in Miami.16 In addition, William’s close friendship with the acting Secretary of 
the Navy, Charles Edison (who warmly referred to him as “Billy”),17 won him 
numerous recommendations among politicians of the time. In those years, Delano 
received a major commission that linked him with Postmaster W. Fogle Brown and 
James Farley; it was nothing less than the enormous U.S. post mail headquarters in 
                                                
16 Letters between W. Delano and Fred Delano from 1937 to 1941 William Delano Collection. The 
Archives at Yale University Library. 
17 Letters between W. Delano and Lt. Charles Edison from 1938 to 1940 William Delano Collection. 
The Archives at Yale University Library. 
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Washington, DC. Considering the strong influence of the U.S. postal service in airport 
planning (particularly in the NY/NJ region), this professional bond becomes 
intriguing. 
In 1928 Juan Trippe, founder and chairman of Pan American Airways System, 
“needed to make a statement about his corporate aspirations” (Szurovy, 2003, p. 62). 
The new terminal building in Miami needed to meet the highest standards, as his 
airline was characterized as offering exotic destinations to the wealthy. Delano & 
Aldrich was the perfect choice: as Delano was a socialite himself (Eggebeen, 2007, p. 
119), his portfolio was well-regarded by the East Coast elites. Plates of the time show 
the elegant detailing of his work and the upscale crowd who used it. This was the first 
of four projects developed for Mr. Trippe (Gordon, 2004). They included the peculiar, 
country club–looking marine Terminal at Dinner Key, which was intended to connect 
to the Caribbean and South America. My guess is that Mr. Trippe was happily 
impressed with the elegant private clubs previously designed by the firm, and in those 
days the terminal was seen more as a clubhouse, just as private aviation was more a 
fancy sport than a part of the transportation industry. 
The accumulated experience of the firm working for Pan Am became a new 
element of consideration.18 Last on the list of possible factors weighed in selecting 
them as the office responsible for the project is Delano’s relationship to President 
Roosevelt. They were first cousins; William was eight years older than FDR. But both 
the President and Delano rejected the notion that the family relationship had anything 
to do with the assignment of the job. As we can see in his private correspondence, the 
architect was certainly a prominent figure in the social scene of the time, and all the 
                                                
18 Three more airport facilities were designed for Pan Am—Midway, Wake, and Guam Island—but 
these were just minor utilitarian buildings, prefabricated and exported from the U.S. (Pennoyer & 
Walker, 2003).  
	  48 
above facts speak to that. Nevertheless, it was said in the New York Times that Fiorello 
LaGuardia was favorably impressed with Delano’s work in Dinners Key Sea-base, and 
it is highly probable that this fact also influenced his judgment (Pennoyer & Walker, 
2003, p. 70). At Delano & Aldrich, Chester Holmes Aldrich, also a Yale and an ex–
Beaux Arts student, was in charge of the office management and organization. As the 
firm continued to grow in the 1920s they invited George A. Licht (Pennoyer & 
Walker, 2003, fn. 35) (owner of a small practice, Licht & Waterbury’s Sons)—a 
promising young architect—to join the firm. He was regarded as an outstanding 
student and designer, having among his remarkable personal achievements won the 
first prestigious Paris Prize in 1904, the gold medal in the Architectural League of 
America in 1907, and eleven medals during his stay at the École des Beaux Arts in 
Paris (“The architectural convention ends,” 1907). 
When the firm secured the airport commission, Delano associated with George 
A. Licht for the first time.19 In architectural practice it is common for large firms such 
as Delano & Aldrich to distribute the workload among their associates. These 
“associations” imply a higher degree of responsibility and therefore a higher level of 
creative recognition. Licht’s associate degree in the LaGuardia project cannot be 
overlooked, particularly given that he was a talented designer. I later comment on his 
role during the design process, in which he was a “strong presence,” according to his 
colleagues.20 
Delano was brought up in a world where frequent travel to Europe was 
considered common. His contact with the latest airports was evident (Licht’s as well), 
                                                
19 As shown in most of the project documentation, where he is credited as associate architect. Columbia 
doc. 
20 As stated in a recent interview. David Aldrich, a former alumnus, in Pennoyer and Walker (2003, fn. 
35).  
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particularly in his frequent trips to France. In 1936, LeBourget was just slightly 
different from what had welcomed Lindbergh a decade ago, a well-developed airfield. 
However, Paris aspired to have a modern airport,21 and for that purpose organized an 
architectural competition. The new complex was laid out as a long, single, flat-roofed, 
three-story building in the style set by the Weissenhoff modernists (Pommer, 1983) 
(severely austere modern mid-income complexes that were designed by famous 
architects of the time such as Mies van der Rohe, J. J. Oud, and Le Corbusier). In its 
austerity, with standardized windows and structural bays, it became a model of 
efficiency, but its most exciting feature was the huge visitor deck originated by the 
architectural gesture. As I have mentioned before, Paris’s LeBourget expansion 
opened in 1937 and became greatly influential. Nonetheless, the “flat roof” trend was 
present in earlier examples such as the Schiphol in Amsterdam, the Speke in 
Liverpool, and the visionary 1929 Leipzig Airport. Hans Wittwer’s masterpiece 
revolved around a futuristic glazed box of stepped viewing platforms, café terraces, 
and gardens, creating a soft transition to the apron (apron is a jargon term for 
platform). Clearly this remarkable example was misunderstood in its sophistication 
and complexity, because in 1936 it became a military facility and was then demolished 
after the war. 
In the soft transition between our affair with airports and our present 
segregation, several elements were transferred from train stations, rail technology, and 
even sailing. In this regard, Douglas (1995) commented that “the airplane itself was of 
limited range and capacity, so few imagined that air transport would ever mimic the 
scale and scope of the railroad. Besides, as the reasoning went, airplanes were 
different from trains. The image of the airplane was one of freedom of movement in 
                                                
21 Modern in terms of Le Corbusier’s idealism, in which planning is “subordinated” to the machine 
(Boyer, 2003, p. 95). 
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any direction and dimension” (pp. 78–79). At the rise of the “functionalist” 
architecture, planners, engineers, and designers “urged for the development of airports 
within existing ‘transportation matrices,’ the projects that were being realized 
provided familiar rather than radical solutions” (Voigt, 1996, p. 13). David 
Brodherson (1993) has explored at length the formation of the underlying concepts 
that allowed architects and designers to create the early archetypes before the Second 
World War. “Initially, designers drew upon forms established in rail transportation 
before they developed design and planning solutions particular to aviation” (Voigt, 
1996, p. 13). This criticism acknowledges that “classicist” architects remained rooted 
in the past, not just stylistically but technologically. Aviation was a tri-dimensional 
technology,22 as opposed to the bi-dimensionality of rail and automobile. 
Paradoxically, this condition would render impractical the expansion of personal 
aviation and the dream of a plane on top of every house. 
A few modernist architects complained that most airfield terminals of this 
period “projected the image of a suburban railway station.” For example, Glendale 
terminal in California was nicknamed Grand Central Terminal. Voigt (1996) wrote 
that  
airplane factories and hangars from this era often took their design cues from 
the rail-yard shed, and airplane interiors, such as that of the Boeing 80A from 
1928–31, imitated that of a Pullman railroad car. The latest aircraft were even 
put on display in railroad stations, in publicity stunts that were intended to 
entice more affluent and sophisticated travelers to this new means of 
transportation, especially as air travel was directly tied to an air-rail 
transcontinental service provided by Transcontinental Air Transport and the 
Pennsylvania and Santa Fe railroads. Passengers flew by day and traveled in 
railroad sleeping cars at night, on cross-country trips that lasted two days and 
                                                
22 Perhaps this is a topic for further study, but it is certainly fascinating to imagine the complexities and 
implications of aerial traffic in a Boolean space, versus the straightforwardness of rail or automobile 
traffic control on Cartesian planes—even in the case of subway systems. By the way, we are still using 
Cartesian coordinates for air traffic control, and that is why the 9/11 tragedy was technically possible. 
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two nights. This speaks of the gestation of early development of a new inter-
modal system of transportation, where the airplane covers the long distance 
and the rail the regional. (p. 13)23  
The early days of airport planning owe much to the previous experience and success 
of the rail terminal. Even in the interiors of their airliners, air carriers nonetheless 
often continued to pay homage to the luxurious sleeping compartments and lounges of 
streamlined railroad trains until well into the postwar period. In fact, rail industry 
providers were responsible for equipping aircrafts and terminals until the Second 
World War. Delicate wood finishes on the walls, ample coaches, and overhead nets or 
bins were installed; even luxurious light fixtures, dining booths, or equipped 
kitchenettes came from train equipment designers (Delius & Slaski, 2005). Moreover, 
as I discussed in an earlier paper, “emerging technologies pass through a period of 
adaptation until they finally become accepted in a more efficient configuration” 
(Marquez, 2007, p. 17). As written in a Scientific American article of the time, “the 
psychology of the first-class railroad terminal is one of inspiring confidence . . . this 
psychology would be even more desirable at the airport, where every first-time 
passenger is more or less nervous” (as quoted in Gordon, 2004. p. 43). At LaGuardia 
Airport, Delano and Licht were sensitive to these issues and imprinted some of their 
design elements from the architecture of rail. 
Because the firm’s previous experience was particularly focused on providing 
comfort to passengers and visitors, they remained faithful to the prevailing notion that 
the airport terminal was basically a new version of a rail station. In terminals for trains 
there is a conceptual/stylistic division between the loading platform and the terminus. 
The station building belongs to the realm of the city and its inhabitants; the loading 
platform belongs to the machine, the trains in this case. Delano intended to follow this 
                                                
23 Substituting for the transatlantic ship or the transcontinental rail routes. 
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same model: his landside architecture is consistent with the 19th-century architecture 
of rail. As the dedication program for the project explains to the opening-day guests: 
“As Union Station is to the railroads, so is NY Municipal Airport to aviation” (WPA, 
October 5, 1939). 
Last, in technological terms, Delano proved to have a long-term vision. As 
shown in his business correspondence of 1939, the architect agreed with the Office 
Central des Chemins de Fer Federaux in Berne, Switzerland, to specifically transfer 
the baggage technology employed to date in rail stations to his new airport in NYC. 
An interesting fragment of a letter sent from an executive of the Swiss consortium to 
its Berne headquarters says: 
Mr. W.A. Delano, cousin du President des Etats Unis, est probablement le plus 
eminent architecte de l’Amerique. Il vient d’achever l’aerodrome municipal de 
la ville de New York, et il m’a demande, dessiner l’un ces wagonnets 
electriques de nos gares suisses, destine au transport des bagages du lieu ou on 
les enregistre aux trains. (Pasquier, 1939)24 
Later, Mr. Pasquier drafted orders to adjust the existing electric trolley systems (used 
at the Swiss rail stations) and sent a proposal to the American architect as soon as 
possible. The system was successfully incorporated and used initially by TWA and 
later by other airlines.25 Surprisingly, this first transfer (adaptation) from rail 
engineering to airport engineering would trigger one of the most complex systems 
ever seen in civil construction: “the automatic baggage handling system” of the 
postwar period. 
                                                
24 Translation: “Mr. W.A. Delano, cousin of the President of the United States, is probably the foremost 
architect of America. He has achieved the municipal airport of the City of New York, and he has asked 
me to do a design like the electric wagons of our Swiss rail stations which transport the baggage from 
one place to another at the register to the trains . . .” 
25 As observed from a photographic detail of the baggage cart system in a TWA flight. C. Manley 
DeBevoise, Photographer, Humanities and Social Sciences Library / Irma and Paul Milstein Division of 
United States History, New York Public Library, 1939, Standard Reference: 1292-D4.  
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VI. The “Soft Transition” 
In this last section, I address the context surrounding architects, engineers, and 
politicians within the design and construction phases of LaGuardia; I also analyze 
some specific features of the airport layout that captured for the first time the growing 
conflict between humans and machines; in other words, structures that “imprinted” the 
irrevocable rupture between spectators and airplanes. I briefly describe and comment 
on the final project and the materialization of the soft transition, the implications of 
the establishment of the landside–airside boundary, and the rise of a rhetoric 
evidencing the shift towards a new technological culture in airport planning. As I 
described in the previous section, the WPA division of work became a decisive factor 
in the final configuration of the project. Moreover, the fixed deadline made public by 
Major LaGuardia added an enormous pressure to the project development. In fact, 
Colonel Somervell acknowledged that it was literally impossible to start bidding until 
the final construction drawing set (blueprints) was finished. Nonetheless, the strong 
relationship between Somervell and Delano grew even closer,26 thus facilitating the 
sorting-out of the delicate moment. Starting in 1937, according to a note in the original 
document set, “approximately one thousand drawings were made in the course of the 
following eighteen months, together with the accompanying specifications.” As I 
reviewed, all construction drawings were done by hand, drafted on Mylar paper. This 
was a painfully long process, as we may see in the original drawings (Construction 
drawing set of New York Municipal Airport and Seaport, 1939), because it demanded 
crowded draftsman workshops and exhausting reviews to verify the correspondence 
                                                
26 Evident in the active correspondence between W. Delano and Fred Delano from 1937 to 1941, 
available in the William Delano Collection, The Archives at Yale University Library. 
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between the parts and levels. In the office, a summoning by George Licht to his 
cubicle was famous for “striking terror into the draftsman heart.”27 
Although Delano & Aldrich never considered themselves a large office (maybe 
compared with the first corporate firms of the late 1940s), the firm’s records show that 
more than three hundred architects passed through its workshop (Pennoyer & Walker, 
2003, p. 15). According to the same WPA agency, the full set of documents “included 
all the complicated drawings for heating and air-conditioning, plumbing, lighting, and 
inter-communicating systems of telephone and pneumatic tubes. Since it would have 
required a year to work these out in final form, it was agreed with the WPA & Colonel 
Somervell, that the drawings should be supplied one after the other and as quickly as 
the necessary information could be gathered and put on paper. This called for close 
cooperation between the architects and the WPA Division of Operations” (WPA, 
1938, p. 4). I believe the rush to submit the plans could have played a positive role in 
the innovation, as short development projects usually receive less pressure from 
specialists and consultants. 
For the non-specialist, LaGuardia Airport sits in an odd location. It meets the 
farthest end between Flushing Bay and Bowery Bay in a plot of 550 acres along the 
Riker’s Island Channel. Three runways were aligned towards the water and formed a 
triangle; they linked to a curved apron made of reinforced concrete. Planes taxiing for 
takeoff or after landing enjoyed the amplitude of the platform. At the central axis there 
was the landside terminal, a three-story Art Deco building with a highly ornamented 
vestibule. At each side, service and office blocks were arranged symmetrically. 
The road system led automobiles through a number of wide parking bays up to 
a rotunda, where arrivals were at the lower level and departures at the main driveway 
                                                
27 Interview with a former employee of the firm (quoted in Pennoyer & Walker, 2003, fn. 35). 
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entrance. This system had never been employed before. On either side of the apron 
there were monumental maintenance and storage hangars. Uncharacteristically, the 
three building blocks were “connected” by a flat-roofed promenade that led passengers 
and supplies directly to the planes (for the first time ever!). Its roof served as an 
observation deck. Facing Bowery’s Bay, a second terminal served the seaplanes. This 
building was similar to the landside terminal, but its arrangement was circular and 
occupied only two levels (WPA, 1938, pp. 5–15). 
The general description of the Office of the Major program reads: 
access to the planes is from a covered platform of concrete construction, 1,500 
feet long and 200 feet wide, which runs along the edge of the loading apron 
tracing a long arc between the two groups of hangars and the administration 
building in the center. Planes will be brought up to a given gate of the platform 
and passengers can embark or disembark28 only a few feet from the gate. A 
public address system will announce arrivals and departures of planes. 
Stairways lead down from the concourse on the main floor to this platform. It 
is from this upper promenade that those seeing travelers off or waiting for 
incoming travelers will watch the field. The promenade is a point of vantage, 
open to the public, from which it is expected thousands of persons will view 
the varied activity of a great airport, with a perfect view of the field at close 
range and yet safely out of the way of the planes. Five thousand persons can be 
accommodated on this platform. (WPA, 1938, p. 10) 
It is remarkable that, above any other feature of the airport, the infrastructure for 
visitors was emphasized. I interpret this gesture as the product of LaGuardia’s 
demagogical spirit and sensitivity to pleasing the masses, especially in the rumble of 
social discontent after the Depression (Kennedy, 2005, ch. 8). Prior to New York’s 
LaGuardia no airport ever split user flows into separate levels, although there are some 
traceable historical references in the 1928–29 entries in the Lehigh and R.I.B.A (Royal 
Institute of British Architects) airport design competitions. Some boards “had included 
                                                
28 Terms imported from operations at maritime ports. Date from the 1582 French terms disembarquer 
and embarquer meaning to remove to shore from a ship, and load onto a ship (Merriam-Webster, 2006).  
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practical recommendations for more subtle systems of boarding passengers, 
arrangements that were supposed to untangle the confusion on the apron by creating 
two levels: by means of passenger tunnels that led directly to the waiting airplanes, or 
by means of bridges from which one descended to airplanes waiting in parallel 
formation” (Voigt, 1996, p. 45). But it is hard to assign authorship in this matter. 
The functional and technical consequences of splitting levels apart were totally 
unprecedented (see Figure 1.1). The firm needed a good aeronautical consultant. 
Delano hired L. L. Odell as the project’s aviation consultant (as Odell used to call 
himself). Captain Odell was an ex-pilot of the golden era, and Juan Trippe’s airport 
planner. He was also Pan Am’s Chief Airport Engineer and a key member of the 
organization; he was responsible for planning most of the company’s previous 
terminals, including the challenging remote projects at Midway, Wake, and Guam 
Islands. In a letter directed to Delano in October 1939, Odell subtly apologizes for a 
“little personal discussion,” but later changes his tone and shows gratitude for 
Delano’s public recognition of the “value of his contributions” to the project and 
accepts that as a “reward.” He also feels proud of his technical achievement and 
claims it will offer the most “efficient operation” of all the airports in the world. Odell 
changes tack again and acknowledges Delano’s “genius” for making the airport “a 
thing of beauty.” He also praises the architect’s ability to sort out the “practical and 
political compromises in happy fashion” in such a “short time that it sounds 
miraculous” (quoted in Urwin, 2002, p. 27). The letter has a slight undertone of 
technical condolence, as if the author of the aesthetic were not the author of the 
planning. Anyhow, it may be inferred that Odell was a very experienced specialist and 
that he may have contributed significantly to establishing the project layout, and more 
specifically to proposing the two major innovations of the design. In particular, if we 
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think of his recurrent participation in competitions and projects with innovative ideas, 
we may assume that he played a key role in this story. 
In 1936, the designers and the specialists decided to split flows into two 
different levels. The imperatives from the WPA (1938) were clear: to “expedite the 
arrival and departure of domestic airline passengers as much as possible.” Dividing 
incoming passengers at the apron and outgoing passengers into a higher level was the 
most reasonable thing to do. The logic behind this decision had to do with the 
increasing complexity of airport systems. In the days of airfields, only a few planes 
were being serviced or uploading or downloading passengers, so that the implications 
at buildings were minimal. Restaurants were able to provide food from downtown 
directly to the airplanes, and city hotels used to send baggage directly to the aircraft 
compartment, so that the only complexity, if any, was the large number of persons and 
vehicles visiting the facility. In 1936, LaGuardia declared that “more people reached 
NYC by air than by sea” (WPA, 1938, p. 1), so clearly the influx was already high. 
Aviation was a growing industry, and the difficulties of providing good service were 
growing exponentially; hence the relationship between rail stations and air terminals 
became a priority. How could they handle hundreds of bags at the same time? How 
could they serve good meals to dozens of passengers or make them wait comfortably? 
The idea of separating “functions” was characteristic of the ideas and writings 
of the influential Le Corbusier. The Swiss-French planner, architect, and artist stated 
that the ideal form to re-establish order in the city was to divide its functions and let 
humans flow among these mega “blocks” of housing, government, education, retail, 
and so on by employing the latest transport technologies such as the airplane, the 
automobile, and the train. In between there would be parks and monumental plazas. In 
this spirit, human actions were subordinated to the efficiency of the technological 
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system.29 In the case of New York Municipal Airport, the separation of flows was 
framed by the potential conflict of synchronizing dozens of operations simultaneously 
(WPA, October 5, 1939). The split would reduce human movements as fixed and 
predictable, in a Cartesian board composed of multiple vectors. The task of the 
designer was reduced to avoiding conflicts. 
Delano, Licht, and Odell decided to organize the terminal in this fashion; they 
assumed that because airports were independent of the city, most passengers would 
arrive by either automobile or bus. In this sense, the road system that privileged the 
automobile and incoming vehicles was ramped up at the outer side of the rotunda; 
departing vehicles flowed around the inner lane at ground level, so that no 
obstructions were possible. Therefore, the lower plan of the building held the baggage 
room, which curiously included a customs section for the first time. On the upper floor 
the main vestibule distributed passengers to the waiting areas and airline counters. The 
challenge was how to bring passengers down to the apron and then make them 
circulate in an orderly fashion toward their plane. In the case of LeBourget, the 
terminal building was an incredibly long building for the time. But there was no 
chance of following such a scheme, as the square footage available in NYC was much 
less than those plots available for European airports. The CAA (Civil Aeronautics 
Authority) and the WPA agreed on the need for docking twenty-one aircraft 
simultaneously. Therefore Delano, Licht, and Odell opted to design a loading platform 
“where aircraft parked on the apron and it extended approximately 750 feet at ground 
level from the center line of the terminal. At the outset this enabled airplanes to load 
simultaneously from a partially enclosed area” (Brodherson, 1996, pp. 77–78), as 
specified in the original drawing set. “From the air this long curving structure 
                                                
29 Le Corbusier’s scheme for a new city distribution is presented as early as 1922 in his Ville 
Contemporaine, but does not fully mature until the publication of the Ville Radieuse (1935).  
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resembled the feeler of a giant insect” (Gordon, 2004, p. 114) that would distribute 
departing passengers to the airplanes towards the terminal. “In general, enplaning 
passengers entered the second story of the terminal from the upper-level roadway 
through the terminal, and proceeded downstairs into the ground-level loading 
platforms. Deplaning passengers could board surface transportation after walking back 
to the terminal through the lower level, and out to waiting automobiles and taxis. 
Alternatively, passengers could walk a short distance across the loading platform from 
the airplane to waiting automobiles” (Brodherson, 1996, p. 78). 
The promenade was rapidly christened the Skywalk, and according to Gordon 
(2004) consisted of a “long boarding dock that extended from either side of the 
terminal[;] it was a revolutionary move in airport planning, a precursor to the pier 
extensions that would sprout from terminals after the war” (p. 114). It is important to 
note that it was not in the original spirit of the Skywalk to divide the apron and the 
landside activities of the complex. This happened after the opening of the building, 
when the south side of the skywalk was partially glazed. It was the product of 
increasing complexity in the cargo-loading operations. The logic behind this 
arrangement is that contrary to the rail station, where trains can be loaded and 
unloaded practically inside a building (or under a roof), airport terminals are severely 
constrained due to the necessary movements for parking planes. So with the exception 
of Tempelhof, it was simply too expensive to park aircraft indoors or at least under 
cover of under partial roofs or canopies. Thus when the demand increased, piers 
became necessary. The Skywalk established a new, two-level relationship with the 
terminal. In a bold move, Delano & Aldrich decided to split not just the pier but the 
entire complex. At the terminal, the building’s “two levels provided efficient 
circulation and helped to decrease bottlenecks in the flow. Incoming passengers did 
not need to pass through the terminal at all but could proceed directly through their 
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gate and out to the taxi stand or parking lot” (Gordon, 2004, p. 114). Essentially, the 
two-level scheme permitted a functional split between check-in activities (upper level) 
and the baggage claim (lower level); the innovative layout allowed for the very first 
time the physical separation of incoming and outgoing passengers and systems. I think 
that the two-level split also simplified the compromised available space for an external 
drop-off area; in a way, it avoided traffic congestion.30 Certainly the architects had in 
mind new ways of expediting flows: be it automobiles or buses, passengers, service 
vehicles and aircraft, and in doing so, they avoided traffic jams, passenger congestion, 
and thus an overcrowded ramp. It was a good justification for the project indeed.  
As I have presented so far, two new elements were introduced here: one has to 
do with functional configuration and was the separation of levels, between arriving 
and departing passengers. The second was an innovative two-level promenade, which 
allowed passengers to free-flow on the apron, and separated spectator flow on top (see 
Figure 1.5). In contrast to the fact that the functional two-level split had purely 
practical reasons and was mainly a reaction to technical demands, “the Skywalk was 
not conceived merely for functional purposes. Its curving promenade helped to make 
the airport feel more like a public place and not an exclusive club for the rich—an 
important point for a mayor who championed the rights of the common man. It was 
open to everyone. Turnstiles were installed, and visitors paid a dime to stand on the 
observation deck and watch planes arrive” (Gordon, 2004, p. 114). (The organizational 
split was the product of planning more efficiently. The Skywalk bowed more to socio-
political reasons than to technical ones.) 
                                                
30 From analyzing the original blueprints prepared by Delano & Aldrich. Construction drawing set of 
New York Municipal Airport and Seaport, (1939), Avery Drawings and Archives, Avery Library, 
Columbia University. 
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Figure 1.5. A view from the Skywalk platform looking towards the apron, showing 
how greatly popular the promenade was. Non-credited photograph. Travelfreak (1939) 
“LaGuardia Airport celebrates 73 years,” retrieved from http://www.travelfreak.com/ 
2012/12/03/nycs-laguardia-airport-celebrates-73-years/ 
New York Municipal Airport became one of the largest modern airports of its 
time; its unique “split” configuration responded to the new requirements of a new 
network of systems. Those were the postal service, aircraft maintenance, baggage, 
food, ticketing, fuel, lighting, traffic, automobiles, radio communications, electricity, 
HVAC, and customs control. LaGuardia Airport represents a sort of paradox. On the 
one hand, it was a small world of systems in itself, gaining in interconnectivity and in 
those terms an important example of technological change; but on the other it also 
encapsulated the end of an era. In the New York airport there is no violent rupture (as 
envisioned by many, such as Le Corbusier) but rather a soft transition. The 
observation promenade was an extraordinary object that successfully realized the 
negotiations between two opposing worlds. However, the days of the unbound dream 
of aviation were fading out, as Antoine de Saint-Exupéry captured precisely in 1939: 
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“progress in aviation technology would inevitably undermine and destroy the moral 
universe of La Ligne,31 once flying is no longer dangerous, the soul of La Ligne will 
be dead” (Wohl, 2005, p. 201). 
The monumental structure was a practical solution that welcomed the old 
spectators and without having them set foot onto the airfield silently transformed them 
into visitors. People were softly detached from the physical proximity of the aircraft 
(see Figure 1.6). The spectacular brand-new machines, such as the Boeing Stratoliners 
and the Douglas DC-4s, stood proudly and perfectly aligned, almost arrogantly 
observing us. The romantic borderline was vanishing, too; enthusiasts were now 
separated in spatial planes. The “air-mindedness” was clearly at stake, and the airport 
promenade became a first warning. But passengers who enjoyed an era of fancy 
courtship will remember fondly those first years of LaGuardia’s Terminal. Nurses 
transformed into pretty stewardesses outdid themselves to please customers;32 
travelers received gifts, flowers, club memberships, and endless services. As Arend 
(1979) chronicles, “the airport observation deck was a huge success. Before opening, 
the city had practically begged concessionaires to operate the deck offering a lease at 
$12,000 per year, but no one was interested. Later the Mayor had a 10 cent turnstile 
installed and receipts for the first year came to a tidy $150,000 in dimes” (p. 23). In 
other words, at least one million, five hundred thousand visitors came to see the 
Skywalk. 
                                                
31 La Ligne refers to the myth of the intrepid French postal service, or Aeropostale, in the 1920s.  
32 See “Perfect Attendants,” an excellent historical chronicle of the role of women in air hospitality, by 
Molly Simms, in the October/November 2007 issue of Bust. 
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Figure 1.6. LaGuardia pioneered in separating the different flows. This view shows 
the courtyard formed between the Terminal and the Skywalk promenade. Notice some 
ground support vehicles at the forefront, passengers circulating underneath, and 
visitors walking on top of the structure. Photo: Levin & Saltzberg (1939) “LaGuardia 
Airport dedication” Legacy of FDR http://newdeal.feri.org/images/ac18.gif 
During the opening days people celebrated and felt welcomed, but the overcast 
sky and the end of our affair were inevitable. (Airport growth in fact put in charge a 
new generation of engineers and politicians who focused on efficiency rather than 
aesthetics.) In hindsight, the promenade is almost nostalgic and evocative, even in a 
photograph. But the Skywalk was not an afterthought. William Delano was not a 
modernist, and therein lies the uniqueness of this story. He sorted out the pressures of 
a growing tendency for an austere, social, technology-driven architecture, and 
designed the terminal much on his own terms, hybridizing styles but without finding 
much artistic value. In fact, Delano was declared the last classicist architect, receiving 
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the 1953 Gold Medal from the American Institute of Architects, and since that year, 
no one has received the same honor. It is not hard to imagine the fate of NY Municipal 
Airport in the hands of the radical modernists of the late 1930s. 
Even for Delano, the pressures to design in a more modern fashion were strong 
enough to make him opt for a hybrid style between Art Deco (concourse massing and 
ornamental detailing), Neoclassicism (concourse vestibule and its reference to the 
Pantheon in Rome), and Bauhaus-style austerity (repetitive fenestrations, exposed face 
brick, standard structural bays, visible economy). The building received mixed 
reviews after its opening. The harshest critique came from the influential philosopher 
of technology and architecture critic for The New Yorker, Lewis Mumford. In a 
December 30, 1939 Skyline column, Mumford viewed the main terminal as “a series 
of bungles, missed opportunities and hideous misapplication of ornament [that came] 
very close to equaling the all-time architectural low.” At least, he concluded, “you 
could get into a plane and fly away” (pp. 49, 50). Also regarding its aesthetic 
impressions, author Alastair Gordon (1994) has described how an “early rendering by 
Delano and Aldrich shows a fairly utilitarian façade broken up by horizontal bands of 
windows and darker brick, but the final version was much more ponderous. Strident 
vertical ribs and decorative grillwork gave it a vaguely totalitarian look; an impression 
that was reinforced by the stainless steel eagle perched ominously on the roof. Exterior 
walls were buff-colored brick, and the coping was black masonry” (p. 112).  
In addition, in his New Yorker column, Mumford “accused the architects of 
designing a ‘faked entrance’ that had nothing to do with the modern split of aviation.” 
Interiors, according to Mumford, were designed in what he described as a “funeral-
parlor motif,” but he reserved particular scorn for the control tower, which he thought 
of as a “miniature lighthouse, which had been seemingly plopped on the terminal’s 
roof as an afterthought” (Mumford, 1939, p. 49). On his critique I think Mumford is 
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basically right, but strictly from an architectural point of view. Several architects of 
the time expressed similar feelings about the building; however, Mumford avoids 
technical language and clearly underestimates the less visible achievements of the 
building. This idiomatic gap was constantly growing wider. The famous critic and 
philosopher was clearly not aware of the technical pressures and limitations; perhaps 
he expected an air terminal as grandiose as a rail station. It is a pity that Mumford did 
not use his recently published “polytechnic versus monotechnic ‘framing’ to discuss 
the airport.”33 His known aversion to transportation means such as the automobile 
would have been seriously challenged by Delano’s noteworthy scheme, and 
particularly by his Skywalk, where evidently not all is subordinated to machines. 
In this sense some of the less visible aspects of LaGuardia are those related to 
the systematic construction of a new technological rhetoric, on both the technical and 
official levels. After the completion of the project, a limited set of documents from the 
WPA was made available. Not surprisingly, it shows an official lexicon that speaks of 
the growing pressures inflicted from the airside towards the landside. Besides the 
terminology on which I have commented before (airfields, field side, landplane, 
landside, seaplane, seaside, terminal), other key examples of this rhetoric are worth 
highlighting. Among the most meaningful expressions relevant to this study, the 
Skywalk encapsulates both the technological demagogy and the real nostalgia for the 
dream of no-boundaries; also, the frequent use of spectators instead of the most 
current visitors speaks of a vanishing time (WPA, July 1, 1939, pp. 4–22). I have 
found three basic levels of discourse spinning around the creation of LaGuardia: first, 
the politics of technology and science; second, the rhetoric of technological 
                                                
33 Mumford (1934) discusses how monotechnics (planes in this case) will only care about its own 
“trajectory,” leaving aside humans and society as a whole. This assumption might be correct in many 
contemporary airports but was hardly the case at LaGuardia. 
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determinism and technology transfer; and third, the use of language to describe a 
system or an organism. 
After studying the original documents that were produced by the WPA for the 
purpose of diffusion and inauguration of the project, I found that the labels that were 
used to describe the different rooms and areas of the airport expressed many aspects of 
the process that are otherwise hard to identify. For example, at the first level of the 
building, technologies are cleverly disguised as neutral or a-political, but when 
analyzed deeply in context they seem to reveal a strong political undertone that was 
common in early “high modernist” projects.34 For example, in the case of the 
Skywalk, language helps to reinforce the implicit politics of the artifact and its 
grandiosity, similar to Scott’s critique of Le Corbusier’s “radiant city” plan for Paris 
(1998, p. 104). Thus, several terms and phrases published in the dedication program 
for the opening ceremony reveal political connotations consistent with the unfaltering 
confidence in technology as a means to reach social progress. Here are some of these 
fragments: “no man can tell the part air transportation will play in the destiny of the 
new world. No man but knows how important it must be” (WPA, 1939, p. 10), “the 
Herculean task was shouldered by Fiorello LaGuardia himself” (p. 10), “the most 
modern airport” (p. 10), “a control tower with every modern facility of aeronautical 
research and science installed within” (p. 12), “it stands as a monument to the progress 
of air transportation and aeronautical research” (p. 12), “it will fulfill a place in 
American aviation long needed and played its part in helping to further advance this 
most modern of man’s means of conquering time and space” (p. 18). Interestingly, the 
political discourse is heavily supported by a deep faith in science, technology, and 
engineering as means to provide a better future. 
                                                
34 Scott refers to “high modernism” as a discourse of social reordering through the design and 
implementation of grandiloquent artifacts or projects.  
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At the building’s second level we can find the usage of some new terms that 
may help us to understand how aircraft systems gain terrain and displace the previous 
rhetoric of the rail station or seaports. Terms such as speeding-up (processes) often 
address many functions such as maintenance of aircrafts but were also employed to 
speak of passenger flows; the use of concourse was imported from rail stations to 
describe passenger halls. Other words such as process and segregation appear for the 
first time, naming the routines of loading and unloading of passengers. Phrases such as 
“the very fact that the building has been built for the sole purpose of expediting the 
arrival and departure of domestic airline passengers” make clear the new rules of the 
game. 
Others such as “seaplane hauled on railroad tracks” did not coin any new 
terms but became rather peculiar expressions. The maritime world offered references 
such as public observation decks (landside–airport boundary), docks, piers, and 
admirals clubs (soon VIP lounges); however, the previous embark and disembark 
would gradually go out of fashion; on the landside, the use of the Victorian driveway 
was rapidly discontinued and was replaced with drop-off sidewalk or the introduction 
of the baggage room, which preceded the future baggage-handling zones and supports 
the fact that a new technological discourse was emerging (WPA, July 1, 1939, pp. 4–
18). 
Last, on a third level, language is used to describe metaphorically the idea of 
an organism or a system, and emphasizes the concept of control of those systems. For 
example, the use of phrases such as the airport nerve center alludes to a living 
organism that is controlled from a master brain, or the more explicit control desk, 
which is equipped with a “miniature model” of the whole complex, or other perhaps 
more technical terms such as “automatic sprinkler system,” baggage system, “modern 
wiring system,” “the network of lights” or “astronomical time switches” that appear as 
	  68 
language innovations that reinforce the futuristic discourse of the time (WPA, October 
5, 1939, pp. 2, 10, 16). Also, in an interesting letter addressed to Somervell, Delano 
(1939) shows his growing concern about the recently installed “automatic sprinkler 
system” and emphasizes the previous exhaustive testing. However, the innovative fire-
extinguishing device failed a few weeks after the opening of the building. 
The interpretation of the emergence of a new speech suggests that language 
gradually becomes an expression of the forces in conflict. The lexicon progressively 
becomes more specialized and therefore interlocked, or inaccessible to the non-expert. 
The expressions mentioned above are only a sample from a wide array of new 
expressions and neologisms often borrowed from the architecture or engineering of 
transportation. However, perhaps the most interesting aspect can be found in the first 
intents to organize human randomness and the strategies to constrain it into a machine-
like system that processes passengers and employees in choreographed routines. In 
this sense, language helps to support my initial assumptions. The growing complexity 
of aircrafts, the systematization of airports, the establishment of federal regulations in 
aviation and airport planning, as well as the business pressures to be more efficient 
and therefore more profitable, have opened up a stream of progress in which the old 
romanticism has no place. 
VII. The End of an Airport’s Epoch 
Few designs in the history of American technology have been so costly, so successful 
though so spurious as that of the Municipal Airport of New York. Its statistics are 
spectacular: it was the largest airport project ever funded by the State, from its 
conception in 1937 it went way over budget but was finished on time. After its 
opening in 1939, the airport was instantly acknowledged and praised technologically, 
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as one of the most advanced airports in the world; it also succeeded socially, as 
LaGuardia himself advertised it as an airport open-to-all for enjoyment and 
entertainment; and the Skywalk patented that assertion. But after just one year the 
complex was working at full capacity, so in 1941 plans for a new airport began. 
There is then a strong contradiction between the rapid technological 
obsolescence of a technological artifact (the airport in this case) and the warm 
response of its audience (the public and passengers); one would expect the opposite: if 
a technology is welcome it will last longer. But this does not necessarily make a rule 
of thumb. Even though members of social groups may show a high “rate of adoption” 
(Rogers, 1962, p. 22), technologies could fail because they were thought of as closed 
systems that cannot be updated or expanded. Nevertheless, LaGuardia Airport can be 
considered a monumental techno-political device and one of the biggest triumphs of 
the American Sublime (Nye, 1994). 
I think it fair to say that the ingenious arrangement of the terminal layout was a 
vivid example of an intense transitory moment where aircraft and airport systems 
started to put pressure on the landside–airside divide. As I have shown, politicians, 
designers, and engineers agreed to the negotiation of a subtle, well-balanced solution, 
carefully avoiding preference for the emerging systems over people’s customs, and in 
that sense it became a soft transition and not a drastic one, as many visionaries 
forecasted. These actions had a clear political value that was capitalized by LaGuardia 
himself. 
As I suggested in this chapter, it is at the Skywalk that two historic cultures 
clash: the openness of the airfield versus the restrictive nature of the modern airport. 
This collision remained imprinted in language expressions that went out of use as well 
as those that remain valid in our times. I could maintain that LaGuardia Airport is 
hardly a modern building in its essence, but its gestures and unprecedented features 
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were indeed revolutionary for their time (the separation of departures and arrivals on 
two levels) and set the basis for the new relationship between users and aircraft. 
In Nye’s terms (1994), the dialogue between spectators and airplanes 
represents yet again the temporary celebration of the sublime: 
The technological sublime does not endorse human limitations; rather it 
manifests a split between those who understand and control machines and 
those who do not. In Kant’s theory of the natural sublime every human being’s 
imagination falters before immensity of the absolutely great. In contrast, a 
sublime based on mechanical improvements is made possible by the superior 
imagination of an engineer or a technician who creates an object that 
overwhelms the imagination of the ordinary men. (p. 60) 
The sublimation of the airport does not come from the architecture and has little to do 
with the terminal building. 
But without the Skywalk nothing near to sublime could have happened there; it 
offered the possibility to extend the imagination of the common person into the world 
of aviation, and only then, the sky-walker dreams. The bold and sober invitation read 
that on October 15, 1939, at 2:30 p.m., the Honorable Fiorello LaGuardia would see 
his dream come true. The special guests would be theatrically received by the landing 
of the latest aircrafts over the reliable airfield, and the deplaning of invitees and exotic 
tourists. “There wasn’t a cloud in the sky and a gentle, northwesterly breeze blew 
across Flushing Bay” (Gordon, 2004, pp. 110–111, 116). For the opening day in 
October 15, 1939, an attendance in excess of 325,000 (see Figure 1.7) celebrated 
LaGuardia’s triumph (New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, 1980, p. 
2). “The extravaganza is on the boards twenty-four hours a day and has a cast of 
thousands, a great parade across the largest sky port of them all” (Gordon, 2004, pp. 
110–111, 116). 
Just a few days after the opening ceremony, the Board of Estimate elected, 
with a vote of twelve to one, to rename North Beach Airport to LaGuardia Airport 
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(this decision was later endorsed by Commissioner McKenzie; “Backs LaGuardia as 
Airport Name,” 1939). As I mentioned in the first sections, “years before the ‘practical 
use’ for the postal service, military and commercial aviation, the flying man-machine 
myth was largely seen as public spectacle. Spontaneously, people greatly celebrated 
takeoffs and landings with gigantic welcomes and parades, and this fact originated a 
profitable industry of entertainment” (Wohl, 2005, pp. 294–301). But the flying man-
machine was about to perform for the last time, during the Second World War. 
 
Figure 1.7. This plate of LaGuardia Airport pictures the hundreds of thousands 
gathered at the opening day. Photo: Levin & Salzberg (1939) “LaGuardia Airport 
dedication,” Legacy of FDR, http://newdeal.feri.org/images/ac18.gif 
Shadows of war were threatening from across the ocean, but neither Mayor 
LaGuardia nor Postmaster General James A. Farley admitted that the airport would 
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ever be anything but a place of peace. “It is fortunate for us here in the United States 
that we can gather to dedicate an airport of this character to the pursuits of peace 
without thought of war, of conquest, of the dread possibility of armed conflict,” said 
the Postmaster General (quoted in Arend, 1979, p. 21). He hoped the time would never 
come when the airport would be needed for military purposes. “This airport is a strong 
guarantee of the nation’s peace and safety,” concluded Farley (quoted in Arend, 1979, 
p. 21). Along the same lines, Washington National was built just one year after its 
northern cousin, and it represented a refinement of LaGuardia’s scheme and its 
landside–airside boundary. 
Nonetheless, the dialogue was finally broken. William Delano and George 
Licht designed a new scheme for Idlewild Airport in Queens, now known as JFK. The 
beautiful illustrations by Hugh Ferris speak for themselves; borrowing from the 
dramatic portico at Tempelhof and perhaps influenced by the monumentality of Albert 
Speer’s masterpiece Zeppelintribüne, Delano offered a more refined, operatic version 
than his Skywalk in LaGuardia. In his plans for Idlewild, the architect delivered a 
more direct, open contact for the air-minded spectator; but at the dusk of the Second 
World War the grim shadow of national security darkened the skies, and Delano was 
forced to break his relationship with the Port Authority in 1948. LaGuardia and 
Washington National became the last true examples of the romantic borderline. As air 
travel became a risk-free activity, these two airports became congested and thus 
obsolete. As Saint-Exupéry predicted, without risk “La Ligne”35 was dead, and with it, 
much of the romanticism of an epoch. As the airport reached the end of its first cycle, 
the modern landside–airside frontier was finally born. 
                                                
35 “La Ligne” refers to “The Line,” or the earliest French airmail system—established through an 
incredibly dangerous trajectory between Toulouse and Santiago, and later known as the Aéropostale 
(Wohl, 2005, p. 201). The author of “The Little Prince” thought that it was risk, and not necessarily the 
need to deliver mail, that moved those pilots.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
“Reinventing the Airport?”: Annex 14, Dulles Airport’s “Mobile Lounge” and 
Other Jet-Age Paradigms, 1946–1962 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Artist rendering of Dulles Terminal by Eero Saarinen. This is one of the 
few modern buildings ever depicted on a U.S. stamp. “Dulles Airport Washington 
DC,” 1982, retrieved from http://airportstamps.webs.com/images.htm 
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When authorities were studying plans for Idlewild Airport (1940-43), NY Art 
Commissioner William Delano suggested some motorized transportation from 
terminal to plane. Nevertheless, his suggestion was thought too radical . . . 
—Sunday Star, Washington, DC, November 11, 1962 
In this chapter I speak, in seven sections, of two themes that are interlocked between 
each other: the context of airport planning after the Second World War and, in 
consequence, the second reinvention of the airport at Dulles. 
More in detail, in the first four sections, I frame in general the problem of 
planning and designing airports in the postwar period. First I present the impact of the 
ideology and the discourse of the postwar period; second, I comment on the 
formalization of airport planning as a profession and describe some of the 
methodological concepts, mainly from S&TS, that I use as tools of analysis. Third, I 
describe the importance of language in the early days of expert planning, and fourth, I 
argue that the airports of the 1950s and 1960s gained “momentum” in the optics of 
Hughes’s “large technological systems model.” 
In sections five to seven, I develop the case study of Dulles International 
Airport in Washington, DC, which was planned and built between 1958 and 1962 (see 
Figure 2.1). In section five I present the result of my bibliographic and archival 
research (based on both primary and secondary sources) of the second reinvention of 
the airport, this time at the request of the U.S. President’s Office and through the FAA. 
In section six I discuss the process of reinvention and the birth of the “Mobile 
Lounge,” and last, section seven addresses the materialization of a new kind of 
landside–airside boundary at the new Washington airport. 
	  75 
I. Post–World War II Airports 
As most modern airports became severely congested right after the war, the future of 
airport planning after the construction of LaGuardia became hard to predict. The 
objective of this chapter is to understand why the two decades after 1945 lead the way 
to the formal (official) reinvention of the airport (Dulles) and how the landside–airside 
boundary plays a role in this timeline of change. For many historians, airports 
progressed throughout time thanks to a process of innovations-building-on-newer-
innovations kind of loop, until high degrees of airport efficiency were thus reached. 
For architects and engineers this process lies, in practice, in the construction of an 
airport typology during the postwar period.1 However, there are important signs that 
historical design changes in the airport may have occurred otherwise. The main 
hypothesis in this section suggests that there are four key aspects that “tend to resist 
changes in the direction of development” (Hughes, 1983, p. 140): 
1. The fact that airports gained technological “momentum,” creating a socio-
technical system that is visible in the consolidation of airport planning as a 
specialized discipline (this movement is permeated by the discourse of the 
Cold War). 
2. The fact that airport growth triggered initiatives of regulation and 
normalization in order to stabilize the infrastructure as a system, and later 
as a system of systems. 
3. The rising complexity of airport operations and the introduction of new 
technologies. (New technologies such as jet aircraft, automatic systems, 
and new building methods and materials, brought passenger discomfort, 
                                                
1 This classification among professionals evaluates and recommends what is working best or is not in 
the field; it consolidates certain schemes and solutions and agrees on their efficiency; last, younger 
designers can pick up where the previous expert left off and move ahead, making only minor 
adjustments. This is the route map towards what I call “standard airport design.”  
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awakening a strong public reaction to noise, disorientation, congestion, 
extenuating distances for walking, long lines, and exposure to the 
elements.) 
4. The reformulation of the modern city of the postwar. (Airports were 
labeled by social and political groups as the new cathedrals of our time or 
the urban gateways of our cities. These metaphors and social constructions 
will pave henceforth the way to crisis and what I will later refer as a 
“reverse salient” (Hughes, 1983) in the consolidation of the airport as a 
large technological system.) 
More specifically, I use the airport culture of the post–World War II period as 
a framework to understand the growing demands of aircraft innovation (jet propulsion) 
and the implications of the air travel boom of commercial aviation during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Airport history author Douglas Karsner (1993) discussed how the period of 
economic growth after the Second World War altered the industry of urban 
development and tourism. As the number of airplanes grew, so did the number of 
passengers, in the same proportion, pushing the terminals to stretch endlessly as long 
docks. Passenger discomfort became a constant, and saturation and delay took over the 
airport. In addition, the newer equipment produced considerably more noise, adding to 
the long list of users’ complaints. The pressures on the landside–airside boundary 
grew steadily, greatly straining the interrelationships within the industry. Designers 
and experts responded with mechanical gadgets such as the 1952 “Loadair System” by 
Whiting Co., the 1954 “Air dock” prototype by United Airways, and the installation of 
the first Jetway by JBT Co. in 1959. Meanwhile, politicians and investors became 
more concerned with the public image of the airport as an icon of progress. Terminals 
were transformed as the new “urban cathedrals” (Downs, 2009, p. 1), and in this 
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regard, TWA terminal in New York became an inspirational model to cities 
worldwide. 
Paradoxically, the building’s sound public success placed its architect, Eero 
Saarinen, at the forefront of an FAA initiative to develop new ways to deal with the 
rising landside–airside boundary conflict. How to reduce delay? The answer was to 
rethink the airport as a socio-technical system. This chapter puts particular emphasis 
on the experimental planning behind the new Washington Dulles Airport in the late 
1950s. In this section I recount the era’s faith in technology as a vehicle of progress 
and, more particularly, how the invention of the “Mobile Lounge” was seen as the 
ultimate solution for the modern airport. Based on the use of primary and secondary 
sources, this study goes deep in search of the causes and ideas behind a radical 
reformulation of the landside–airside boundary. Why push change at such enormous 
cost? 
In the next sections I use Thomas Hughes’s (1983) metaphor of technological 
momentum to describe how a supportive context or culture led to the development of a 
super-system of airports “—a socio-technical one” (p. 140), and how interpreting 
Hughes’s model Dulles, just like LaGuardia, may be understood as causing a “reverse 
salient.” 
In a fast-changing industry such as aviation, and particularly after its 
technological boost during the war years, most of the modern prewar airports in the 
U.S. became rapidly obsolete, and “the changing nature of the airplanes that use them 
created many problems for the airport designer” (President’s Airport Commission, 
1958, p. 39). The advent of four-engine airliners and the eventual arrival of the 
German jet engine to commercial aviation marked a new technical challenge for the 
existing facilities across the country. One may be tempted to think that the pressures of 
the new equipment, the growing complexity of airport systems, and the new 
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dimensional requirements were ultimately responsible for the new concept of the 
postwar airport. Authors of planning manuals and technical texts during and after the 
war seemed to rely on these matters and attributed these tendencies of change solely to 
the “rapid rate of growth and changing demands of new aircrafts” (Froesch & 
Prokosch, 1946, p. 20). However, in this investigation I have found that this is only 
partially true and that above the forces of technological progress, the larger discourse 
of the postwar era was perhaps the primary agent of change. 
In terms of planning, the demand for new airports came from two main 
sources. The first is rooted in the National Airport Plan, which in the early 1940s 
anticipated significant air traffic growth and therefore recommended initially the 
construction of 470 new airports, although the number of projected new facilities and 
renovations grew to a huge 3,500. Although the plan was overtaken by the Second 
World War, it was readapted to the new needs of the country. According to airport 
historian Geza Szurovy (2003), the plan that “ultimately emerged was skewed 
geographically to military rather than civilian needs,” although there were “myriad 
requirements for converting an airport for military use or building one from scratch, 
depending on its intended mission”; and the war “launched the biggest concentrated 
industrial expansion in America’s history, which sent the demand soaring for airports. 
Domestic and international air transportation and freight operations became critically 
important to accomplish certain tasks with the urgency required by modern warfare. 
From requisitioning about 170 airliners at the outbreak of the war, the military air 
transport system grew in the next four years into an international airline operating 
thousands of aircraft on a network of routes spanning the globe.” In addition, although 
several airports were benefited by its military use—in terms of expansions and 
renovations—according to historian Janet Bednarek (2001), “the defense-related aid 
during the 1940s brought significant improvements to airports all over the country. 
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And the continued military value of airports provided part of the justification for the 
postwar airports aid program” (p. 11). 
The second source of demand for new airports came from the Federal Airport 
Act of 1946. An extended network of airports would guarantee national coverage in 
terms of an eventuality, but who was going to pay for it? In this sense, it was evident 
that the available public resources were not enough to cover such a massive enterprise, 
so the federal government had no choice but to promote a municipal plan of financing. 
For this purpose, two aspects played a significant role: the construction (re-
construction?) of a culture of an air age armed with phrases such as the skyways of 
tomorrow and the utopian dream of an airplane in every home and an airport in every 
town as flagships. The second aspect came from conditioning development to 
technological progress: “a community’s future position may depend upon its airport 
planning today. Failure to provide airport facilities may not necessarily mean another 
ghost town, but it is too big a chance to take” (Johnson, 1946). In contrast, “towns and 
cities were encouraged to build new airports because they were ‘relatively low-cost’ 
and the modest investments would become profitable considering the future revenues 
from rentals and concessions” (Bednarek, 2001). 
Within this context, the first airport-planning manual of the postwar era was 
austerely named Airport Planning. This volume was edited in 1946 by John Wiley & 
Sons of New York and authored by two employees of Eastern Airlines at the time, 
Charles Froesch, who was chief engineer, and Walther Prokosch, who was head of the 
planning unit. Although a number of publications such as the annual Airport 
Construction and Operation Reference preceded Airport Planning, this work became a 
wide-range planning source of the time. The book is a comprehensive treatise on 
airport planning and includes sections on planning, technical requirements, and 
construction, as well as intriguing sections in which the authors give themselves 
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license to theorize on the larger historical context of airports. These aspects are 
especially interesting, because the undertones of cultural history are often more 
transparent in the technical literature. My analysis of Airport Planning yields several 
findings at different levels. 
The first finding is the total omission of the terms landside, airside, and 
seaside. The terms are not even included in the extensive glossary at the end of the 
book. In the manual there is scarce mention of the quintessential LaGuardia, which at 
the time was clearly a model no longer to be followed. Broader mention is made, 
however, of the marine terminal, in which the term seaside has been suspiciously 
substituted for seaplane (WPA, 1938, pp. 238–239). I suspect that the authors 
deliberately rejected the airport divide, and thus the terms I mentioned before. This is 
consistent if one considers their efforts to understand the airport as something larger 
and interconnected. But at the same time, they envisioned the airport and its traffic as 
something subject to forecast through the use of mathematics and scientific methods; 
the planning of the airport needed to pass from the hands of artists to the hands of 
planners and engineers. 
Thus the second finding is the growing need to conceive airports as systems. 
Throughout the different essays, the words network and system are used in multiple 
ways. Initially the authors describe aviation through the concept of airline standard 
operation, which implies the consolidation and maturity of a system; the emphasis is 
on stability and gradual change. Mention is also made of patterns in aviation, which in 
a way implies that the evolution of the technology is somewhat foreseeable and risk-
free. With these ideas as a backdrop, the authors present the concept of a national 
network of transportation and specifically how the airport will provide access to 
smaller communities and connect them into the net. They also emphasize not 
considering aviation as an “agent that will relegate existing means into the shadow of 
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obscurity” (Froesch & Prokosch, 1946) but the contrary, that aviation will become part 
of this large-scale system. In terms of planning the continuous expansion and spread 
of airports and its parts, the other elements of network will link them together: express 
highways and the automobile, subways and trains. But perhaps the network is better 
defined with this metaphor: “a system of arteries and veins is planted in the body of 
this new creation so that its lifeblood the population may travel freely from one 
portion to another”; the network is the physical infrastructure that allows the system to 
operate, and uncertainty and risk are therefore reduced to a minimum. 
The third finding is an open concern for making airports useful parts of the 
system of national defense. For example, when speaking of the future airport planner, 
Froesch and Prokosch (1946) maintain that, “to achieve the best engineering 
compromise, he (the planner) must appraise all factors which govern aviation as a 
means of transportation and must try to weigh what were once imponderables. He 
must direct his efforts toward planning facilities which will be useful units of an 
integrated whole, forming a broad pattern of civic usefulness and national defense” (p. 
8). Here the authors clearly acknowledge the dual nature of the airport as a military 
and civil facility, and, therefore, they extend this idea as core to the new airport 
planning profession. 
The fourth finding is the need to make airport designers aware of urban 
decentralization and the new policies of dispersal. On several occasions, direct 
reference is made to decentralization, particularly in three different contexts. First, 
Froesch and Prokosch (1946) credit the automobile as the major force behind urban 
decentralization. Second, they use the term (dispersal) while issuing recommendations 
for decentralizing airports and transportation in general. The third use of the concept 
of decentralization is made in reference to the modern concept of the city, where the 
functions must be dismembered and separated from the core. The authors argue in 
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favor of this split and suggest the construction of at least three airports in every city. 
One airport must be in the residential suburbs, and its main purpose must be personal 
travel and recreation. The next is the commercial airport, a facility that should attend 
to business needs. The last is the cargo airport, which should be placed in relation to 
the most advantageous location to industry. 
The last finding is perhaps Froesch and Prokosch’s (1946) most ambitious 
claim and in a way is the best example of what I call the ideological undertone of the 
work. The authors make clear throughout the different sections that the real challenge 
in airport planning is to predict future changing conditions and to avoid obsolescence 
at any cost. Therefore, they introduce the concept of a true “air city,” a larger 
metaphor that perhaps unintentionally captures many of the dreams and fears of the 
epoch. The “air city” will supersede the prevailing “motorcar city”: “The 
disfigurements which the motorcar, plus lack of planning, has visited upon the 
American scene are well known. The beauties of landscape which are opened up for us 
by the motorcar and the opportunities for fuller living are equally well known” 
(Froesch & Prokosch, 1946). The authors maintain that the airplane will affect our 
“individual and national lives even more rapidly than the motor vehicle” (Froesch & 
Prokosch, 1946). The airport city is a city where planning is subordinated to the 
airport. It is developed on a vast space, dividing the functions of the city—in a way 
very similar to the proposed scheme by Norbert Wiener published in Life magazine in 
the early 1950s, in which the city parts are separated and linked through highways or 
“life belts” (Boyer, 1985); the main difference is that contrary to Wiener, the airport 
becomes the center of distribution (passengers, products, and objects). 
The ideology of the early postwar era was ever present in the conception, or re-
conception, of the modern airport. In addition to the technological advancements—
many of them products of the runaway warfare industry during the war, I suggest that 
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the machinery of progress was not solely, or even mostly, responsible for the 
construction of a new airport culture in the late 1940s. In presenting evidence from 
technical sources, I suggest that within the technical discourse, much of the period’s 
political ideology remains embodied in these documents. But perhaps what best 
explains why it was necessary to diffuse this ideology is the fact that the proliferation 
of airports was linked to the plans of urban spread and, at the same time, the necessity 
to involve the municipal governments in order to finance the initiative. 
This was clearly not just a technical move; the underlying reasons were well 
founded in the incapacity of public funds to cover the huge costs of the expansion. 
What is evident to me is that without the construction of metaphors and the prediction 
of future views that made airports simply necessary, the government would have not 
made this rapid expansion possible. 
II. Formalizing Airport Planning 
Just a few years later, at the turn of the 1950s, airport planners claimed that forecasting 
and regulating the airport were indispensable to avoiding the alarmingly rapid 
obsolescence of airport facilities. It is timely to remember that when compared to the 
rail station, where even the newer trains adapted to the old tracks and station sheds, the 
newer airport inevitably ends in need of having large investments put to no use, in just 
a few years. In 1947 the influential Architectural Record published the article 
“Establishing an Airport Planning Program,” in which Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, 
Inc. affirmed that “the tendency in the past has been to lay principal stress on the 
engineering factors of airport planning with no program established to guide the 
engineer and architect in the long range requirements of an airport. Previously built 
airports have been used as guides to space-use patterns. These examples no longer 
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serve that purpose.” Thus the lack of a set of airport planning principles or a 
theoretical framework somehow pushed airport designers to base new ideas on 
previous cases in a sort of “learn by using” (Rosenberg, 1994) or learn-by-error 
model; thus this continuum of real-world constraints and use of technical logic shaped 
those “technological trajectories” (Vincenti, 1976) so often found in engineering 
thinking. The airport was thought of, then, as a scientific issue, or a problem with a 
predictable input and output. 
As I will discuss later in my analysis of Dulles, planners and designers reached 
the extreme of documenting cases on five continents in order to close all possible 
windows to potential failure. My contention in this regard is that this method masked 
the timely identification of the landside–airside boundary as a technological anchor. 
The influential Walter Prokosch—the co-author of the first planning manual 
that I mentioned before—wrote in a long essay in 1951 about the importance of 
programming through experts: “The evolution of a program for the various facilities 
needed on an airport consists of a complex series of calculations which are generally 
prepared by the airport specialist” (p. 113). It is interesting that he speaks of the 
evolution of a program as an organic, ever-changing entity. True; it is in that process 
of refinement and readjustment of the airport/terminal programming that the core of 
this thesis argument lies. What Prokosch calls evolution is close to what I define in 
this thesis as a negotiation process. However, in practice this is not that simple, and 
the so-called programming2 falls often into several hands at the same time.  
But planners were busier figuring out methods to foretell traffic in order to 
increase financial “certainty” than understanding the growing landside–airside conflict 
as a socio-technical construct. In 1953 Progressive Architecture published a special 
                                                
2 In practice, the airport terminal programming of spatial, technical, human requirements is usually 
subordinated to a preliminary cost analysis. 
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issue, “Airport Terminal Buildings.” In it, the editorial staff said that “after community 
needs, air traffic, and economic considerations have been studied, the program 
planners will finally come to the great question: How large should the terminal be? 
The key to the answer and all its parts (how many aircraft loading stations; how much 
passenger waiting space; how much space for toilets, restaurants, concessions; how 
much additional space for visitors and sightseers) lies in an estimate of peak-hour 
traffic, according to presently accepted planning methods” (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 70). 
But as in all rule-of-thumb calculations, “various unusual factors will affect the final 
figures, and the method of calculations are not all agreed upon” (Arroyo et al., 1953, 
p. 70). 
Technically speaking, peak-hour passenger traffic is translated into aircraft 
space requirements, which inform the spatial program. Peak-hour passenger traffic is 
divided by average aircraft seating capacity (a variable, depending on type of airport 
according to CAA during the 1940s and 1950s); the result represents the number of 
peak-hour runway operations. Therefore, the building requirements can be almost 
directly translated from the peak-hour passenger figure. In the same issue, Progressive 
Architecture made reference to this aspect: “although passengers and visitors mingle 
in some space, the ticket counters and the baggage pick-up space are related directly to 
the traffic count” (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 70). The fact that planning became primarily 
an analytical activity left aside the understanding of multiple dimensions of the 
landside–airside boundary, and thus, it was put under an enormous strain.  
According to the experts of Progressive Architecture, the architect may adopt 
either of two options: “The smaller port, with its lower passenger volume, may use a 
frontal arrangement with aircraft strung out along the perimeter of the building” or 
what I call here linear arrangements or parallel piers. “For the larger-volume terminal, 
a finger scheme, consisting of piers stretching onto the field, perpendicular or radial to 
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the building, with planes grouped along these extensions, seems best.” Among the 
benefits of this scheme were the chance to have a centralized ticketing and baggage-
handling operation for independent airlines (per pier), “since walking time from the 
waiting room and loading distances from baggage and cargo rooms can be reduced” 
(Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 90). These kinds of geometrical arrangements were desperate 
measures to counterattack delay and the long walks.3 
Perhaps one of the major impossibilities for studying the landside–airside 
boundary as a design problem was the fact that too many actors used to intervene in 
decision tables. By the 1950s Progressive Architecture experts discussed the reasons 
for which designers felt they were not getting the job done: “In business practice, as in 
planning and design, the airport commission is likely to be a complicated one for the 
architect, as well as for the consulting structural, mechanical, and electrical engineers 
who works with him. In crafting the first-of-a-kind monograph, the magazine’s editors 
have talked to many experienced architects and engineers in this building typology, 
and opinion was unanimous: the multiplicity of clients to be satisfied makes approvals 
difficult and changes likely; relationships with consultants hired directly by the airport 
authority as experts on one phase or another of the problem are not always pleasant; 
fees, generally, are too low” (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 113). 
Among the multiple clients or groups, agencies, and individuals pushing 
requirements that should be fulfilled are the actual client (municipal and federal 
governments), representatives of the different scales of government such as state, 
county, and municipal; the airlines, the CAA, U.S. Post Office, U.S. Weather Bureau, 
U.S. Public Health Service, Bureaus of Customs, Immigration, DIR, Department of 
Agriculture, local fire and police departments, a myriad of specialists, and the main 
                                                
3 Walking distances were already causing sound complaints from passengers; among the most sound 
were the ones against Chicago O’Hare that used to have pedestrian trajectories of over one mile.  
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concessionaries.4 The required negotiations between the numerous actors were 
characterized then by the existence of pressures and slowness (“The Airport 
Scramble,” 1956, p. 133). 
Planners started studying the moving patterns of humans, and called them 
flows. These passengers’ circulations were the primarily basis for planning.5 During 
the 1940s among the studied flow patterns, the need for a physical separation between 
airport visitors and passengers arose as perhaps the most critical and unpopular. 
(“Activities are channelized and separated,” 1941, p. 53).6 In describing the future 
airport of the 1950s and 1960s, the firm Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Inc. (1947) 
explains the desired sequence: “The enplaning passenger leaves his car or airline 
limousine at road level and point of baggage check-in and proceeds by escalator to 
second level ticketing, lounges, rest rooms, or directly to gate of plane departure” (p. 
93). 
At this point a passenger is checked in by a ticket agent and boards his plane 
by way of an all-weather gangway. Guests of air passengers have access to an air 
passenger lounge. “The public has a separate entrance and a spectators’ promenade at 
second level in common with shopping and recreational facilities” (Smith, Hinchman 
& Grylls, Inc., Architects and Engineers, 1947, p. 93). Logically there were strong 
consequences in the landside–airside boundary dimension, being perhaps the more 
evident when planners assumed that aircraft were what really interested visitors and 
not the social spectacle of traveling (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 129). The spectators’ 
                                                
4 See who gets involved in the subsection “The Client” (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 116). 
5 See the full flow sequencing on page 116 of Arroyo et al. (1953). 
6 The literature also refers to the term “channelized,” to describe the conduction of many activities, but 
particularly baggage. 
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fascination with the theatricality of travel (having the airport as a backdrop) is evident 
in such memorable stills as those taken when the Beatles arrived in America in 1964. 
During the early postwar period, planners coined new terms that became part 
of the technical jargon and help to build momentum. Progressive Architecture’s 
influential special issue on airports in 1953 described how the planner must insure that 
international travelers are “processing through customs, immigration, and other 
agencies that are concerned with their movements or the contents of their baggage. If 
they are incoming, they must be segregated, and their baggage must be handled 
separately” (Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Inc., Architects and Engineers, 1947, p. 94). I 
highlight the use of processing and segregation as an early usage of the terms. 
One more aspect of this special issue that speaks of the struggles between 
economic and social interests is when the authors write that “the balance between 
necessary income and passenger convenience must again be carefully weighed” 
(Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Inc., Architects and Engineers, 1947, p. 92). This idea 
addresses how decision making will often subordinate users’ comfort to economic 
interests. During the mid-1950s the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Authority, later FAA) 
issued recommendations that called for “economic practicability, amortization 
potentialities, and functional efficiency should be the prime considerations in the 
allocation of space. Expansibility and flexibility should be the prime considerations of 
design and construction” (U.S. Civil Aeronautics Administration, 1953). After the 
bitter experiences of the previous years it was clear that the state machinery aimed for 
healthy finances and expandable facilities. But this speaks specifically of the interests 
of the CAA, who played a double role as the responsible governmental agency and 
principal client at the negotiation table. But as I show later on, this does not reflect the 
interests of the U.S. government as a whole. Other politicians had other ideas in mind. 
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Perhaps located in what critic Lewis Mumford (1934) called “the fantasies of 
the future which have been suggested by the triumph of the machine” (p. 492) is the 
intriguingly common ideal of thinking of the airport “as basically a machine to 
facilitate transfer of passengers from the ground to the air and vice-versa” (Arroyo et 
al., 1953, p. 88), as described by the Progressive Architecture editors. The 
comprehensive study in the American magazine assures that the “ideal airport terminal 
would be a smoothly functioning machine. But what should flow with machine 
precision, too often has become over elaborate and complex” (Arroyo et al., 1953, p. 
82). The publication ends making no mention whatsoever of the terms landside and 
airside, although this absence seems to be consistent with many of the articles and 
manuals of the epoch. 
III. The Language of Planning 
So far I have described how during the war and at least until the mid-1950s the terms 
landside and airside were either put into disuse or deliberately abandoned for not 
reflecting the new interests of airport planners and their mechanistic vision of the 
airport. The Oxford English Dictionary credits the Daily Telegraph in 1955 as the first 
publication to employ the words landside and airside in order to define the distinct 
parts of an airport terminal; but as I have shown in chapter one, they were used during 
planning stages of LaGuardia Airport at least eighteen years earlier, in 1937. Proving 
that one exception always breaks the rule, the normative bible of airport planning and 
design, the famous Annex 14 of 1947, surprisingly makes constant reference to both 
terms. Thus, in these following paragraphs, I will elaborate on how and why the terms 
had such a preponderant role in the manual. 
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The imperative need to regulate the chaotic disparity of national and 
international aviation encouraged the international community to found the 1944 
PICAO (Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization), which, after two years 
of analyzing the status of international aviation and airports, took its final and current 
shape as ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) in 1946. Its standards for 
aerodromes (notice the word, instead of airports) was instantly accepted worldwide. 
The same team of international experts put on paper a number of Annexes or standard 
manuals that were meant to regulate both the airspace and the land-space of aviation. 
The first edition of Annex 14, Aerodromes (1951), was rapidly replaced by the 
thoroughly revised second edition of 1953—which, according to contemporary airport 
planners, instantly became the norm for planning and designing airports (see next 
chapter). The terms landside and airside are used throughout the 133 pages of the 
document and even defined in the separate glossary of terms: 
Airside: “That area of an airport which is in whole or in part under the 
jurisdiction of the Government Control Authorities. Where this jurisdiction of 
the Government Control Authorities does not apply, it is that part of the airport 
terminal building(s) with immediate access to the apron. In both cases, the air-
side area is prohibited to the non-traveling public.” (International Civil 
Aviation Organization [ICAO], 1953, p. 121) 
For the specialized scholar, this is a fascinating attempt especially within the 
context of the early 1950s. The definition is rather ambiguous because instead of 
providing a single, standard case or condition, it provides two possible scenarios and 
one inflexible rule. The first part of the definition presents the airside as an area of the 
airport (without defining one) that is under full or partial control of the state. Meaning 
any, but the terminal. Surprisingly, the second part of the definition makes reference to 
the terminal and its zoning, but not the airport as a whole. So as a subtraction, it fails 
to define multiple areas that are implicitly left out. 
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Thus, if this speaks of areas and jurisdictions, it also implies borderlines and 
frontiers. Then, according to this rule, everyone traveling is allowed on the airside and 
therefore the apron, and it segregates only spectators and passenger companions. 
There is also ambiguity in the understanding of what constitutes immediate access to 
the apron. Does it mean that there are no control points, or just doors and fences, or 
anything at all? One of the keys to understanding this definition is the fact that at the 
time every single passenger had to walk on the tarmac to enplane. 
Landside: “That area of the airport and buildings which is available to the non-
traveling public.” (ICAO, 1953, p. 128) 
This definition is comparatively much shorter, meaning that whoever is in control of 
the landside—as here defined—is relatively irrelevant (implicitly, irrelevant for the 
state). Rather, the clear message from ICAO was that “everyone not traveling” was 
unwelcome within the state-controlled zones. The spirit of both definitions—
understood as complementary concepts—is maybe clearer now; there is an underlying 
need to segregate, at this point at least, two different kinds of users. 
From the above-mentioned definitions one may infer that in this case, ICAO 
tried to use the landside–airside boundary as a super control mechanism. The creation 
of global institutions represents what James Scott (1998, p. 4) calls “high modernism,” 
or a strong exercise of control through regulation and reordering through the coercive 
powers of the state (or group of states in this case). The physical reference in both 
definitions emphasizes the need to define material boundaries, though it leaves out 
room for any non-physical dimensions of landside and airside. The text of Annex 14 
(ICAO, 1953) also includes the definition of an airside assembly area (airside waiting 
lounge; airside waiting room; embarkation room), or the “accommodation allocated to 
passengers on the air-side of the airport terminal building for their use prior to 
embarkation” (p. 122), and the concourse (common concourse; hall; landside 
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assembly area; lobby; main concourse), which is “that area on the land-side of the 
airport terminal building provided for the convenience of passengers and the non-
traveling public” (p. 122). 
 
Figure 2.2. A normative illustration by ICAO, showing graphically how airport 
planners worldwide should draw the boundary between the landside and the airside. 
Notice the difficulties in making this regulation comprehensible and applicable across 
the table. Reproduced from Aerodromes: Annex 14 to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (2nd ed.), International Standard and Recommended Practices, by 
International Civil Aviation Organization, 1953, Montreal, Canada: Author, p. 19, 
“Diagram for Passenger Flow Routes.” 
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These two definitions speak less straightforwardly of the use of landside and 
airside, not as spatial labels but as tools for segregation. It speaks indeed of areas 
which are separate, but as a norm does not let us know how or where to draw the line; 
what should designers do? The laxness of the definitions leaves clear that each airport 
or terminal layout would be resolved through a per-case negotiation. The standards 
are furnished with some drawings addressing specifically the landside–airside as 
territories divided by an intangible boundary. The illustration depicted in Figure 2.2 is 
perhaps one the most relevant pieces of information regarding the topic of this study. 
This sketchy hand-drawn illustration shows us an example of how to treat the 
boundary as a material entity. There is a serious contradiction between this formula 
and my previous analysis of ICAO’s definitions, as both the landside and airside are 
now invading the neutral territories of the terminal building. The use of a broken line 
suggests through points or lanes and avoids, as a representation, the implication of a 
partition wall. 
In sum, the drawing resembles a hesitant approximation of something that is 
better to leave partially unclear or open to interpretation. (It is useful to remind the 
reader that these standards are international and are applied in all sorts of cultural 
contexts.) In addition, Annex 14 mentions the “flows of load,” referring to passenger 
and visitor patterns of movement. It demands that the “design of the terminal building 
on the land-side should facilitate the disembarkation of passengers, under cover, and 
the unloading of their baggage from vehicles at the same point” (ICAO, 1953, p. 9). 
From this quote, it is clear that for ICAO the landside is the side of the building facing 
the road. In this same sense the manual suggests that, “whilst it is not practicable to 
recommend a maximum walking distance within the terminal building, it is desirable 
that the distance which passengers have to walk from the land-side entrance of the 
terminal building to the air-side exit be as short as possible.” 
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Moreover, “it is equally desirable that the route which the passenger has to 
follow within the terminal building be as straight and direct as possible.” (ICAO, 
1953, p. 18). Again, greater emphasis is placed on the existence of two faces of one 
building, one representing the entrance and one the exit. This in itself contradicts the 
glossary definitions discussed above (let us remember that before the 1970s, visitors’ 
access was granted up to the doors that connected to the [often] lower apron). 
However, inside the building the question of where the boundary is remains open, as 
shown in Figure 2.3, which depicts an airport in Charleston, West Virginia. 
 
Figure 2.3. This photo portrays the free flow in the early postwar period between the 
landside and the airside. Charleston, WV Airport, twentieth-century building type. 
Reproduced from Airport Terminal Buildings, special issue of Progressive 
Architecture, by Arroyo, N. R. et al., May 1953. 
The photograph portrays a relaxed landside–airside boundary, according to 
which the different layers of rooms, glass walls, promenade, terrace, apron, and 
airplanes are part of the same uninterrupted sequence. With regard to baggage 
	  95 
handling, Annex 14 sets the standard for locating domestic and pre-cleared baggage. 
The code recommends that the baggage claim be “appropriate to the arriving 
passenger flow process and with ready access on the land-side of the building to 
public and private transportation and that the unloading of departure baggage from 
vehicles should be off-loaded from vehicles under cover on the land-side at the same 
point as the passengers are disembarked” (ICAO, 1953, p. 29). At this point ICAO 
literally portrays the landside as the road and the drop-off sidewalk, and this fact 
explains why so many planners keep using the same concept in the present day. 
One more critical aspect addressed in the manual is that the word 
segregation—previously used by Froesch and Prokosch (1946) and in the multi-cited 
Progressive Architecture special issue on airport design of 1953—has been carefully 
replaced by the less-charged term separation. The manual instructs designers on how 
to separate passengers from non-traveling people (such as relatives, friends, 
companions) as follows: In the case of international passengers, separation should be 
effected for departing passengers at the point where final personal control commences; 
this, where [outbound] 
customs clearance is required, is normally at the position referred to above as 
Customs Personal and Hand Baggage Control; where outbound Customs is not 
required it may be at the Currency or Passport Control point). It is important 
that adequate provision be made to ensure that the handling of passengers at 
the airport-handling counter (check-in point) is not impeded in any way, i.e. 
the airline handling counter should be isolated in a suitable manner. If this 
isolation is achieved by means of guardrails, sufficient space should be 
allocated in front of the handling counter. In addition, arrangements should be 
made so that arriving passengers can join the non-traveling public at the point 
where they clear the final inbound control. (ICAO, 1953, p. 11) 
This article clearly shows the difficulties of understanding and defining the 
materialization of the landside–airside boundary. Again, rather than being a norm, it is 
a set of design restrictions that are flexible and interpretive. But it is striking to see 
	  96 
how ICAO needed to represent a physical frontier for each of the three options: at the 
outbound customs stand, at the currency or passport control point, and at the check-in 
counters using guardrails. Even for the early 1950s, norms that implied containment 
were hard to understand, and when put into practice they usually eliminated security 
leaks. While Annex 14 speaks of two possible configurations for an airport, neither is 
suggested as ideal and much less as a norm. The “finger system” is described as a 
layout whereby protrusions from the terminal building extend into the apron area, 
giving access to aircraft parked on the apron, normally immediately adjacent to the 
finger. A finger can take the form of either an extension of the terminal building, a 
pier or a tunnel, or a fenced passenger walkway on the apron. When a finger takes the 
form of a pier it can have one or more levels (floors). In contrast, the “open apron 
system” is defined as “a system whereby there are no protrusions extending into the 
apron area. Access to parked aircraft may be gained by walking or by motor transport 
and involves the passage of passengers, baggage, freight and other load to the parked 
aircraft across an area in which aircraft are being maneuvered” (ICAO, 1953, p. 62). 
In an “Open Apron System,” walkways are defined by painted lines on the surface of 
the apron and aircrafts are parked adjacent to the terminal building in more than one 
row, thus requiring that passengers and loads be moved through the first row to get to 
those beyond. 
This austere classification is accompanied by a long analysis of advantages and 
disadvantages wherein the finger system’s outcomes are superior by far, with the 
exception that it does imply a higher initial investment. In short, this article shows the 
struggle between the old “Open Apron System” and the more modern finger system, 
and what takes place here is the fight between two epochs and two ways of 
understanding the landside–airside boundary. A good analogy for explaining the 
aforementioned is to imagine the piers as elastic extensions onto the apron, the result 
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of which is now a much more reduced space and surface in proximity to aircraft but 
one that is, evidently, now much closer. In simple terms, it is bringing the terminal 
into the realm of aircraft forming a 90-degree or less angle with the concourse. 
In conclusion, I suggest that ICAO experts’ use of language throughout the 
manual evidences their own concern with classifying and reordering the parts that 
form an airport in the 1950s, and furthermore seeks to homogenize on a larger scale 
the routines and zones in order to standardize as much as possible. It is the need to 
break with the established jargon that perhaps explains the profuse use of some 
outdated and unconventional terms. In this context, the inclusion of landside and 
airside and, more specifically, the boundary, worked well as a socio-technical tool that 
conveyed a much deeper thinking of the nature of the airport. Also, the 
acknowledgment of the landside–airside boundary as a tangible entity opened perhaps 
prematurely—though only partially—a discussion on how the boundaries are finally 
negotiated.  
IV. How Did Airports Gain “Technological Momentum”? 
In August of 1940, Architectural Forum published a so-called revolutionary scheme 
for a new airport in Washington (Projected Airport by Fellheimer & Wagner 
Architects, L. L. Odell Aviation Consultant, 1940, pp. 85–87). Behind the scenes, L. 
L. Odell, a pioneer of airport planning, proposed a double-spike layout that 
surprisingly resembles the typical models of the 1970s and 1980s. Strikingly, the 
architects, Fellheimer & Wagner, who had extensive experience designing rail 
stations, had never designed an airport before. Odell, who also acted as a consultant 
for LaGuardia, quickly learned the failures of this airport, and proposed waiting rooms 
that were shaped as long piers that sprang out of a central, circular concourse. This 
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example is exceptionally relevant to understanding the early mentality of the planner. 
Odell’s concept reveals many of his interests: he looks to reduce passenger discomfort 
by bringing the waiting areas closer to the planes, and he even proposes telescoping 
air-bridges in order to have an undercover approach to aircraft. However, the proposal 
was abandoned, and a scheme similar to LaGuardia’s was built instead.7 There was not 
enough credibility yet for the young specialist (Odell). 
As I have mentioned before, just a few years after beginning operations, 
LaGuardia Airport became practically obsolete (or saturated and unable to cope with 
projected growth). This situation alarmed and alerted several politicians, who thought 
it impossible to keep investing such astronomical resources in infrastructures that 
could not keep pace with traffic growth and last even a few years in full service. Step 
by step, aviation slowly became a profitable business and a good alternative for long-
distance travel, and traffic did keep growing. Thus the need for a new airport in New 
York City became imminent; but this time, William Delano did not get a chance. As 
the Roosevelt period faded away, new political alliances emerged. Thanks to his 
connections to the higher spheres in Washington, the socialité and modernist architect 
Wallace K. Harrison was given the heroic task of planning a new airport for New 
York City (see Figure 4.2). Harrison & Abramovitz intended to reinvent not the airport 
but the way airport terminals might become smaller components of a larger system or 
collection of stations. Harrison baptized his concept the “airport city.” The visionary 
planner imagined a huge, never-seen-before elliptical central island, with several air 
stations or terminals arrayed around its perimeter, each devoted specifically to housing 
just one airline (also called unit terminals). This concept survives in just one paper 
                                                
7 The chosen scheme for Washington National was Howard Lovewell Cheney’s conservative, post–Art 
Deco building. Nonetheless, the building was praised by Architectural Record as “perfect,” “ahead of 
contemporary practice,” and deserving a “five star rating in anybody’s news” (“Washington National 
Airport, 1941, pp. 53–57). 
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sketch that captures one of the most important airport-planning innovations of all 
time.8 This fresh planning strategy proved to be much more long-lasting than any 
prewar examples such as LaGuardia. However, each building in particular was again 
thought of as a terminal and contained somewhat limited frontage length towards the 
apron. The deep platforms and new airport layout particularly favored the possibility 
of rotating the terminal on a ninety-degree angle in order to work as a pier. The New 
York–based firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) introduced this idea at the 
International Terminal (one of the nine planned by Harrison), which was placed 
perpendicular to the street. SOM gained an increased aircraft parking capacity but did 
not offer anything new in rethinking the airside–landside boundary. This is a clear 
example of how airports formed a sort of linear progression: designers would pick the 
virtues of the previous scheme, work out some smaller improvements, and then devise 
a slightly different layout. Unfortunately, the proliferation of similar layouts left 
unbuilt a number of visionary schemes, such as the 1954 design of Paul Gerhardt for 
the Chicago Municipal Airport. Often these missed opportunities reflected the rule of 
the game, which was not efficiency but political value. The existence of a sort of 
mainstream tendency in airport planning during the early postwar period was probably 
co-responsible for the serious bottleneck congestion in Western airports around the 
mid-1950s. In the following pages I do not critique this technological pattern but 
instead introduce the socio-technical facts that established the context of an atypical 
and unexpected rethinking of the airport as a whole. 
In the book Technology and Urban Transportation (1965), authors Meyer 
(Harvard), Kain (Rand), and Wohl (MIT) affirm that “Americans are becoming an 
urban people and at least one consequence of this process of urbanization is that 
                                                
8 See the first definition of “unit terminal” (“Planning of Jet Airports,” 1960, p. 169).  
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transportation of people and goods into and out of cities increasingly has become a 
matter of great public concern” (p. 1). Although this claim is not necessarily true, it is 
interesting to see how around 1960, regional transportation reached out to a larger 
public, both urban and suburban. In these upcoming years airlines began to surpass the 
airport’s capacity to service the growing flight demand. According to Architectural 
Forum, most of the issues behind the aviation boom “stem from the fluidity of the 
airline business itself. The civilian airport-building program, held up during World 
War II, faced a greatly expanded interest in air travel in the postwar period. Traffic-
growth estimates have nearly always been conservative. Result: the program has 
been—and still is—trying to catch up with demand” (“Airport Scramble,” 1956, p. 
131). The so-called “Jet-Age airports” (“Jet-Age Airport,” 1959) rapidly turned out to 
be more of an “airport scramble” (“Airport Scramble,” 1956, p. 117). Available 
facilities were insufficient and produced long lines at check-in, and often featured low 
ceilings and insufficient air circulation. But the real nightmare came when passengers 
were pushed to walk extremely long distances to board or set down. 
Again, Architectural Forum described the true situation for users: “in the air 
the customer may be treated like a king. But on the ground he still has to fight his way 
through a chamber of horrors. Sheer size and the coming of 160-passenger jets call for 
new thinking about air terminals” (“Airport Scramble,” 1956, p. 117). When 
Architectural Forum published the article “New Thinking on Airport Terminals,” the 
editors subtitled a section “Which usually turn out to be civic monuments when they 
should be pipelines for passengers” (“New Thinking of Airport Terminals, 1956), in 
clear reference to spectacular terminals such as TWA Terminal at New York’s 
Idlewild or Saint Louis’s Lambert Terminal and others. This critique alone captures 
the frustrations and goals of airport planners; airport developers wanted fewer 
architects and more technical experts (planners wanted the airport to work as a 
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machine). In contrast, in a 1956 pamphlet London’s airport describes itself as 
“Passenger’s Progress” (Chandos, 1956). The planning solution at the self-named 
“New World Air Centre” introduced twelve “channels” of flow, or processing lanes, 
which guaranteed agility and rapid transit through the terminal and resembled, at least 
in concept, a pipeline. In a compelling photograph, we can see how baggage was also 
“channelized,” thanks to a spectacular (at the time) mechanized conveyor, which was 
proudly displayed and separated from viewers with a fence (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. The mechanization of the airport becomes a spectacle. New processes to 
cross the boundary between the landside and the airside are implemented even for 
luggage. Reproduced from “Passenger Progress,” by J. Chandos, 1956, in London 
Airport: The Official Story of the New World Air Centre, London, UK: Ministry of 
Transport and Civil Aviation. Original caption from the book: “Meanwhile the 
luggage comes up by conveyor belt!” 
The channels protruded from the parallel airside façade, ramping all the way 
down to the apron, where pilots and drivers parked planes and buses as close as 
possible to avoid passenger exposure to the elements (“Airport Scramble,” 1956). The 
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study makes a tough critique of American airports in general, and calls its glazed 
exterior channel an airside gallery.  
As the number of airplanes grew in the Western hemisphere, so did the number 
of passengers, in direct proportion; as a result of the definition of landside–airside 
boundaries, new airports faced new problems that required new solutions. In the U.S., 
according to the President’s Airport Commission, new facilities were “local problems” 
that needed to be designed while keeping in mind enough airport versatility to cope 
with technological change and social and political requirements and to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with their surrounding environment (President’s Airport 
Commission, 1958, p. 41). However, after the introduction of new aircraft 
technologies such as the jet engine, technology brought new problems such as noise 
and fumes. This adverse condition formed a sort of noisescape. 
As a nationwide response, “the FAA administrator was instructed to form a 
group composed of noise experts, lawyers, and traffic controllers to address the 
immediate issue” (FAA, Executive Director, 1962). After receiving endless passenger 
complaints, ICAO decided to recommend as “a general principle that the 
Administration should study the serious effects of noise, fumes and dust with regard to 
personnel, passengers and visitors at an airport. This problem is particularly acute on 
the apron side of the buildings. It is most important that the buildings be provided with 
adequate sound-proofing and air conditioning (including temperature, humidity, 
purification, and volume change control). Every practicable means of abating or 
eliminating noise, fumes, and just should be examined with the view to possible 
incorporation in the design, layout and construction of the building(s) and apron(s)” 
(ICAO, 1953, p. 5). This rising public pressure had a tremendous impact on the 
conception of the landside–airside boundary after the mid-1950s. Now buildings were 
required to be soundproofed and enclosed from the external noise conditions. This 
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situation set out an environment similar to Thomas Hughes’s example of the 
Americans’ early electrification systems, for creating technological momentum. (Just 
as, in order to solve the problems of the postwar era, knowledge institutions had to be 
created and new incentives for inventors and engineers made available to find 
workable solutions.) Users had finally challenged airport engineers, planners, and 
designers: how could they enclose the passenger’s path to the cabin of the aircraft? 
The race for invention had begun, and most aviation companies had to put together 
design and engineering teams that were looking for practical solutions to this problem. 
Among the noteworthy innovations of the time, the early use of air bridges between 
terminal buildings and planes was a radical departure from the romantic borderline. 
In 1951 an early version of the “Loadair System” developed by Whiting Co. 
was planned to connect planes to the pier in a very literal way, but it complicated 
things by trying to draw planes on dollies running on sunken tracks. The following 
year, a simplified variation of the “Loadair System” was placed in experimental 
operation by Avianca Airlines in Colombia, South America (see Figure 2.5) (“Loading 
Made Easier,” 1952, p. 26). Prokosch (1951) describes in Architectural Record what 
he calls mechanical docking: “the device was similar to the locomotive transfer table 
in general use in railroad repair shops. It consists of a pair of tracks each of which 
support a dolly. The airplane taxis onto a dolly with each of its main tires, and is then 
brought toward the loading gate by means of electric-powered cables. Projecting from 
the terminal is a fixed two-story finger with, at its outer end, a short ramp which can 
be adjusted to varying cabin sill heights” (p. 115). Its original purpose was to expedite 
cargo, although soon after, the company saw the convenience of using the system for 
passengers and could avoid their exposure to unfavorable weather. Just two years 
later, in 1953, the race began when United Airways developed the “Air dock” 
prototype (which was a refined variation of the above) and JBT Co. patented the first 
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passenger “Jetway” in 1959. By the end of the year the company had installed the 
“Jetway 1” at San Francisco International Airport (see Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.5. The first mechanized cargo dock. For passenger purposes, the same 
concept was reused soon after by some airlines. Reproduced from Flight Magazine, 
UK: The Official Organ of the Royal Aero Club, 1952, p. 26. 
The jet-bridge marks an important shift in the history of the landside–airside 
boundary. With the exception of smaller regional airports, the transit from the building 
to the cabin was finally isolated, but not without complications. Designers had to 
develop a device capable of adapting to the rapidly changing heights of airplanes. The 
jet-bridge is a typical example of a “heterogeneous technical object” that has been 
constructed by diverse forces (Akrich, 1992, p. 205). It is my contention that the 
invention of this artifact embodies two kinds of “actorships”: first, it responds to the 
interests of passengers (whose complaints were impossible to ignore), and second, it 
depends on the requirements of the machine (the diverse shape and sizes of aircraft 
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complicated for years a possible solution). I suggest, therefore, that a more current 
reading of these artifacts should include these formative features. 
 
Figure 2.6. One of the first jetways is tested at SFO airport. Photo: United Airlines. 
(1964). Negative. San Francisco International Airport. Retrieved from 
http://www.flysfo.com/web/page/about/organization/history/1950s.html 
Although the airport configuration during the 1950s became a clear example of 
technological momentum, few designers responded to the growing complexities of the 
landside–airside boundary. Most of the designs opted either for lateral growth, 
producing incredibly long buildings parallel to the runways, or for the newer 
perpendicular piers recommended by ICAO. These adaptations and new 
configurations often left aside the fact that social aspects now would play a role in 
direct proportion to both traffic growth and local culture particularities. But experts as 
well as designers were tempted to predict what was coming in the next few years, and 
they didn’t miss the mark by much. For example, Prokosch (1951) foresaw the 
“mechanization of docking” (p. 115), which he considered not economically viable. 
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The author and airport planner also thought that “for many years the bane of passenger 
handling—at least from the passengers’ viewpoint—has been the fact that loading an 
airplane cannot be accomplished with protection from the elements. Extensible canvas 
awnings were used at a few airports with meager success. The ubiquitous umbrella 
almost lent a touch of comedy to the loading process as passenger and agent leaped 
among the puddles in a dash toward the cabin door” (p. 115). On another front, 
American Airlines engineer E. W. Fuller, building on the European bus model, 
proposed to transfer passengers on double-decker buses, which could load at ground 
level and feed passengers at the same height of an aircraft (see Figure 2.7). His 
proposal was presented at the Society for Automotive Engineers in 1952, but was later 
dismissed (“Airport Bus,” 1953, p. 69). Fuller’s design was called the “mobile 
gatehouse” and curiously somehow anticipates Saarinen’s solution for Dulles. 
Nevertheless, technological change was far from homogeneous. Two terminals 
went beyond the planning mainstream and became symbols of their time: TWA 
Terminal at New York’s Idlewild, and Lambert Terminal in St. Louis. In 1956, just a 
few months after Minoru Yamasaki’s structurally monumental terminal opened to the 
public in Missouri, Saarinen was commissioned to design Terminal 1 for New York’s 
Idlewild. His approach, in his own words, was to accomplish what Yamasaki left as 
“something to be desired as a flight terminal” (Temko, 1962, p. 46). Amid the rapid 
changes of the time, the iconic TWA terminal in New York became an inspiration 
model, where metaphor and symbolism played together with a futuristic aesthetic of 
connecting tubes and bridges. Leaving the springy lawns of the airfield aside, TWA 
offered stunning views through its monumental elliptical rose window. No doubt, the 
legendary terminal became for many the technological cathedral of the future. Pulitzer 
prize–winner Allen Temko (1962) described right after Saarinen’s death why TWA 
became so important: “Individual man, in the symbolic personage of the traveler, was 
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given [more] consideration, on the whole, than were machines and corporations” (p. 
46). However, few know that the main forces behind the grandiose design were the 
airlines, and not the city’s administrations (as is commonly thought). When Wallace 
K. Harrison individualized terminals in his plan for an airport city, he made them 
exclusive to airlines, thus triggering corporate competition and the use of architecture 
as means of large-scale branding. 
 
Figure 2.7. Prior to Dulles’s Mobile Lounge concept, E. W. Fuller of American 
Airlines devised a similar system that used double-deckers for the same function. 
Reproduced from Popular Science, July 1953. 
V. Towards the Reinvention of the Airport 
By the time FAA was established in 1958, airspace had been successfully regulated 
and normalized in the U.S.; thus aviation marched steadily towards its consolidation as 
a large technological system. But during the roughly twenty years that separate the 
planning of LaGuardia and the airport congestion crisis around 1960, the traceable 
changes at the landside–airside boundary were relatively gradual. In fact it was the 
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technological continuity and its own consolidation into more formal knowledge (the 
planning profession) that kept the debate on the landside–airside boundary at its 
lowest. However, social pressures continued to rise as congestion started to hit most 
large-scale airports across the U.S. and Europe. The international scene of airport 
planning was suffering from similar problems across the board, and still under the not-
so-distant shadows of the Second World War, the nationalistic temptation to form new 
systems from zero was certainly strong. 
In the U.S., after the birth of the airport city at New York’s Idlewild, President 
Eisenhower’s special Airport Commission of 1958 reported that the future may 
“require super-airports and at least six of them . . .they should be located at a 
considerable distance from metropolitan centers and high costs could be anticipated” 
(quoted in Chandos, 1956, p. 27). This piece of advice certainly paved the way for a 
possible reinvention of the airport as a system. 
In the fading days of the CAA, presidential advisor General Elwood R. 
Quesada took over the FAA and the tortuous mission of furnishing the capital city 
with a brand-new airport. Quesada put himself at the forefront of a team of FAA 
experts, plus Ellery Husted, a reputed local master planner, and personally took over 
the task of finding the right land plot for the new airport (Geraci, 1965, pp. 15–16). In 
1958, once the preliminaries were ready, the New York firm Ammann & Whitney, a 
high-caliber engineering company that held in its resume nothing less than the George 
Washington Bridge, was awarded the contract. Quesada “zealously insisted that the 
passenger should not receive short shrift; instead the objective was to get them through 
the airport as safely and expeditiously as possible” (Geraci, 1965, pp. 15–16). 
During the previous decade the voice of the passenger was mainly heard 
through the press and letters to the authorities. In 1961, travel journalist Robert C. 
Ruark ironically described how “one of the more desirable aspects of the modern 
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airport is its capacity for serving as a training camp for athletes. I don’t take the long 
healthful strolls in the country anymore, I just travel by air.” For passengers the 
experience of traveling became gradually less pleasurable. In the sequence of a 
departure flow, for example, passengers would have to form long lines at short drop-
off curbsides, be rushed by traffic officials, and again form new long lines at check-in 
counters. Once documented, users and their companions had to walk down long aisles 
to reach their departing flights. In the end, departure halls were totally overcrowded 
because passengers and companions were not yet separated. The last nuisance was the 
imperative need to use stairwells (U.S.) or ramps (Europe) and to walk on the tarmac 
regardless of the weather conditions. 
By the end of the 1950s, one more inconvenience was the exhaustingly long 
boarding time. “It sometimes seems to take longer to get to an airplane than it does to 
fly 300 or even 50 miles,” passengers complained to the New York Post in 1959 (“Jet-
Age Progress,” 1959). Distance and delay certainly created a paradox. A year before, 
others papers such as the Sunday Star in Washington chronicled how “for the 
commercial plane passenger, the average hike from ticket counter to plane was about 
1/5 of a mile. Passengers transferring from Continental to American Airlines at the 
new Chicago’s O’Hare jet airfield must walk 9/10 of a mile from arrival to departure 
points” (“You Ride to Plane in Mobile Lounge,” 1962, pp. 36–37). 
But it was the FAA that finally decided to remediate the crisis. On the one 
hand, the agency had to cope with increasing demands from traffic and thus the 
airlines and the travelers. Through its Public Affairs newsletter, the FAA (1961b) 
declared that “the magnitude of Dulles International Airport and the tremendous air 
traffic to be handled there in the foreseeable future caused the FAA to search for new 
methods of solving the passenger handling problems facing most airport terminals 
today. The Dulles terminal will provide the necessary facilities required to streamline 
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passenger handling for the jet age” (p. 2). At the time, airport facilities were often 
patched with temporary solutions that only remedied the issues for short periods. Thus 
the FAA was particularly “concerned with the tendency for airports to grow by the 
construction or extension of finger systems. Finger systems cause tremendous 
inconvenience to passengers when enplaning, deplaning or attempting to transfer from 
one airline to another.” 
But not all passengers agreed, especially because now they were less exposed 
to the elements. For the FAA (1961b), however, “the conventional finger system 
makes the passenger walk long distances through the fingers and additional distances 
to the plane, exposed to wind, rain aircraft noise and propeller blast from adjoining 
gates. This method often requires long and intricate aircraft taxiing” (p. 3). 
In addition, the agency did not favor the loading bridge system used at some 
airports because it also “involves long walking distances thought finger buildings, 
although all on one level. It does, however, keep the passenger sheltered at all times.” 
This is a very important assumption that the FAA makes with respect to the newest 
technology on the market. It discredits the system based on the above reason and the 
argument that they “also require costly, intricate aircraft taxiing and demands 
precision positioning at the gate” (FAA, 1961b, p. 3). Nonetheless, agency officials 
thought that “by contrast, the normal highway type bus system in use at London, 
Frankfurt or Amsterdam cuts down the passenger walking distance” (Chandos, 1956, 
p. 27) (also known as channels in the UK). This motorized solution allowed the British 
to operate a very dynamic ramp at Heathrow where many aircraft could be parked 
remotely and perhaps have smaller satellite facilities as support. However, officers 
complained that the bus would “still require changes in levels and the passengers are 
exposed to weather, noise, blast and fumes during the transfer from bus to plane” 
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(FAA, 1961b, p. 9). So in the end, the FAA was in need of a new passenger-handling 
concept, not just at Washington Dulles, but nationwide. 
In the case of Dulles Airport, what had to be finally reformulated was not only 
the object (terminal) or the system (airport) but its meaning (for example, it would be 
difficult to reinvent a seaport from scratch without understanding the cruise ship and 
the ship passenger, plus their in-between relationships). In this airport, those 
relationships of mediation would be part of a negotiation process in which different 
actors pursue different interests. 
The outcome would be a new kind of landside–airside boundary configuration, 
one never seen before, resulting in a whole new kind of airport. This section traces 
those voices (FAA, designers, planners, engineers, airlines, passengers, pilots, 
journalists, administrators, government officials, and others) and analyzes their role in 
negotiating and eventually materializing a reinvention of the airport. 
VI. The Birth of the Mobile Lounge 
Perhaps the history of Dulles Airport should be divided between the planning and 
design phases. Apparently, this would be consistent with the fact that after the 
consolidation of planning as a profession between the 1950s and 1960s, both activities 
would split up a good deal of the work. However, there were unique conditions behind 
the initial organization of Dulles; the client concentrated most of the load of both 
specialties in the hands of the architect. Charles Landrum, a pioneer airport consultant 
with Landrum & Brown, acted as the external consultant, but the FAA left him little 
room to maneuver. Remarkably, this was not necessarily the case in practice, since 
Saarinen split his staff into two main branches: field investigators and designers. 
Therefore, an integrated account would be historically imprecise. 
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Although it was General Quesada himself who wanted to hire Saarinen 
(Geraci, 1965, p. 16), in the case of Dulles, the pressures to deliver a scientifically 
sound study (that could justify a new airport concept) initially relied entirely on 
Ammann & Whitney and not on the architect. I should point out again that FAA 
contract #33777 mentions neither Saarinen nor any of the other specialists. Thus the 
responsible party must have inflicted tremendous pressure on the subcontractor. By 
the end of 1958, Saarinen put two teams to work in parallel. One key condition was 
necessary in order to come up with a whole new idea for an airport. According to 
Hughes (1983), “the system builder needs to direct a process involving problem 
identification and solution as an idea” (p. 19). As I showed in the previous section, the 
FAA provided a very solid problem identification (from users mostly, rather than from 
any theory) and eventually pointed towards the most desirable solution. For the FAA, 
the European bus system was perfectible; thus the message was sent straightforwardly, 
and Saarinen was expected to come up with an integral solution. 
During the first year of preliminary studies Saarinen designated two teams, 
which were put in charge of carrying out two central tasks: a comparative analysis of 
airports and a study of the most common airport problems. To come up with a 
comprehensive comparative table, the Finnish architect scheduled a number of trips 
throughout the world in search of the most modern airports; to research passenger 
complaints and general airport issues, Kevin Roche—one of his closest collaborators 
and his eventual successor—was put in charge of surveying airports worldwide in 
order to list all sort of problems, layout weaknesses, delays, and passenger complaints. 
Basically, the surveys’ purpose was to feedback architectural schemes towards an 
airport that would fulfill Quesada’s main concern: to expedite transit through the 
airport at any cost. 
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Thanks to a generous budget, employees were sent in all directions to “time” 
and “evaluate” airports. In 1962, U.S. News & World Report published a special 
reportage on the planning of Dulles. In the article the editors describe how Saarinen 
organized the task: “before he drew a line, he sent out teams with counters and stop 
watches to see what people really did at airports, how far they walk their interchange 
problems” (“A Look at the Newest Thing in Airports,” 1962, pp. 78), as he put it. He 
found that as airports grew and jets consumed more and more space (a 200-foot 
parking diameter), travelers had to walk further and further along miles-long ‘fingers’ 
to get to them” (p. 80). 
The Washington Sunday Star reported that “Architect Saarinen, trying to find a 
better method of airport transportation, bought stop watches and counters and sent 
men to several airports to clock passengers time between flights” (“You Ride to Plane 
in Mobile Lounge,” p. 37). In the firm’s logbook, several airports are listed for testing. 
Visits were organized to Zurich, Philadelphia, London, Australia, Montreal, Newark, 
Dublin, Alaska, Charleston, Edinburgh, Seattle, Rio de Janeiro, Chicago, Long Beach, 
and Burbank, among others. The envoys reported back to a table of solely quantitative 
data, which included relationship tables of distances, times, basic characteristics 
(finger, pier, satellite systems, etc.). Those tables were handwritten on paper, sorted, 
selected, and later photographed. 
In the meantime Mr. Roche made slow progress in his personal striped 
notebook, where several pages show small sketches of traffic flows with passenger 
patterns in the shape of arrows pointing in different directions. His notebook also 
evidences the lack of an appropriate requirement program; Roche himself was 
gathering a long list of locales and facilities that could or should be included. Roche 
and his collaborators were in fact dealing with the geometries of aircraft taxi and 
parking movements at the ramp. In his notes appears the name Froesch & Prokosch, 
	  114 
and many of the requirements and suggestions are direct transcripts of the original 
airport-planning treatise. This may explain the total absence of the terms landside and 
airside from all documents and technical drawings.9 
Even the word airside was replaced on many documents with the unusual 
aircraft space. Among the various diagrams and drawings produced by the architect, 
several propose separation of flows in sections; others, slightly more elaborate, 
organize the different elements of the program, similar to TWA in New York. These 
sketches illustrate architectural parties of internal and external organization around a 
major central hall called “the waiting room” that is similar to Saarinen’s approach for 
TWA in New York; from this room piers sprung to a parallel loading pier, also 
emulating LaGuardia’s Skywalk. 
The aforementioned process speaks of little progress in terms of laying out a 
new airport, but enough data was collected to inform two key charts: a table illustrates 
how large airports such as Chicago and Los Angeles had very long walks, 6200 feet 
and 6500 feet respectively (under their worst possible condition), but in general the 
means are close to 2000 feet in walkable length (see Figure 2.8) (“Passenger Walking 
Distances,” 1959). The second chart shows a curve in which the “average” finger 
scheme for Dulles would require that passengers travel forty-five minutes from check-
in to departure (“Time Study—Mobile Lounge,” 1959). In the final scheme 
hypothetical times and distances were added to these tables and compared as technical 
evidence. In parallel, Saarinen was in charge of the design aspects. His immediate 
reaction was to use the very standard method of analogues. This model, popularized 
through architecture schools since the days of the Beaux Arts, calls for a compilation 
                                                
9 The original Masterplan submitted by Ammann & Whitney, and Saarinen, mentions neither the 
landside nor the airside (Ammann & Whitney, Eero Saarinen, Burns & McDonnell, Ellery Husted, & 
Burhan Kelly, 1960).  
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of similar buildings that resemble the genre, the program, or the purpose of the target 
building. Once the analogues are gathered there are critique sessions in which the lead 
designer speaks of the pros and cons of each scheme (or experience) and tries to unveil 
the “metis” (Polanyi). The trained eye of the master-lead designer ponders the 
previous layouts in terms of style, efficiency, structure, aesthetics, abstraction, 
economy, responsiveness, buildability, context, character, and originality.10 Above all, 
a design is a hypothesis that the creator tries to elevate to the category of a paradigm. 
Extrapolating from Kuhn’s model (Bird, 2011), the hypothesis must seem better than 
its competitors and gain acceptance from expert groups in order to be considered 
paradigmatic. 
Saarinen traveled extensively, as his letters and personal documents show, in 
search of the best and most modern airports. On some of his visits he announced 
himself as a sort of ambassador and requested technical visits.11 In other trips, such as 
to London, Sao Paulo, Athens, Rome, or Zurich, he thoroughly toured the facilities. 
From his private collection of hundreds of slides it is evident that his interest was 
eminently architectural and not technical in terms of airport planning. It is particularly 
revealing that on two slides special marks cross out the titles; these photographs bear a 
striking resemblance to certain back angles of Monco & Luccichenti’s Fiumicino 
Airport and the final version of Dulles. 
                                                
10 Paraphrasing Lackney (1999). 
11 Saarinen often asked Charles Laudrum, his famous airport planner, and other governmental officers 
to write on his behalf in order to receive special credentials in the airports he was touring. For example, 
in a letter directed to Pierre Cot, Paris Airport executive director, he expresses his interests in “airport 
problems” and asks for assistance in going through the “magnificent new facility.” Saarinen, E. [Letter 
to Mr. Pierre Cot. May 18, 1961. Saarinen, E. (1961, May) 593. Box 8, Doc 95. Collection Manuscripts 
& Archives, Yale University. 
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Figure 2.8. Passenger walking distances. Saarinen was gradually building an argument 
to justify a reinvention of the airport. The airport’s biggest flaw seems to have been 
the long passenger walking distances. “Passenger Walking Distances,” from the 
Saarinen Archive, 1959, Kodak Color Patch, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library. 
Back in America he traveled to the West to visit the spectacular Lambert 
Terminal at St. Louis International, designed by his direct competitor, Minoru 
Yamasaki. Of all his trips this one perhaps became the most influential during the 
design process. Back in Hamden, Saarinen started a series of sketches in which he 
became seriously concerned with the structural shape of the possible terminal 
building. The drawings depict different geometries and possible organic shapes for 
spanning a nave. On a more finished sketch the architect shows how the main façade 
of the building forms a monumental colonnade and a long car drop-off sidewalk.12 
Here Saarinen shows his interest in what historian of engineering David Billington 
                                                
12 Saarinen, E. 3080–3133. Box 463, Doc 59. Collection Manuscripts & Archives, Yale University.  
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(1983) has called structural art, which is understandable if one compares the very high 
standards set by the beautiful concrete vaults of the St. Louis airport. 
Speaking of system builders, Hughes (1983) suggests that “the first expression 
of an idea often appears as a drawing in a notebook or a scrap of paper” because 
inventors are frequently visual (p. 19). In Saarinen’s sketchbook, though, there are no 
accounts of the landside–airside boundary concept of Dulles. Rather there are multiple 
roof alternatives, vaulting systems (some similar to Nervi’s), colonnades (some 
derivative of the same Yamasaki), and structural shapes. His concept does not yet 
reveal the reorganizing vision of the airport as a whole. But following my 
extrapolation of Kuhn’s model, many pieces of the puzzle now do fit. Yamasaki’s 
scheme had two opportunities for improvement: 
• Planning: Replace the finger scheme. 
• Design: Integrate the split vaults in one single nave (in the ideals of modern 
architecture the sublimation comes from achieving full homogeneity or a 
“universal space,” completely lacking of historical or cultural references). 
It is through this possible model of competition, I argue, that Saarinen resolves 
the riddle: in terms of planning he follows the bus model of London Airport (with 
which the FAA sympathizes), but in order to fix the variations between the aircraft and 
the building (the nature of the variable machine versus the stillness of the terminal), he 
turns it into a technological challenge. Innovation passes now to the hands of Chrysler, 
the quintessential American company of the 1960s. Saarinen has given them the idea, 
a simple one perhaps, but now the pressure is on the fabricant. This may explain why 
Chrysler Corporation cites both the design and construction of the mobile lounge as 
theirs in several advertisement of the time.13 Freed from the planning straightjacket, 
                                                
13 Eero Saarinen Collection (1938–1962), Printouts of advertisements by Chrysler, publicizing the 
virtues of the Mobile Lounge (1961–1963). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
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Saarinen tackles the design aspect and uses the same structural system he used a few 
years later for the Yale University Ice Rink. The roof will be strung from cables, 
producing a support-less open plan. “It will never be hard for critics to find basic 
decisions which irrevocably shaped the form and movement of this jet-designed field. 
CAA selected the runway pattern it wanted for south-to-north and north-to-south 
operations with jets landing and taking off simultaneously. It adopted the mobile 
lounge concept to move passengers between far-flung ramp positions and a 
centralized, tight-knit terminal building. Virtually nothing that has been done since 
these two decisions were made—long before first contracts—has been unaffected by 
them” (Dunbar, 1960, p. 37). This fascinating dichotomy may be understood through 
the lens of Pinch and Bijker’s former idea of the technological frame. More 
specifically, for Bijker (1997), technological frames are built up as an interaction 
around an artifact begins, and once constructed they shape activity. In this case, 
Saarinen’s suggestion of a mechanically adjustable bus (Mobile Lounge) depicts an 
engineer’s response to the key problems the artifact is sought to solve; therefore, it is 
“imprinted” (Akrich, 1992) with very specific routines and codes (see Figure 2.9). In 
contrast, the terminal is a neutral artifact, devoid of meaning or specific purpose. It 
could be a terminal, but also anything else that may need a shelter. Thus, Bijker’s idea 
of the technological frame helps explain why the interactions between the relevant 
actors (Saarinen, FAA, Chrysler, Ammann & Whitney, Landrum, Quesada, Burns & 
McDonnell, Ellery Husted, plus passengers, the press, politicians, and so forth) spin 
around the mobile lounge and not the terminal itself. It also clarifies why this 
technological object follows a process of substitution for previous landside–airside 
boundaries and how, in doing so, creates a circle of activity that may be understood as 
well as a continuous negotiation. 
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Figure 2.9. Diagram showing how the landside–airside boundary is now mechanized. 
“The Mobile Lounge,” from the Saarinen Archive, 1959, Exhibit 12, Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University Library. 
However, things were far from decided. According to an article published in 
the New Yorker, “to sell his scheme, Saarinen had his long-time friend Charles Eames 
make a film on the trials of an air passenger, in which one background noise was the 
squeak of shoes. Washington officials were sold last week” (“Jet-Age Airport,” 1959, 
p. 18). In fact, the concept was immediately welcomed by many, even in its most 
preliminary phase. Journalist Brad Dunbar (1960) said in Airlift that “snuggling 
against gates built two-abreast in each bay on the field of the terminal will be the 
mobile lounges. Whether ‘detachable terminal fingers’ or glorified buses on stilts, they 
will be the true key to Dulles International Airport” (p. 37). However, much was at 
stake now, and the final efficiency of the new system was hard to predict. In a master 
plan preliminary report, Ammann & Whitney and Saarinen presume that some of the 
assumptions on the plans for the airport have been based will inevitably change, so 
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they ask the FAA to develop a mechanism for adjustment (Ammann & Whitney et al., 
1960). 
But on other fronts the first design progress reports triggered new discussions 
with new interlocutors. The airlines, for example, categorically rejected any 
responsibility for supplying a traffic quota or for paying any of the construction costs 
of Dulles. The airlines were against the mobile lounge from the beginning, because the 
estimated costs were greater than those of the finger type operation. They made an 
offer of $360,000 per year of use. Negotiations to discuss the airlines’ participation 
and project scheme lasted six weeks.14 The Association of Pilots & Aircraft Owners 
(AOPA) sent multiple letters to the FAA and published others in their bi-monthly 
newsletter claiming that 
individual and corporate taxpayers in the 50 states are committed to pay some 
$150 million for the land, construction cost, landscaping and access facilities 
of Dulles Airport. These taxpayers and aircraft users are expecting a regional 
jet airport that will meet the requirements of those who desire long-haul 
international or domestic jet transportation. They expect airport designers to 
lay out a plan that will provide equal convenience at the terminal building for 
seat-holding airline patrons, no matters what modern conveyance they use in 
arriving to go aboard any airline transport. They want no discrimination with 
reference to loading accommodations, between the passenger who arrives by 
air taxi and one arriving by highway taxicab. They expect design experts to 
select adequate space near terminal building doors for both the rental airplane 
user and the car user. They will want a prospective airline passenger who 
arrive in a private or business airplane to step out of his vehicle as close to 
ticketing and baggage services as will the passenger who arrives in the 
family’s Chevrolet or his company’s Chrysler. (Thompson, 1962, p .1) 
                                                
14 Bacon, R. F. [Director of the Bureau of National Capital Airports]. (1962, April). [Letter to the 
Administrator of the FAA Memorandum No. 7941]. From the U.S. State Government. 
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Figure 2.10. Commercial postcard showing how the passenger’s upload to the aircraft 
now takes place in the middle of the apron. Postcard “Mobile Lounge at Dulles,” by 
the Allen Company, 1964. Retrieved from http://www.cardcow.com/211626/mobile-
lounge-at-dulles-international-airport-washington-district-columbia/ 
But the FAA felt that the Mobile Lounge concept was a model that could be 
replicated in the future, perhaps even a typological building. And perhaps Chrysler 
saw big business in the future (see Figure 2.10). For the FAA, “every possible method 
was explored to increase passenger comfort, convenience and to reduce the walking at 
Dulles International Airport since it is the first airport being designed for the jet age 
from the ground up” (FAA, 1961b, p. 3). In the same vein, in a letter referring to an 
administrative report to the U.S. Congress, Acting Director of the Bureau of National 
Capital Airports Robert F. Bacon assured Congressmen M. Gerhardt that the finger 
system was not only outdated but, relying on the studies made for this project, 
economically less costly. Bacon affirmed that exhaustive studies under his supervision 
verified that the Mobile Lounge is far a superior alternative to the satellite and finger 
systems.15 Others published: “So it is encouraging to learn that at least something is 
                                                
15 Bacon, R. F. [Director of the Bureau of National Capital Airports]. (1962, March) [Letter to U.S. 
Congressman M. Gerhardt]. 
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being done about shortening the time it takes to get aboard after you have reached the 
air terminal” (“Jet-Age Progress,” 1959). Both the planning and the design were 
finished, and a supportive environment was being built. 
The FAA internally published four reports called “fact sheets,” the purpose of 
which was to homogenize the information that had to be communicated to the exterior. 
The sum of these reports forms what I call here the official version. For the FAA 
(1961a), “the terminal consists of a single compact building. It is therefore radically 
different from the usual terminal building, which sprawls out with fingers extending to 
distant plane positions. This compact terminal was made possible by the adoption of 
an entirely new method of passengers movement from terminal to parked aircraft—the 
FAA Mobile Lounge concept” (p. 2). Furthermore, Dulles represented an “entirely 
new method of passenger movement from terminal to parked aircraft” (FAA, 1961a, p. 
3). Thus, what spanned the gap between previous airport examples and Dulles were 
the proposed innovations at the landside, the airside, and the boundary that divides 
them. For the Association of Pilots & Aircraft Owners (AOPA), Dulles “was designed 
to eliminate the walking distance and time delays that have steadily increased at the 
conventional finger type airport building. When mobile lounge vehicles are used, the 
large jet planes do not come up to the terminal, but are serviced on a remote central 
service apron between widely spaced parallel taxiways and runways” (p. 3).  
 This terminal building area arrangement permits the passenger arriving by 
automobile to unload directly in front of the airline that serves him. Just inside the 
entrance doors are the ticketing and baggage check-in counters. The mobile lounges 
wait in docks on the opposite side of the building, as little as 150 feet from the doors. 
“Between the check-in counters and the docks, in an appropriate location, are 
consumer service or concession areas where newsstands, shops, restaurant, coffee 
shop, and other public facilities face the field” (Thompson, 1962, pp. 3–4). The FAA 
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(1961a) maintained that “from an airport management standpoint, it allows maximum 
operational flexibility of the airport by placing aircraft operational facilities separate 
from passenger handling facilities and placing each in its own uncongested area” (p. 
4). Again the Agency emphasizes another of the major changes at the landside–airside 
boundary. In its official fact sheet, the FAA (1961a) highlights the new features of the 
concept in relation to aircraft and taxiing: “Another distinct advantage of the Mobile 
Lounge concept is that the passenger terminal can be concentrated in a single structure 
rather than in the sprawl of numerous buildings now found at most major airports. In 
addition to simplifying the passengers’ problem of enplaning and deplaning, the new 
concept requires a minimum of aircraft taxiing to and from gate positions. This is 
extremely important to the big jet transports since they weigh upwards of 200,000 
pounds and consume large quantities of fuel while taxiing” (p. 4). The official 
description of the terminal continues: “passengers entering the lounge at the terminal 
will pass on either side of the driver’s compartment and enter the spacious lounge. 
Music will be piped in from the terminal building. There will be carpeting on the floor, 
soft pleasant lighting overhead and tinted windows to filter light from outside” (p. 9). 
Once passengers approach the gates, they will board a Mobile Lounge. “One end is 
designed to connect to the terminal building utilizing two wide entrances. The other 
end is designed while all four-engine aircrafts are at use today, and in the foreseeable 
future by domestic or international carriers. This connecting device will permit an easy 
transfer of passengers between the Lounge and the aircraft at the level of the aircraft to 
the building at which point it automatically becomes a comfortable waiting room or 
lounge of the terminal building” (p. 2). In the Mobile Lounge, “the passenger 
compartment will accommodate a total of 90 passenger with 73 seated” (p. 9). Access 
to the local services or feeder planes is by a central wing that projects out beyond the 
main concourse of the terminal. “The upper story of this wing will house a beautiful 
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dining room commanding a full view of the jet gates and the landing field area. Also 
the roof of this wing will serve as an observation platform” (p. 6). In conclusion, three 
aspects stand out from the “official description” of the airport; first, the FAA 
discredits the “finger” option; second, they make clear that the airport is a “radical 
departure” from the past; and third, they emphasize a new level of passenger comfort 
throughout the complex. 
VII. Materializing a New Landside–Airside Boundary 
The new landside–airside boundary at Dulles rephrases our historical dialogue with 
aircraft. Although a technologist may trace some continuity and branch evolutionary 
patterns between LaGuardia in 1939 and Dulles in 1962, it is not until now that the 
boundary allows a full revision and questioning, from top to bottom, of the airport’s 
past. This in-depth revision shows how the increasing tensions within closed systems 
result in eventual crisis and thus a reformulation of the most basic terms becomes 
necessary. In the end, Dulles does not change the airport at all; its essence untouched. 
Planes land and depart, people arrive by car, bus, or on foot; somehow they enplane 
and deplane; sightseers are awed, employees work, baggage is loaded and unloaded. 
Although multiple voices helped shape the new boundary, a system builder remains 
necessary. Table 2.1 lists some of the main interests and the different actors. 
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Table 2.1. Actors Who Intervened in the Decision Process for Dulles, by Main Interest 
and Specific Role During Negotiations 
Social group Central interest Specific role 
FAA (Federal Aviation 
Authority) 
PROGRAM Provides a new kind of airport that responds to the current airport 
crisis across the country. The agency showed preference for a 
variation on the UK’s bus system.  
The main contractor DELIVER Delivers a master plan that is technically sound and complies with 
the contract.  
The designer INTEGRATE Creates a paradigmatic building that stands out in architectural 
modernism, and is therefore accepted by the leading groups of the 
profession. Outshines his competition (St. Louis Airport)  
The designer’s team JUSTIFY Technically justifies the new solution, provides evidence (statistical 
and quantitative) in the shape of “exhibits.”  
Chrysler  Engineer that technically solves the Mobile Lounge. They bet for a 
potential airport dependency in the short future (ML devices), and 
thus future business.  
Users of airports DEMAND Want a more comfortable experience of travel; Complain about 
walking long distances or multiple levels, agglomeration or 
jamming, getting exposed to the elements, etc.  
Critics and journalists PUSH ON Have become ironic and sour. Complain about the airports of the 
1950s is so cramped and uncomfortable, that is becoming the news. 
Places hope on new ideas that could improve the current situation.  
The airlines TRADE Did not like the concept of Mobile Lounges because it would create 
added cost and additional need for personnel, thus, less revenue. 
Refused to take any responsibility for the “experimental” layout.  
The administrators DECIDE Agreed upon the need to look for options other than the “finger 
scheme.”  
ICAO (International 
Civil Aviation 
Organization) 
REGULATE Issued regulations that expected designers to address the landside 
airside boundary in their designs. The norm called for multiple 
requirements such as separation of flows, etc.  
Pilots and aircraft 
owners 
IMPROVE Asked for equal convenience at the terminal building for seat-
holding airline patrons; no discrimination for those arriving in 
transportation other than cars, equal dealing with users of general 
aviation.  
Federal government FORESEE “Super-airports” based on exceptional planning and located at a 
considerable distance from metropolitan centers. High costs could 
be anticipated.  
The airport consultant PRIORITIZE This specialized voice of this specialist has been deliberately 
suppressed by the client. Airport consultation could end in a 
“priorities conflict.” Rather, the FAA takes all the credit for what 
they called “airport studies.”  
 
A designer is an integrator and a negotiator; hence Saarinen’s success as a 
system builder is the product of posing the problem in a way that any possible 
outcome would cover most of the interests on the negotiation board. In spite of the 
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excessive reliance of the FAA on one person, Saarinen came afloat, projecting 
confidence and reliability. His use of a scientific approach to his designs granted him 
invulnerability to the enemies of change. Much was at stake in this endeavor for both 
the designer and the promoter; faith on the efficacy on a new landside–airside 
boundary relationship was the only way to guarantee a welcome reception to the 
reinvented airport. 
As the landside–airside boundaries gained complexity, they could now be 
materialized or de-materialized, meaning that they could be designed to shorten the 
total passenger’s walking distances. In the case of Dulles terminal, the concourse level 
may be fully considered part of the landside. Nothing at the building is subordinated to 
the interests of the airport, not even the height of the floor. Conversely, no aspect of 
the aircraft enforces actions on the part of humans. At Dulles, the landside–airside 
boundary materializes as an independent artifact, adding even more complexity to its 
historical relationship. The Mobile Lounge is like being in limbo or in a shared 
territory of convergence. If passengers are neither in one realm or the other, the 
Mobile Lounge reveals as a nonplace that is far from neutral. For the first time in 
history, a “bustronaut”16 is in charge of adjusting the landside–airside device and 
making it “fit” according to the needs of machines and humans. Bustronauts had 
basically two tasks: first, to operate the machine and adjust its height in order to make 
it flush with the terminal level; and second, to manually change the machine’s 
configuration and adapt it to the variable height and specs of aircraft. 
But perhaps only Quesada’s clairvoyant view describes why this discussion is 
right at the core of technological determinism. In 1958, the President’s Airport 
Commission maintained that “the question whether fixed airport facilities should 
                                                
16 Sutton (1962) mentions in his article that the Mobile Lounge drivers used to call themselves 
“Bustronauts” (p. 23). 
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control future airport design is highly controversial. To say that the average-capacity 
should be the limiting factor in airport design is to place an undesirable inhibition on 
progress. Conversely, complete latitude in airport design planning makes long range 
planning for a well-integrated airport system difficult or impossible” (pp. 38, 39). This 
debate captures how the opposed interests of technical groups and users will 
eventually collide and form landside–airside boundaries. On the one hand, new aircraft 
“demands” new requirements, for example a 1958 DC-8 jet by Douglas was 
significantly larger in wingspan, and higher and noisier than the previous DC-3. On 
the other, passengers no longer wished to be exposed to the high-pitched noise from 
the jet turbine; for the traveler walking on the tarmac it was not as romantic as it used 
to be. How should designers resolve this conflict? 
I suggest that landside–airside boundaries are spaces between two ended 
technological interfaces, and that at each end, humans and machines interplay, in a 
continuum state of negotiation. That is why the airport never stops changing. But once 
identified as an entity (an interface in this case), it can be studied and classified. Just 
as the interface of a device mediates the interaction between users and technological 
artifacts, airports would become the interaction platform between users and aircraft. 
Ultimately, a landside–airside boundary works as a technological anchor that 
allows the understanding of the system from top to bottom, and not necessarily from 
the base up. The way this operates may be exemplified by the Dulles concept. For 
example, I described earlier in this chapter how different airport layouts failed to 
provide a better balance to the human (user) / machine (transport) conflict, and I 
pointed out how they formed a sort of technological progression, up to the point where 
innovation, or the Jet-bridge, became an evident solution to the crisis. However, the 
outcome of Dulles is totally unpredictable in terms of historical linearity. The FAA 
showed no “blind faith in progress” because the preferred option for the airport was 
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not the obvious pier plus Jet-bridge. In this situation, the futurologist cannot predict 
what is next, and the analyst no longer understands how the system works. On the 
contrary, the sole identification of the landside–airside boundary at Dulles might 
explain why such a layout addresses almost twenty years of planning failures. Each 
question that we ask about the way Dulles’s boundary was set will inevitably unveil an 
old chain of techno-social conflicts, and an intriguing historical irregularity. 
Under a cloud of great expectations the FAA (1961a) reported that the “new 
Dulles International Airport was being constructed with passenger comfort and 
convenience in mind. For instance, instead of walking, passengers will ride in air-
conditioned comfort from the terminal building to their airplanes in a waiting room on 
wheels. Called a Mobile Lounge, this unique vehicle will be introduced to the air 
traveling public at Dulles International Airport when it opens for business in the fall of 
1962. In size it is comparable to eight intercity busses arranged with two side by side, 
two more parked to the rear of these and then four more stacked on top of the first 
four” (p. 1). According to the Birmingham Eccentric, more than “30,000 of critical 
mock-up situations were tested before the opening” (“Mobile Lounge-Ramp Ends 
Walk to Planes,” 1962). But how was the new airport received by the public? 
In the inaugural dedication speech, president John F. Kennedy stated, “For 
years, people have been hearing about a revolutionary airport for Washington!” (FAA, 
1962). The airport kicked off with 566 flights in the first three weeks of operation 
(Bacon, 1962). “It’s open now, and questions rise: What is it like? Will all Washington 
flights land there? Are novel features working well?” (If You’re Flying to 
Washington, 1962, p. 82). The St. Louis Globe (1962) masthead read: “Dulles 
National Airport makes hit with travelers.” According to letters, during the first week 
of operations passengers complained about the inability to get off and use and enjoy 
the terminal, the Mobile Lounge concept forced all passengers in transit to remain on 
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board until staying passengers deplaned.17 Travel Notes observed that “the Mobile 
Lounge eliminates the cost of building fingers for those long cardiac causeways that 
lead out to the jets in many airports, here and abroad” (Sutton, 1962). For the Boston 
Globe, “the Mobile Lounge is FAA’s answer to the problem most major airport are 
faced with today—that of the ever growing distances passengers are required to walk 
between the terminal building and their aircraft. Up to 90 persons will be transported 
in the Mobile Lounge. It is the largest passengers carrying vehicle ever built to be 
operated on rubber tires” (Riley, 1962). The New Haven Register titled a column “The 
People Likes It: New Dulles Airport Starts Out as $110 Million Hit” (Haugland, 
1962), and Sutton (1962) declared that at the Terminal “no one need touch a tootsie to 
the crust of the outside world. No steps, no stairs, no slush, no slop. The mobile 
lounge has removed the last mile from air travel, at least in Washington” (p. 23). For 
the Boston Globe, it was “designed to take the walk out of airports, it has been hailed 
as the greatest thing for the human foot since the advent of arch-support shoes” 
(“Logan Still a Winner,” 1965). Even the combative association of pilots and aircraft 
owners praised that at Dulles, “both designers and planners for Washington’s 9,800-
acre jet airport have been doing advanced thinking about facilities to increase safety 
and efficiency in the handling of international flights. Today’s jet airport, frequently a 
monument to national or civic pride, can be managed to spread the cost load by 
designing the landing areas and terminal building to accommodate a substantial 
increase in that general aviation traffic which complements the airline business” 
(Thompson, 1962, p. 1). For the association, “the nation will be proud of Dulles 
airport as a national monument and service facility if its final design and operations 
                                                
17 Bacon, R. F. [Director of the Bureau of National Capital Airports]. (1963, May). [Letter to the 
Administrator of the FAA]. 
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plans are also realistic in providing for domestic long-haul patrons” (Thompson, 1962, 
p. 1). 
 
Figure 2.11. This illustration shows how meaningful the configuration of an airport 
could be in the popular culture. Reproduced from My Weekly Reader, November 1962, 
issue on airports. 
In the end the new landside–airside boundary turned quickly into a cultural 
icon. By the end of 1962, My Weekly Reader, a periodical also called the “Children’s 
Newspaper” devoted its November issue to airports, with a focused on the newly 
opened Dulles (“A Jet Airport Opens,” 1962; see Figure 2.11). In the article many 
references are made to the landside–airside boundary in a compelling, simple way. 
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The article explains in ordinary language how the airport borderlines are organized in 
different levels; it describes the flows, the waiting, and the new conveniences. It also 
includes a short reading comprehension exercise in which children are asked questions 
that make them think of airports and the new features of the airport. 
The cultural dimension of these expressions offers an invaluable opportunity to 
understand the social reverberations of the landside–airside boundary and the airport. 
No less compelling was the fact that Mobile Lounge drivers felt proud of their 
historical task. The term “Bustronauts” wonderfully captures how Dulles and its shiny 
new landside–airside boundary were understood as the future here and today for those 
traveling through or working on its grounds. 
The FAA spoke of the future expansions with great optimism: “By 1975, when 
additional gates have been constructed, some aircraft will be parked as remote 
positions as far as three miles from the terminal building.” But these dreams never 
came true. The Mobile Lounge concept lasted for a few years, but the introduction of 
security measures through ICAO’s Annex 17 conflicted much with the rigidity of the 
scheme. By the early 1980s, Dulles Airport’s main tenant, United Airways, decided to 
build midfield buildings where there should be only aircraft parking per Saarinen’s 
layout. Those temporary buildings were necessary to creating more hold-room 
capacity and to release pressure on the declining Mobile Lounge. During my last study 
visit to Dulles in 2010, the Mobile Lounge was working as an inter-terminal shuttle, 
and boards on the walls announce its final replacement and removal for good. Perhaps 
in the future Dulles will be to airports what the Concorde is to aviation. 
In conclusion, I have used Thomas Hughes’s metaphor of technological 
momentum to describe how it led to the (somehow frustrated, however) development 
of a super-system of airports. I have analyzed how Dulles, just like LaGuardia, may be 
considered a historical irregularity. Although in Hughes’s term, the condition that 
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triggers a reinvention of the airport may be seen as a “bottleneck,” I also argue that the 
materialization of Dulles may be seen more as a “rupture” protruding out of an 
imaginary timeline of “standard” airport terminal designs. In order to reduce the 
nightmares of delay and the rising popular discomfort in airports, the FAA initiative of 
reinventing a new kind of airport prompted the development of new ways to deal with 
the rising landside–airside boundary conflict. Designers were encouraged to rethink 
the airport as a socio-technical system, and this incentive shaped the experimental 
planning behind the new airport. In this section I recount how faith in technology at 
the turn of 1960 contributed to the idea that the Mobile Lounge was the ultimate 
solution for the modern airport and its modern user. However, during the following 
decades, Dulles’s influence reached the far corners of the world, but paradoxically the 
airport itself was stigmatized as a failed idea. Flashy, young, professionalized airport 
planners harshly criticized the new system and wish to propose a new one. In the next 
chapter I will tell their story. 
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CHAPTER THREE: “The Landside Airside Concept”—Breaking to Reconnect: 
The “People Mover” at Tampa International Airport, 1962–1971 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. An aerial view of the centralized “landside” building and its “airside” 
satellites. Photo “Tampa International Airport” [public domain], 1972, retrieved from 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/8/80/Aerial_Airside_B-C_1971.PNG 
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It’s the first time in all my 18 years in the consulting business that this has ever 
happened. Everybody wants a terminal right now, maybe even yesterday. They 
define the problem and say “Find the solution.” Tampa has in effect reversed 
that procedure and told me to define the problem first. 
—Leigh Fisher (1965)1 
Right after Dulles Airport was inaugurated in 1962, a group of young 
professional airport planners (Leigh Fisher and Associates) started working once again 
on a complete reinvention of the airport. In a house’s basement they came up with the 
“Landside Airside Concept,” or a new, revolutionary layout that would surpass both 
the experimental Mobile Lounge at the Capital’s airport and all other previous 
schemes. 
This chapter tells this story in six sections, which mainly spin around the 
voices of those actors who were involved in the planning of the fascinating airport that 
is Tampa International Airport (TIA). In the first section, I talk about the way I intend 
to apply S&TS concepts and introduce the reader to general framing of the analysis. In 
the second section, I discuss the history of Tampa’s airport and identify the actors who 
took part in this story (particularly in the formation of the landside–airside boundary), 
and present a chronicle of the public reception of the new facility. Although this may 
be anticlimactic in narrative terms, I would like to provide first a full historical 
snapshot of the airport planning. 
In the following four sections, I analyze the interactions of the design’s 
stakeholders and the role of planners. I have arranged these discussions around three 
key issues: “problem posing,” “problem construct,” and “problem solving.” I have 
                                                
1 Hillsborough County Aviation Authority. (1965). A new approach to jet age air terminal 
development: Progress Report 1961–65. Tampa International Airport. 
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also framed the discussion in technical terms, using Wittgenstein’s (1997) language 
interpretation in Zettel. Thus, in section three, I speak of Leigh Fisher’s diagrammatic 
and semantic planning approach employed at Tampa, directly from interviewing those 
involved at the time. Next, in section four, I address the technical procedures and 
methods, or what I call the problem construct; in section five, I deal with the problem 
solving, or in other words the final planning process. Last, in section six, I conclude by 
pointing out what happened after Tampa’s airport in terms of planning and the 
consequences of extending the People Mover into other airports. In the end I discuss 
why airports are open negotiations that will hardly find a technological closure. 
I. Framing Tampa 
The analyst may be tempted to assume that after the success of Dulles, most airports 
followed the adoption of the new and ostentatiously efficient system of organization, 
Mobile Lounges included. But surprisingly this was not the case. Most large 
international airports—among them Chicago, London Heathrow, and Miami—kept 
growing in the same old fashion, expanding on lengthy piers and concourses either to 
the sides or perpendicularly to the “box” terminals. In spite of the growing passenger 
discomfort and harsh criticisms, airport authorities paradoxically chose the perhaps 
safer “standard” airport layout. 
Although Dulles proved to solve the biggest problem of the modern airport by 
reducing the walking distance from drop-off to enplaning to a minimum, the new 
technological artifact did not reach closure, and some of the relevant social groups, 
particularly the airlines, remained distrustful and unconvinced. However, physical 
expansion in response to the growing traffic demand was inevitable, and standard 
designs remained as a pattern of stabilization. 
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Of the three noticeable ruptures in what I call in this dissertation the “linear 
history of airport planning,” I have addressed just two so far. In chapter one, I 
described how New York LaGuardia Airport was a techno-political artifact in which 
the interests of politicians finally imprinted the materiality of the design (Skywalk). In 
chapter two I showed how Dulles International Airport captured the ambition of the 
designer and the state powers who endorsed him (Mobile Lounge). In this third 
chapter I present how Tampa International Airport brought the first opportunity for 
airport planners to rethink an airport from the ground up (Landside Airside Concept). 
*** 
As the analyst could easily predict, most of these practices have been jealously 
black-boxed by airport planning companies through the years. Thus I must thank in 
advance the generosity of the interviewees, because their voices and experiences are 
the real backbone of this chapter. More specifically, this chapter explores in depth the 
heuristics behind the landside–airside boundary, and responds to why this problem-
solving activity led airport planners to reinvent the airport once again. In this sense, 
and as a research tool, I am using Bijker’s theoretical concept of the technological 
frame in order to explain why these processes comprise social, material, and cognitive 
elements. Bijker proposes a tentative list of elements comprising a technological 
frame. These elements could “structure the interactions among the actors of a relevant 
social group” (Bijker, 1997, ch. 3). In the case of Tampa’s airport planning process, 
the technological frame may be simplified as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. How Tampa International Airport Meets Bijker’s Criteria and How It May 
Be Analyzed as a Technological Frame 
Bijker’s list Features of case study (Tampa) 
Key problems  Users’ discomfort, lengthy walks, congestion; aircraft 
change moves faster than airports adjustments.  
Diagnostic Historical contradiction between opposite landside 
and airside demands. 
Semantics/communication Definitions: landside, airside, terminal, purgatory, 
concourse, people mover, etc. 
Requirements (negotiated) 750ft. maximum tolerable walk from drop-off to 
enplanement (International Air Transport 
Association). 
Methods  Comparative, statistical. Between 20 major U.S. 
airports.  
Current standards and styles Linear or perpendicular terminal growth (piers); 
endfield terminals. 
Hypothesis, solutions Landside–airside split; midfield terminal. 
Constraints Reconnection: implies new technologies. High cost of 
innovation. 
Discourse An airport for people and not for machines.  
 
In this chapter I discuss changes in the landside–airside boundary as a result of 
the world’s massive growth of air travel as well as the new availability of planning 
experts. Beyond pressures from concessionaries and the ever-changing technological 
conditions of aircraft, the fact that airport planning became a well-established field of 
specialty in universities and technological institutes had an enormous impact on the 
way airports were conceived. The paramount example is Tampa International Airport 
of 1971, in which a young breed of planners pioneered the way in which the landside–
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airside boundaries could be materialized in a different spatial dimension called the 
“Landside Airside Concept” (1963) (see Figure 3.1). In this case, one of the leading 
airport planning consultants in the country, Leigh Fisher and Associates (LF&A), and 
not the FAA, would persuade the officials of Hillsborough County to re-study the 
quantifiable inefficiency of current airport terminals. The outcome was a radical 
innovation, which became an instant airport-planning touchstone and a model that 
influenced new airports worldwide. The landside was physically separated from the 
airside, but linked through a “People Mover,” shortening the long walks and avoiding 
the so-called delay. For the first time in more than three decades, zones were again 
called “airside” and “landside,” and the airport was now considered a transportation 
hub (or a multimodal facility, in contemporary terms). In fact, the airport planning 
company rapidly copyrighted the report describing the scheme. Through a series of 
interviews, this section frames the interactions of those actors who negotiated the 
landside–airside boundary during the planning phases at Tampa International Airport. 
II. The Airport and Its Actors 
“I was lucky to get here at the very beginning,” Bean said. “The concept of the 
main building being separated from where people get on and off airplanes—
connected by some sort of ride system—was totally revolutionary. I knew very 
little about Tampa, but I was told it was in the process of doing something 
revolutionary. I came down and said, “This is where the future is.” (as quoted 
in Waresh, 1987) 
Tracing the main actors who participated in landside–airside negotiations may 
be difficult. In this sense I follow the structure used by historian Deborah Douglas 
(1996), in her keystone dissertation The Invention of Airports: A Political, Economic 
and Technological History of Airports in the United States: 1919–1939, in which she 
claims that the evolution of airports required the collaboration of architects, engineers, 
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city planners, and local and federal authorities. Leaving aside a few isolated cases such 
as the visionary airport consultant J. J. Odell, who started consulting in the 1930s, the 
birth of airport planning would not be consolidated until the end of the Second World 
War. During those days, pioneer firms started airport consultation to provide 
financing, planning, and engineering studies. Among these firms, Buckley, Landrum 
& Brown (L&B) and Leigh Fisher & Associates (LF&A) stood at the forefront. L&B 
was characterized by its technical “rigidity” and low “negotiation” capacity; it was a 
well-balanced firm equipped with architects, engineers, and financiers. LF&A was 
founded by Leigh Fisher, an engineer, who has been described as a “strong negotiator” 
and who knew how to surround himself with the best in the industry (Brink Coridan, 
2006, p. 2). Even in his early years, the firm was a sound success, handling a client 
portfolio of more than 90, and had worked by 1959 on more than 140 civil airport 
projects. 
But besides the establishment of airport consultation as a field of specialty 
(which was mostly learned from experience, by the way), other factors helped trigger 
strong changes in the way airports were designed in the decade to come: “In the late 
1960s, air traffic had been exploding across the nation and the world. In response to 
burgeoning air traffic demand, terminal buildings throughout the nation were being 
expanded by adding new concourses and lengthening existing concourses. As a result, 
walking distances at major airports were becoming excessive and the media were 
almost daily criticizing the ‘heart attack’ walks at most major airports. At Drew Field, 
air traffic demand had far exceeded the capacity of its small “box” terminal to 
accommodate it” (Brink Coridan, 2006, p. 2). This situation triggered an alarming 
congestion in the small terminal by the early 1950s: “We are facing the prospect of an 
aerial traffic jam that could slow down the state’s business growth” (“State’s Skies 
Getting Congested,” 1989), declared Hillsborough County—before starting the 
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analysis for replacing the existent airport—and picking through a long, heated debate, 
between St. Petersburg and Tampa (see Bliss, 2011) as the new potential location for 
the new airport. 
According to the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority (HCAA, 1965), “at 
peak hours, queue lines at the airline ticket counters sometimes stretched across the 
airport entrance road.” It was clear that a new terminal was desperately needed. Rather 
than simply go full speed ahead with a conventional terminal concept, Leigh Fisher, 
who had been consultant to the HCAA since 1957, convinced the Authority to 
undertake a research study of existing airport terminals. This study would be directed 
toward evaluating passenger comfort and convenience, which had become the focus of 
sharp newspaper and media criticism. The intent of the study was to identify passenger 
service problems and, in particular, to quantify walking distances at major airports as a 
basis for planning new terminal facilities at Tampa. The real emphasis, as it turned 
out, was on lengthy walking distances (because they could be quantified) and on 
possible solutions to the walking distance problem. Fisher led the research team, 
which started with a major research study of 20 U.S. airport terminals; the study was 
overseen by Jim Jones and prepared by the young Marjorie (Marge) Brink Coridan, 
the first female airport planner worldwide. In her corporate memoirs, Brink Coridan 
(2006) recalls those early steps in the process:2 
The study concluded with alternative planning concepts designed to solve the 
walking distance problem, some prepared by Jim Harrison and some by Gene 
Lewis, who was retained independently by Fisher at that time. The result of the 
research and planning studies was the “landside/airside” separation concept, 
which separates the permanent functions of the landside (ticketing and baggage 
claim) from the continually changing functions of the airside (changing aircraft 
                                                
2 In the following citations I have added emphasis, underlining the words, phrases, or passages that help 
to trace the origins of their Landside–Airside Concept, as well as their own opinions about the landside–
airside boundary in general. 
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designs and operations) and connects them with a ride system. It is a source of 
minor pride that the terms “airside” and “landside,” standard today in the 
industry lexicon, were born in Jonesy’s basement during a review session of 
the research report. It is also a source of minor pride that the research report is 
the only report ever copyrighted by LF&A. (p. 57) 
These last two sentences are particularly interesting and will be addressed in a 
following section, but the tone of the quotation is worth highlighting here. It is hardly 
deniable that these experts truly felt that they were in front of an imaginary device that 
was powerful in terms of both problem posing and problem solving. Brink Coridan 
(2006) continues: 
As a result of the research and planning studies, it was recommended that the 
Authority (Hillsborough County Aviation Authority or HCAA) explore a new 
terminal design concept in which the landside and airside functions were 
separated and connected by a ride system. When the program was initiated, 
Herbert C. Godfrey, Jr., was Executive Director of the Authority. After the 
adoption by The Authority (HCAA) of the recommendation to pursue the 
landside–airside separation concept in parallel with a conventional terminal 
concept, Godfrey decided to resign from the Authority to assume a vice 
presidency with United Airlines. With Godfrey’s departure, the then-Deputy 
Executive Director, George J. Bean, assumed the position of Executive 
Director. There could not have been a better successor. Bean immediately 
formed a design team and a management committee to oversee the planning 
and development of the new terminal facilities—and established a calendar-
based meeting schedule to ensure that the program kept moving ahead. The 
team included Leigh Fisher, Leigh Fisher Associates (Bob Joerger); Allen, 
Dell, Frank, and Trinkle, attorneys (Stewart C. Eggert); Greiner Engineering 
(Rene Crouch), and two architects, initially, Carlos Alfonso, a talented local 
architect with a small company, who was succeeded by Reynolds Smith & 
Hills, a major architectural firm which had the depth of personnel to handle a 
project of this magnitude. (pp. 57–58) 
Here, Brink Coridan leaves clear the chain of command, which obviously has a strong 
impact in assigning the right decision weight of each actor: the administrator, the 
planner, the lawyers, the engineers, and the designers. It is striking to learn how, 
compared with my previous examples, in which designers like Delano and Saarinen 
played protagonist roles, in this case, Brink Coridan plays a supporting role within a 
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larger cast. This is especially interesting when we think of the magnitude of 
reinventing a technological system like the airport; the “system builder” finally made 
its way to a new, more complex negotiation process. Brink Coridan (2006) closes her 
summary: 
In the end, after six years of intensive planning and design efforts, the new 
terminal complex, complete with a “must ride” Westinghouse System, opened 
in April 1971 to international acclaim. The Westinghouse System, upon which 
the operation of the terminal complex was completely dependent, had never 
been tested in a formal application before. In addition to the unique and 
innovative design concept, the management aspects of the program were 
equally creative. In order to ensure the retirement of the revenue bonds (first 
issue: $67 million), the Authority adopted a formal concession policy designed 
to maximize revenues while providing the highest level of customer service. 
This policy was adopted as a condition of the revenue bond indenture. During 
the concession award process, various adjustments were made in the pre-bid 
and pre-proposal conferences in order to ensure that a certain level of revenues 
was guaranteed while permitting the concessionaires to amortize their 
investments. For example, in the news and general merchandise agreements, 
originally intended as five-year agreements, the concessionaires agreed to take 
significant losses (called a “blood bath” internally) in the first five years of the 
agreement and make up their profits in the last five years. The 10-year 
Authority audit reports showed that this was exactly how it worked out. The 
Tampa International Airport terminal facilities and management program have 
been a model in the industry. When LF&A became the consultant to the 
Greater Orlando Aviation Authority for the development of its new terminal 
facilities, John Wyckoff, the Authority Deputy Director and manager of the 
Orlando terminal development program, instructed LF&A to “do exactly what 
you did at Tampa.” (p. 59) 
In the 1960s, the manager of Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, George 
Bean, attributed the planning and design concepts that had been introduced 
successfully in Tampa with inspiring the innovative concept for the new midfield 
terminal complex in Atlanta, which opened in 1981. Bean was a legendary airport 
director. LF&A was privileged to serve as the HCAA consultants from 1957 until 
Bean’s retirement in 1996. Bean, ever gracious and ever generous, always gave credit 
for the success of the new Tampa terminal facilities to Leigh Fisher. Beyond reflecting 
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the LF&A view of this long enterprise, this vivid account represents the voice of the 
airport’s main planner and also serves as a candid introduction to the Tampa 
International Airport planning route. 
The old Drew Field was a hard piece to replace, however. This was a very 
popular airfield in its time, a military facility turned into commercial airport and 
equipped like no other facility of its kind in terms of leisure. Perhaps only Pittsburgh 
matched the array of entertainment options. Among others, it was furnished with a 
pool and theaters which showed films “weeks ahead of regular Theater circuits” 
(Hawes, 1978). But throughout the years it grew obsolete and became incapable of 
handling the booming traffic. Surprisingly, the new building complex was far from 
aesthetically pleasant; it was miles away from the grandiose rail terminals of the past 
and the cathedralesque architectural modern masterpieces such as TWA. “It’s not 
designed for beauty, but new terminal is impressive” (“New 180-Foot Control Tower 
Due,” 1971). According to the Tampa Tribune, Authority director Bean said that the 
HCAA “did not want the building to be a monument, as a lot of airports have 
become”; “because the building is so simple looking—it’s imposing because of its 
size—it ended up not being as attractive as we would have liked it. So, to increase the 
beauty of the complex, we decided to use a great deal of landscaping” (“Greening of 
an Airport,” 1971). 
The press always showed an enormous interest in the airport. Several 
magazines and periodicals described even the planning process as something worth 
speaking of, with a certain sense of pride. Author Michael Bane wrote in The Best Li’l 
Ole Airport (1981) that 
the authority hired aviation planning consultants Leigh Fisher Associates of 
San Francisco and instructed them to spend the next six months just looking at 
other airports analyzing their collective strengths and weaknesses, and then to 
develop something better. What the survey found was that when people came 
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to airports, the thing they hated most of all was long walks to the planes. Most 
air terminals had been built for convenient parking, and as the airplanes got 
bigger and the number of flights increased, “fingers” stretched away from the 
main terminal to the planes, and the passengers had longer and longer walks, 
the people-moving system, which whisked 100 passengers back and forth 
between Airside and Landside in less than a minute, was so popular that the 
HCAA “opened” the airport a few weeks before the official opening to allow 
local residents to ride back and forth in the shuttles, which proved to be an 
immensely popular pastime. As the Chamber of Commerce is fond of pointing 
out, Tampa International Airport has been singled out by such publications as 
Fortune and Esquire as one of the best—if not the best airport in the country. 
(Bane, 1981, pp. 104–106) 
I find it particularly intriguing that those who were commenting and publishing 
about the airport were not trying to translate or interpreting the terms landside and 
airside, but the contrary. Most publications refer with great familiarity to both 
concepts without offering much explanation. 
Journalists and users rapidly appreciated the new features of the airport. The 
Tampa Tribune article “The New Air Terminal: A Site for Sore Feet” noted, “In an 
industry focused on engineering and high technology, Tampa International Airport is 
generally known as the first airport designed for people, not machines” (Garret, 1976). 
In a published interview (Garret, 1976), Bean, the director of the HCAA and the “man 
behind” the realization of Tampa, explained that “crowded airport terminals trying to 
accommodate increased flights and larger aircraft attempted to solve their problems by 
constructing fingers or piers. This resulted in longer passenger walking distances, 
which was totally unacceptable. Dulles Airport (outside Washington, D.C.) attempted 
the first innovative busing of passengers to airplanes from a main terminal. Our design 
team studied their concept and improved it. The airport was designed for people 
comfort and convenience rather than specifically for airplane convenience.” Bean was 
quick to add that Tampa International maintained a close working relationship with 
the airlines. The airport’s design had attracted worldwide interest, with visits by 70 
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foreign delegations from Afghanistan to Zaire and Zambia to study the airport 
facilities. 
In 1975, Paul MacAlester, the former director of information of the HCAA (as 
quoted in Garret, 1976), described how “back in the 60s when this daring concept was 
being formulated, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority board members vigorously 
recruited support of far-sighted business and political leaders in Tampa. Although the 
Authority is an autonomous unit of county government and vested with the full 
prerogatives of a private corporation, MacAlester said the project still needed 
community support. The authority owes a special debt of gratitude to its own former 
chairman, Clyde Perry, who spearheaded the endeavor; to Leigh Fisher Associates, 
charged with planning, and Herb Godfrey, former HCAA director, who helped the 
design team come up with the airside/landside terminal concept.” MacAlester had 
reasons to think the concept was daring. According to him, the airline officials were 
strongly skeptical of the scheme, and it was thanks to the negotiations by two 
members of the HCAA, Norm Stallings and Sam Bucklew, that the acceptance of 
airlines was finally gained. “It was a painful project to see through to completion,” 
recorded Tom Inglis, associate editor of the former Tampa Times. “There were grand 
jury investigations, special investigations at the orders of the Governor, lawsuits, 
strikes, and other problems” (as quoted in Garret, 1976). 
The airport at Tampa was one of the first facilities built right at the transition to 
the enforcement of the first steps in civil security. The American best-selling novel 
Airport, by Arthur Hailey (1968), and later the even more popular and iconic film 
Airport3 (Seaton, 1970) exploited for the first time the potential fears at the airport. 
The plot refers to harsh weather, congestion, and airport management as potential 
                                                
3 Seaton, G. (Director). (1970). Airport [Film]. Los Angeles: Universal. 
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threats. More disturbingly, it presents, in an almost naive way, the case of a desperate 
man, D. O. Guerrero, the first suicide bomber in history. Audiences panicked. Hence, 
Tampa was a pioneer airport in setting up security measures. Airport Police Major J. 
Quinn declared to the Tribune that “the airport has completely adequate emergency 
facilities of its own, of course, Quinn adds. And Tampa International has had 
emergencies. ‘Sure, we’ve had ’em.’ In addition ‘especially since hijacking became 
popular,’ the airport has had potential security problems to prevent. It also has traffic 
problems, lost or confused patrons, bomb threats and big areas vulnerable to vandals. 
Because of all this, Tampa International had its own police force, almost militarily 
detailed emergency procedure plans, and special emergency and security equipment” 
(“Airport Police Prepared,” 1971. p.4). 
Another important aspect, key to the discussions around landside and airside, is 
that aircraft innovation presents a continuum of changing demands and requirements. 
As this pattern is unpredictable, each facility must be adapted in one way or another to 
service the most current equipment. These design features are very often a source of 
pride among planners and critics. “The huge new DC-10 is one of the jumbo jets for 
which the Tampa International Airport was designed and constructed. Along with the 
already heralded Boeing 747 and the Lockheed L-1011, it will be seen regularly 
landing at the new airport, the first in the nation designed specifically with the jumbo 
jets in mind,” wrote a journalist with the Tampa Tribune (“DC-10 Will Fit Nicely,” 
1971). A Northwest official assured that “all gates are equipped to handle the 747 and 
DC-10 aircraft in addition to other planes in Northwest’s fleet” (“Those Faraway 
Places,” 1971). 
Another unusual feature is the location of the lodging facility. “The Tampa 
Airport Marriot Hotel, located as the centerpiece in the magnificent Tampa 
International Airport, is one of the assets that make the Tampa airport a monument of 
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convenience in air transportation” (Dunn, 1985). For journalists, Tampa was an 
abundant source of reportage. The Times, describing the new system, said that “the 
airport’s unique system of speeding travelers from the main building to the satellite or 
‘airside’ buildings is usually referred to as a ‘people mover’ apparatus” (“Getting 
There’s Easy,” 1971). Howard Gorham (1971c), another writer with the Tribune, 
chronicled in his article “They Came, They Saw, They Liked” how the airport 
functioned: “By plane, you step fully enclosed into one of the airport’s ‘airside’ 
buildings and hence into one of its horizontal elevators to its ‘landside’ terminal, a 40-
second climate-controlled ride that should be, and probably will be, a tourist attraction 
and a free way to spend a Sunday afternoon the airside buildings which were paid for 
by the airlines.” B. O’Donnell (1991) described the airport in the Tribune as “laid out 
like a hub and spokes. The central building, or ‘landside,’ is linked by people movers 
to five satellites, known as ‘airsides,’ with room for one more airside. When further 
expansion is needed, a duplicate landside–airside complex will be built to the north.” 
When the terminal opened for a public open house the weekend before flight 
operations began, 70,000 to 80,000 people clogged local traffic to tour the futuristic 
airport that was given a human touch with $1 million in landscaping. But with its 
efficient routing and passenger flow, the Times proudly predicted that “that was 
destined to be the last traffic jam to take place at Tampa International Airport” (Garret, 
1976). 
In another 1971 article, “Tampans Dazzled by Their Airport,” Howard Gorham 
observes that 
an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Tampa Bay residents came and saw and 
apparently were conquered by the new Tampa International Airport yesterday. 
The authority threw open the doors yesterday to the modern new complex and 
let Tampa Bay residents get their first looks. The crowds came in a steady 
stream all through the day from 9a.m. to 6p.m. Officials had feared they might 
come in bunches and clog the building and its parking facilities. People 
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wandered all over the complex, viewing first the main landside terminal, then 
venturing out on the shuttle cars into the four satellites. Many of them, it 
developed, frequently fly out of Tampa and were coming by to check out just 
what procedure to follow to get to their planes. The crowds came in a 
considerable mix—children, young married, elderly, middle aged. And all, 
obviously, were impressed. 
However, the official fliers and pendants from HCAA recommended that users 
familiarize themselves with the new facility because “the more you learn now the less 
you’ll have to learn . . . the hard way. Instead of risking ‘gridlock’ at curbside, park 
conveniently in the Short-Term Garage, and proceed to the attractive ambiance of 
America’s most popular airport” (Tampa International Airport, 1972). 
“The crowds came in a considerable mix—children, young married, the 
elderly, middle-aged. All obviously were impressed,” was the way the Tribune shared 
its excitement. The local paper published comments picked from the public: 
The décor is beautiful. The color combinations are pleasing. It is restful to sit 
here. You can enjoy your wait. —Mrs. Earl Phillips. 
We are taking a Cook’s tour to see where to go. It’s better than O’Hare 
(Airport) in Chicago. You’ve got to walk 10 miles to get anyplace there.  
—Fred Schmidt, of Tampa. 
It’s elegant. I was in Chicago (O’Hare) two weeks ago and this one has got it 
beat all the devil, as far as beauty and convenience. The décor is gorgeous, it is 
beautiful and comfortable. —Albert Straughn, 118 Cotton Ct., Auburndale. 
I like the way you can park and go inside. The décor is wonderful. It doesn’t 
look like an airport. —Mrs. Fred Schmidt. 
It is intriguing to learn how the first users of the airport are concerned with 
comfort rather than modernity. The first interviewee speaks of a restful and enjoyable 
wait; the second and third compare the short walks with O’Hare; and the third 
highlights that it does not look like an airport. Considering the positive response, it 
seems that the airport was in fact doing things right. In another article, “New Airport 
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Jammed on Open House: They Came in Greater Thousands,” Gorham (1971) 
chronicles how thousands visited the new complex: “Airport officials said the giant 
terminal handled the vast crowds with great ease. And the viewers, as they were 
Saturday, seemed greatly impressed with the new terminal.” Other commentators in 
the printed press seem to be very pessimistic with the current airport offerings around 
the country. 
Airport enthusiasts consider the prime function of an airport, in addition to the 
obvious, to be “to make a good impression.” Most air travelers and airport 
visitors, however, would settle for less, a lot less. They would be happy with 
an airport that fails to make a bad impression. These are the airports that stand 
as the pride of other communities, an area of giant jams, invariable delays 
horrendous aggravations that local citizens diligently learn to avoid. Other 
airports are so terrible in appearance that they fade into being picturesque. But 
most airports have a non-look about them. Although all airports are places to 
pass through, these in question are left without leaving any sensation of having 
been anywhere at all . . . I advise to go to its “landside” terminal, a 40-second 
climate-controlled ride that should be, and probably will be, a tourist attraction 
and a free pleasant way to spend a Sunday afternoon. (“An Impression,” 1971) 
I have to confess that I rode myself back and forth for many hours on that same People 
Mover, or at least that is how I remember what it was called during a 1978 school trip 
to Tampa. I can personally confirm that it became a tourist attraction, and we loved it. 
 
Several opinions were sensitive to the reasoning behind the Landside Airside 
concept. The Tampa Tribune said that the airport 
has a unique plan for eliminating “terminal sprawl”—an affliction for airports 
and passengers throughout the nation. What the term means is that passengers 
sometime have to walk thousands of feet—7,700 in one instance—through 
sprawling terminals to get from their cars to their planes, or vice versa. The 
problem is that in addition to physically wearing down travelers, the huge 
terminals were reducing the time saved by passengers flying the swift new jets. 
Lengthening the airports solved the problems for the aircraft but it left the 
weary passenger with more and more space to traverse getting to and from his 
plane.” (“Terminal Sprawl,” 1971) 
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These radical changes were seen with delight by many and with an unleashed 
optimism by others. For a popular innovation, it reached such a scale that people 
thought they were witnesses to a new kind of airport, the airport of the future. Some 
referred to it as a “first generation airport” because of its odd looks and thought that, in 
essence, “Tampa Airport was dramatically different—futuristic, beautiful, efficient, 
state of the art” (Tampa International Airport, 1972). An enthusiast expressed after 
visiting Tampa that “airports symbolize adventure, pioneer spirit, freedom, 
exploration, change. In many ways, airports are a microcosm of the world“ (Hill, 
1996). 
Tampa International’s new terminal would become a posh, polished facility, 
“but it didn’t get that way overnight . . . it took hard work and lots of imagination and 
money” (“Getting There’s Easy,” 1971). Bean, the airport administrator, was 
prompted about the origins of Tampa: “Leigh Fisher, an airport consultant who 
advised officials on all aspects of planning and operating an airport back then, 
dreamed up the concept of having a main building where ticketing and baggage check-
in occurred and a separate building . . . airports all over the world are now using (this) 
system” (as quoted in Brown, 1994). Other officials and politicians externalized their 
views of the airport. Tampa’s Mayor Dick Greco (as quoted in “A Santa in April,” 
1971) described the building as “futuristic enough to make it a functional—and 
copied—for years to come.” He pointed out that airports often are absolute the day 
they open because construction programs were not flexible enough to utilize new ideas 
and materials. and Hillsborough County Commission Chairman Ellsworth Simmons 
believed that “the opening of this airport expresses complete confidence of this area in 
the development of the science in aviation.” This observation is a classic illustration of 
the reliance on scientific progress in the American political rhetoric of the time. 
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As the accounts from travelers and journalists evidence, throughout the years 
Tampa International Airport has won plenty of fans, including, surprisingly, the 
airlines, which in other cases usually complain about the smallest detail. An article 
from the local newspaper describes how “the airline industry itself represents another 
group of TIA customers that seems to have nothing but praise for the facility. Airline 
representatives applauded the design, operation and maintenance provided by the 
airport” (Taylor, 1986). This may be considered a breakthrough achievement 
considering the airlines’ initial opposition to the project. 
Last, the “Landside Airside” airport was far from romantic or aesthetically 
pleasing. But many accounts show that the grandeur of Tampa’s airport would come 
from the socio-technical appreciation of its “revolutionary” concept. Some local 
newspapers showed the overexcitement of the moment. “Paris has a tower, London a 
palace and New York a certain skyscraper. Visitors are expected to see these 
landmarks. They haven’t really seen San Francisco unless they’ve eyeballed the 
Golden Gate Bridge. Tampa now has its new air terminal. For grandeur, it can’t 
compare with, say, the Coliseum in Rome; for beauty, it is no march for the Gateway 
Arch in St. Louis; for size, it isn’t in the same league with Kennedy International” 
(“Tampa’s New Crown Jewel,” 1971). A double-page-spread advertisement by the 
Tampa Hillsborough County was published at the Tampa Tribune in 1971 (see Box 
3.1). 
Other companies, such as Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the main 
contractor of the ride system, thought that “after Tampa, airports will never be the 
same. No wonder airport people from all over the world are studying Tampa. Its 
designs will influence the 21st century. The design [see Figure 3.2] was based on a 
landside/airside configuration allowing more effective use of aircraft” (Westinghouse 
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Company, 1971). (Note that for the company the end beneficiaries are the airlines and 
not passengers, as officially stated.) 
Box 3.1. Advertisement for Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, Published in 
Tampa Tribune, 1971. 
The	  Future!	  
Thanks	  .	  .	  .	  to	  men	  of	  vision	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  men	  of	  vision	  who	  plan	  and	  prepare	  for	  the	  unlimited	  
opportunities	  of	  the	  future!	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  builder	  .	  .	  .	  who	  materializes	  those	  plans	  .	  .	  .	  and	  builds	  for	  
the	  future!	  .	  .	  .	  	  
 
A few months before the airport’s opening weekend, the Times published an 
advertisement from Eastern Airlines (see Box 3.2). 
Box 3.2. Advertisement for Eastern Airlines, Published in Tampa Tribune, 1971. 
“In	  October	  1971,	  Eastern	  Airlines	  will	  fly	  to	  another	  world.”	  
 
The design life of the original system was twenty years. As stated in the 
“Tampa Airport System Replacement Program,” experts explained that since 1972, 
“two additional airside buildings have been built with their own shuttle systems. In the 
23 years since the initial installation, the vehicles and controls have served well, 
exceeding the design life of the systems” (Culver, 1996), although other companies 
tried to improve Tampa’s People Mover, including Otis Elevator Co., who installed 
cars pulled by cable at Cincinnati’s airport and Tokyo’s Narita Airport; railcar giant 
Bombardier in Canada (who also builds monorails); and AEG Transportation Systems, 
	  153 
a German manufacturer that talked about using experimental magnetic levitation 
technology someday for an airport train. 
 
Figure 3.2. “People Mover, Westinghouse advertisement.” Original vintage print 
courtesy of VMC Collection. Illustrated advertisement insert, 1971, by Westinghouse 
Company, published in the Times, Tampa. 
The Tampa Tribune noted, almost twenty years after the opening of the airport, 
that “the Westinghouse vehicle first tried in Tampa remains the American standard” 
(Taylor, 1986). Tampa’s cars were “the first batch of automated people movers ever 
installed at an airport. Now, they will be the first retired. Officials at manufacturer 
AEG Transportation Systems think the early cars belong in a museum” (Huettel, 1995, 
p. 24). Museum pieces or not, the vehicles helped spark a revolution in airport design 
that saved billions of travelers untold trillions of steps. Some twenty airports 
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worldwide now have some type of people mover to whisk passengers between ticket 
counters, airline gates, baggage carousels, and parking garages. 
Travelers at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport could end up hiking two miles from end 
to end. The solution, concluded airport consultant Leigh Fisher, was to move the 
airplanes away from the rest of the airport. But there was a hitch. How do you move 
passengers quickly between the main terminal and remote airside buildings? (Huettel, 
1995). Twenty-five years after its implementation, Tampa’s journalists were still 
interested in the landside–airside system, and they continued to compare their 
emblematic airport with others, such as the disgraced O’Hare. 
Tampa International Airport has become, over time, a distinctive part of the 
city. Even well into the 21st century the “Landside Airside Concept” is still 
appreciated and in use. In 2011, CNN Travel published a list of the 10 of the world’s 
most loved airports, and surprisingly, among hundreds of options, Tampa remained 
the sixth favorite, globally (Rane, 2011). Furthermore, in the national J. D. Power 
airport consumer satisfaction study of 2010, Tampa International Airport was ranked 
second in the U.S., among more than four hundred facilities. 
However, not all withstands time; among the few features that are outdated are 
the congestion in the parking garage due to the lack of more ample drop-off and pick-
up areas (which led to the “load and leave” policy in February 1995), the general 
aging of the prefabricated concrete buildings, among others; but surely the most 
sensitive point has been security. 
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Figure 3.3. “Original Complex Model by Reynolds, Smith & Hills,” 1970. Image 
courtesy of VMC Private Collection. 
The “Landside Airside Concept” (see Figure 3.3) did not adapt well to the 
wave of security-driven changes after September 11. The physical, jurisdictional, and 
procedural constraints of the original layout have occasioned multiple pressures on the 
buildings and the designed passenger flows. In the words of Tampa’s planners, there 
were basically no security zones at all in the former airport plan. The following three 
sections of this chapter are based solely on primary sources, organized around a 
number of interviews, plus the analysis of the original documents submitted by LF&A 
to the client during the 1960s. The LF&A team included Leigh Fisher, Marge Brink 
Coridan, Eugene Lewis, Jim Jones, and, later, Alistair Sherret and William Dunlay, 
among others. From HCAA, both Herb Gottfried and George Bean have passed away. 
Nonetheless, Marge Brink Coridan and Gene Lewis were the key planners of Tampa, 
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and both kindly accepted to give long interviews for this work. Both participating in 
later stages at TIA, Alistair Sherret, a business and financial airport planner, and Bill 
Dunlay, an expert on airfield and airspace planning, also generously spoke at length 
about these topics. 
III. Problem Posing 
In the case of Brink Coridan and Lewis, much of their expertise in airport planning 
came from the practice. By the time they both became involved in TIA in the early 
1960s, the former planning team, with Leigh Fisher himself at the head, was likely one 
of the first expert groups ever put in front of an airport design. An architectural 
approach to the problem would usually materialize a building; in this case, however, 
the collaboration resulted in a plan, or the diagrammation, of future actions that inform 
the architectural program of a terminal. In planning, the creative work is diagrammatic 
and strongly semantic. The following paragraphs present full fragments of my 
conversations with members of this group of planners; they have been purposely left 
untouched as whole paragraphs in order to preserve their narrative and idiomatic force. 
Therefore, my analysis spins around the strong differences among experts with respect 
to the keywords that support their individual views and ideas. It is decidedly semantic 
and thus interpretive of the specialized language expression. Last, I underlined in the 
quoted paragraphs certain keywords, jargon, and paragraphs related to the landside–
airside discussion. 
The problem was evident: airports were not keeping up with the pace of 
growth, passenger demands, technological changes, and other challenges. By the end 
of the 1950s, airports were still thought of as architectural pieces; runways, taxiways, 
and aprons belonged to the realm of aviation. They were expensive investments with 
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low return, and to make things worse, they invariably grew rapidly obsolete, because 
they could not cope with projected growth rates. Because airport terminals could not 
be simply replaced or updated, they simply expanded in any direction possible, 
including the sides (pier) or the apron (finger). One side of the airport was subject to 
the pressures of technological change (aircraft changing dimensions, airspace slot 
patterns, noise, new codes, etc.); the other was simply not delivering what people 
wanted. When LF&A was called to devise a concept for Tampa, according to the 
HCAA (1965), the team decided to undertake the “research path and Fisher was given 
time to explore a variety of possible solutions to the terminal dilemma.” But it was not 
until LF&A’s Jones, Brink Coridan, and Lewis identified and verbalized these issues 
in planning terms that the planning problem was finally posed and discussed. LF&A 
internally agreed on defining five keywords, which literally launched the final 
planning report: Landside, Airside, Terminal, Conventional Terminal, and Transfer 
Device. (Note that the words landside and airside—with the exception of their profuse 
mention in ICAO’s Annex 14—were no longer used at the time.) 
LF&A’s final product, the Recommended Planning Criteria for New 
Passenger Terminal Facilities at Tampa International Airport, begins with a glossary 
(see Box 3.3). 
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Box 3.3. Glossary from Recommended Planning Criteria for New Passenger Terminal 
Facilities at Tampa International Airport 
As set forth in Volume I of this study, the design of any airport terminal area must reconcile 
the requirements of three basic operational areas: 
Airside - The area where aircraft loading and servicing takes place, 
including the passenger processing space dictated by any 
given design. 
Passenger Collection Point - The facility or facilities where passenger processing and 
service take place prior or subsequent to passenger transfer 
between airside and landside (conventionally it is the 
terminal building). 
Landside -  The area where all ground transportation requirements 
(roadway systems and parking areas) are accommodated. 
Airside functions 
The physical layout of the aircraft parking and servicing apron for an airport. Must relate 
passenger handling procedures to aircraft servicing requirements. Generally, co-mingling 
of passengers with ground servicing equipment and aircraft should be held to an absolute 
minimum. The physical configuration for any given airside design is dependent upon both 
the number of gate (loading/unloading) positions required by the airlines and by each 
individual airline’s methods of servicing and handling its aircraft at the gate position. 
Landside Functions 
Surface transportation is the major consideration and problem area on the landside. The 
provision for rights-of-way, properly located curb frontages for off-loading and pick up, 
and holding and parking facilities are required for all modes of ground transportation 
ranging from private cars, taxis, limousines, busses, and rent-a-cars to trucks delivering 
cargo, mail and express as well as those servicing the airport with goods and commodities 
or removing trash and debris. All systems providing ground (or helicraft) transportation to 
airports require roadways or surface rights-of-way (ROW) on the landside of the function. 
These vehicles may be broken down into two categories: 
CONVENTIONAL TERMINAL CONCEPT 
In a conventional terminal concept, airside requirements have almost always been 
contiguous to the passenger collection point (terminal building) and connected to the 
passenger processing facilities by some type of finger or concourse. In a conventional 
concept, the landside requirements have likewise been contiguous to the terminal 
building and have usually been situated on the side opposite the airside. 
The passenger collection point (terminal building) has historically stood between the 
landside and airside both as a funnel to get maximum concession exposure and also as 
the single link which houses the transfer of passengers and cargo from surface to air 
transportation. This degree of centralization to facilitate landside convenience, coupled 
with the extensive decentralization demanded in the airside, has caused excessive 
walking distances and the loss of proper human environmental scale in most conventional 
terminal solutions. 
Note. Reproduced from Recommended Planning Criteria for New Passenger Terminal Facilities at 
Tampa International Airport, vol. 2, by Leigh Fisher and Associates, Inc., July 1963, San Francisco, 
CA: Author. Emphasis added. Here Brink Coridan describes her views of the landside and airside. 
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The above definitions are certainly consistent with Marge Brink Coridan, who 
authored the document. However, they do not necessarily coincide with some of her 
colleagues’ definitions of the same terms. According to Brink Coridan, landside and 
airside establish a machine–machine relationship, which captures the essence of the 
plan. For her, 
The landside infrastructure held the permanent building, while the airside has 
only temporary buildings, supposed to be torn down along with the airplanes 
changes, and mostly for money reasons. (Personal interview, M. Brink 
Coridan, March 8, 2008) 
In short, for Brink Coridan the airside is the zone of aircraft, and the landside the zone 
of the automobile (or other terrestrial means of transport). In between there is a 
passenger collection point (PCP), or terminal. The archetype of the terminal or station 
too often makes reference to monumentally epic spaces, where the steam of trains let 
us know they are ready for departure. The romanticism of this imagery strongly 
contrasted with the severe austerity of how the “Landside Airside Concept” was 
finally materialized. The glamour of transportation of terminals was now reduced to 
dark corridors, escalators, and small carpeted rooms. Thus the word terminal needed 
be removed, at least as a reference. The way keywords are organized in the above text 
makes the real nature of the enterprise more transparent. What LF&A was trying to 
achieve at this point was to materialize a diagram: a diagram understood as a chart, 
which describes the logical sequence of a system or routine. What Brink Coridan was 
looking for here was to pose a problem through semantics. Should she use the term 
terminal, the complications of negotiating between human and machines would be far 
higher, so a new term must be coined instead. The “Passenger Collection Point” is a 
term or a label that perhaps deflects possible criticism for having shrunk the terminal 
to a miniature version—removing all possible grandeur and thus, becoming anti-
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cathedralesque. The semantic diagram deconstructs the terminal in several pieces. 
Users work as a bridge between two poles: two technologies that ask for different 
requirements. 
 
Figure 3.4. View showing the mechanized connector between the landside and airside 
buildings. Photo “Bird’s-Eye View of Tampa International Airport” from State 
Archives of Florida, Florida Memory, 1973. Retrieved from 
http://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/41905 
The diagram poses one serious problem, though, as stretching the boundary 
would imply increasing rather than reducing the distance between passengers and 
aircraft. The new boundary was initially called the “ride system,” later the “shuttle,” 
and, finally, the “transfer device” system—which needed to be made to fit. The system 
is defined in the document as a “tool to serve a function.” Incidentally, this artifact 
was known humorously among the design team as the “horizontal elevator” (see 
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Figure 3.4). Years later, and after the collaboration with Westinghouse, it was finally 
baptized the “People Mover.” 
Returning to the landside and airside definitions, as Dunlay rightly expressed it 
in an interview: “You have to be very careful every time those terms are used or 
people would interpret them differently.” When Alistair Sherret, who is a Cornell 
engineer and who served as a financial/operational planner of LF&A, was asked about 
the landside–airside concept, he spoke of balancing capacities: 
Airside being the airspace, airfield, taxiway system, and the landside being the 
gates and the terminal and ground transportation. So the basic question to be 
resolved is the balance of the capacity of the airside versus the landside. And 
ideally those two would be in perfect balance and there would be sufficient 
capacity and there wouldn’t be delays. But in practice there is always an 
imbalance. (Personal interview, A. Sherret, March 8, 2008) 
Sherret does not see the terms as zone-defining, but rather as transportation 
subsystems, almost as interdependent subcultures. Among them, he speaks of delay as 
the foremost enemy. His use of the word versus apparently speaks of a silent 
antagonism. Later he mentions balance as a solution to this conflict: a perfect balance 
could make delay disappear. Sherret is tracing a line, a path. Dunlay, a distinguished 
Berkley and University of Pennsylvania professor, rapidly responds when he is 
questioned about the terminology: 
One thing that I would note that . . . These terms are not used as correct or as 
precise. It may suggest a boundary that is different in different airports and 
different people . . . The original idea at Tampa was mostly the airside was the 
concourse where you park aircrafts, and the landside was everything else, and 
the terminals, specially . . . But many people would make the distinction 
between airside terminal and landside, strictly the access roadway and parking 
so . . . I take it here the landside is where the terminal ends and then the access 
parking, and the airside is where the aircraft park and passengers board . . . The 
definition is a little fuzzy . . . So each time you use those terms you have to 
define them . . . Usually people refer to landside, people at FAA and people 
doing research and the National Transportation System . . . The general thing is 
that airside has been from the apron out. And then terminal and everything 
	  162 
with passengers and ground vehicles, that’s landside. In the classic Tampa 
split, the definition was to separate one part of the terminal from another part 
of the terminal: the airside part of the terminal where the passengers board the 
aircraft, and the landside portion with the ticketing and the baggage claim, 
typically that included the curbside and the access roads too, split in two. You 
have to be very careful every time that term is used, people would interpret it 
differently. (Personal interview, W. J. Dunlay, March 8, 2008) 
For Dunlay these terms are clearly “fuzzy.” For the expert eye or not, his 
adjectives may be not that different. When the airport engineer speaks of “different” 
boundaries, he makes me think of changing boundaries or frontiers that are in constant 
movement, either historically, physically, or contextually speaking. That would be 
congruent to the need to define them on a per-case basis and would be explained as 
interpretive flexibility.4 It makes sense to think of different relevant social groups 
providing different interpretations of the “Landside Airside Concept” when, at bottom, 
they all picture different solutions for the same problem. What is even more striking is 
that Dunlay believes that people—clearly referring to planners but perhaps addressing 
users—would interpret it differently. How can you base an “airport revolution,” as 
described by the HCAA (1965, pp. 1–2), on such ambiguity? 
Marge Brink Coridan is the first female airport planner on record, and she has 
been considered for decades an authority on the matter. However, her vision of 
landside and airside is far from standard or encyclopedic. After reading multiple 
documents regarding these projects which span almost a decade, I have found that she 
was consistently congruent with her initial definitions and that those definitions 
remain almost intact nowadays, even after a lifetime of practice in the planning 
profession. When asked about the linguistics of airport planning, and more specifically 
landside and airside, Marge Brink Coridan responds with a nostalgic expression on her 
face: 
                                                
4 As in SCOT (Social Construction of Technology; Pinch & Bijker, 1987). 
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My definition of airside is everything that has to do with airplanes, while 
landside is everything that has to do with ground transportation. In this 
definition the Terminal building is just a connector, not being part of either the 
airside nor of the landside, but primarily containing the “ride system.” 
(Personal interview, M. Brink Coridan, March 8, 2008) 
For the legendary planner, the landside and airside are defined by a conflict 
between machines only, rather than a relationship between human and machines. 
During the conversation Brink Coridan emphasizes that the terms were coined with 
only transportation systems in mind, around the spring of 1961. She argues that the 
historical conflict within airports has to do with the unresolved problem of making 
efficient connections between two different systems of transportation: the airplane and 
the car (or other mass transit systems). Regarding the specific use of those terms in 
Tampa, she holds that “in this sense, the landside infrastructure held the permanent 
building, while the airside has only temporary buildings” (personal interview, March 
8, 2008). Here Brink Coridan reveals another key idea. She implicitly defines airside 
as temporary and landside as permanent. This idea may have several interpretations, 
even in philosophical terms. The reasoning behind it according to her comes from the 
very nature of the way we have constructed and evolved our large transportation 
systems. She holds that terrestrial transport, such as the automobile, has suffered very 
modest changes since its origins; thus there is basically no need to change or adjust the 
infrastructure, which facilitates the flow or parking of vehicles. On the other hand, 
there is constant change in aircraft (particularly during the postwar period), thus its 
transformative nature. 
Brink Coridan (personal interview, March 8, 2008) last considered in the 
interview “the relationship between landside and airside to be practically the same, 
since they are not actually separated,” and for her the boundary is not a boundary but a 
case, since aircrafts and passenger services are both servicing functions. If she had to 
draw a line, it may be across the face of the terminal building, which is perhaps closer 
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to what many planners in the business would think. In the end, I would consider Brink 
Coridan an unbiased mind, able to associate things that others perhaps could not, and 
audacious enough to label them with “new” words. 
From the opposite perspective, a known rebel without a cause and long-time 
Bay area inhabitant, Gene Lewis, is still an active planner and a legend in the business. 
I have had the pleasure to work alongside him and to learn much from his 
incontestable planning expertise, but beyond that I am privileged to enjoy his 
friendship. He is a great conversationalist and a true enthusiast of airports. Our talk is 
loud, and Lewis passionately responds to the key question of this section: For the 
former leading planner of Tampa, and now several decades after, what is the meaning 
of landside and airside? Lewis has to respond twice to the same question, as our 
interview must be split into two parts. During the first part of the encounter, Gene 
speaks freely and in a more improvised manner, and, gesticulating, he begins to make 
rapid connections: 
Airside? But it’s still not a real word. It’s more important what’s inside. Every 
time you type it up, there is no such word as the airside. It isn’t really a popular 
medium. Since the airports are so small, to the general population, nobody else 
uses the word except the airport planners, and the airport people. And that’s 
almost nobody . . . So, when do you think that started? The use of the words? I 
think it started by . . . it started definitely with Tampa, people started using it, 
just getting to the idiom. Remember it’s only used by airport people. If you 
take everybody working at all the airports, and the airline personnel and sort of 
airport planners, and engineers, and architects, and stuff like that, that’s a very 
small population. Because how many towns have more than one airport? 
Almost none. How many towns have no airports? There are only 200 airports 
in the United States. How many hospitals are there? How many schools? How 
many churches? There is hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thousands of those. 
There are only 200 airports. And each airport has a relatively small number of 
people that keep it running 24/7. That’s not a lot of people. And most of the 
airports anywhere, they don’t call it landside and airside. At Tampa, the name 
was supplied for two different side buildings, it became part of the graphic 
system. Airside A, Airside B, Airside C and Airside D. And then while they 
were given the name, there had been airports where they had airside and 
landside, like Atlanta is a good example, the busiest airport in the world! Most 
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passengers were landing there than any airport in the world. They didn’t use 
the term landside–airside. They used the term “concourses.” Concourse A, 
Concourse B. As soon as you start giving this stuff these weird names that no 
one knows about . . . Concourses came from trains. Train stations have 
concourses that are what they are concourses. Trains would come in on a track, 
like this (moving both hands in parallel) and each one of these tracks had a 
walkway in between and that was like the concourse. I don’t really know why 
the term concourse, it sounds kind of French to me. But most airports call it 
Concourse A, Concourse B, Concourse C. This is a term only airport planners 
use. Other than read the signs where it says Airside A, Airside B. In the heat, 
the people mover was given different names: the ride system . . . they keep 
giving it different names: the shuttle this . . . the transporter this . . . and all that 
stuff is confusion. You have to come up with some kind of term, at least for 
airports, because everybody has to know. (Personal interview, E. Lewis, March 
7, 2008) 
Lewis affirms that the terms do not exist outside the limits of the airport world, 
and that therefore they represent a sort of “expert code” in terms of meaning. 
However, he also suggests that these terms give Tampa its own sense of identity, and 
that this identity was embraced, but not necessarily understood, by airport users. This 
idea is reinforced by the fact that, in order to avoid becoming a copy or a derivative, 
Atlanta sought its own language, its own idioms, interchanging Tampa’s “landside” 
for “concourse.” Did airside–landside become Tampa Airport’s trademark for 
posterity? According to Lewis, very few airports call it landside or airside anymore, 
but why? Last, Lewis leaves clear that the terms landside and airside define buildings 
as orientation points or references within the airport geographic system. From now on 
he refers to these boundaries as physical barriers. 
During the second part of the interview, which took place just a few hours 
later, Lewis appears much more focused and reflective—by his facial expression it is 
easy to guess that he is making a strong effort to recall events as far back in time as he 
can: 
The landside–airside boundary was literally where the airfield started. 
Everything else was available to the general public. Before they had real 
	  166 
security like they’ve got now, the landside–airside was always secure. You 
couldn’t get out on the airfield, anywhere near the airplanes. You couldn’t get 
on the airplane without going through . . . You weren’t able to walk out to the 
airplanes . . . Somebody from the airlines, when it would be reported, now it’s 
time to get on the plane, they opened up the door to the loading bridges. All 
this was going on when the loading bridges had just been invented. Leigh 
invented the first one there was in the world, at San Francisco. When Leigh 
and I were standing there, measuring the loading bridge, how long it took 
people to get . . . This was one bridge, United Airlines had one bridge. And we 
are watching this thing work and said—“that thing is really working perfectly,” 
people went to the airplane and everybody lowered up. And then they pull the 
plane back and taxied away, and Leigh and I were measuring it and timing it 
and everything else. And then we knew—“hey, that was our plane!” (Laughter) 
So Leigh who knew all the persons on the airlines, just called up a guy from 
American Airlines when we were on the United flight or something like that. 
Next thing we know some punk from American Airlines shows up, takes us 
right out on the airfield and drives us over to American Airlines, and puts us on 
an airplane, no tickets, no nothing, and we were on our way. We met the plane 
down in LA or something. It was a whole different industry then. It was like a 
little club. Leigh and I were sitting in . . . Leigh actually had a lease on that 
building and they were there for 55 years. He basically owned the airport for 
55 years. (Personal interview, E. Lewis, March 9, 2008) 
In this second part Gene continues to express his previous ideas, but in 
addition to supporting historically why he thinks the boundary is mainly physical (he 
even refers to it as a “door”), he introduces a new concept: security. In this deeper 
meditation, Gene depicts the landside–airside boundary as a way to secure two 
territories. This border is material and passengers need to go through it. 
I find particularly interesting the fact that he uses that expression, as if the 
boundary would have enough depth in order to go through and not just in or inside. 
Last. he associates the air bridge with the boundary. This time he imagines the frontier 
as a passage, which connects two edges: the airplane and the terminal. But in the end 
he recalls fondly that “it was like a little club.” 
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Figure 3.5. These diagrams show the different possible layout arrangements for a 
landside–airside separation. Leigh Fisher & Associates (1963) “Basic Concept 
Diagram, Landside Airside Concept” by Brink Coridan, M. (Jun. 2006) in Leigh 
Fisher Associates: History and Lore, as seen through the eyes of Marjorie Brink 
Coridan. Courtesy of Marge Brink Coridan. 
In this section, I have argued that the main planning problem was isolated and 
posed, once the terms landside and airside were dusted off and put into a new context. 
The terms’ meanings were not agreed upon among the key actors as one may suspect; 
rather, there was a consensus on the semantic diagram or, in other words, the way the 
terms interrelated with each other, forming a sequence. This semantic diagram (see 
Figure 3.5) is an argumentative solution to a historical controversy: the way airports in 
the 1950s were laid out, as a model, does not progress at the same speed aircraft does 
(technologically and economically). And that is precisely why the identification of the 
landside–airside boundary is one necessary step in the understanding of why the 
airport—seen as a technological object—is socially constructed. The term terminal 
had to be replaced with the newly coined PCP (passenger collection point). The 
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outcome of such idiomatic debate may be illustrated with the LF&A diagram shown in 
Figure 3.5. 
Again, in my view, the fact that at the time of posing the problem experts could 
not agree on a word’s meaning sounds natural and could be explained as interpretive 
flexibility. As the artifact has not yet materialized, it only holds everyone’s opinions 
and interpretations in linguistic terms. It is almost an abstract idea, but a powerful one. 
Let’s split the airport, and then, let’s reconnect it again with a machine!—they may 
have thought. In the case of the “Landside Airside Concept,” in SCOT terms,5 the 
relevant social groups reached a “rhetorical closure” and agreed on the theoretical 
disappearance of airport planning problems.6  
IV. Problem Construct 
By the spring of 1962, airport planners had won the first battle. They had identified 
and labeled what most architects, engineers, and politicians had failed to address in the 
past: the rising conflict between the landside and the airside. Now, the HCAA (1965) 
faced a difficult decision between commissioning a “conventional” terminal and 
taking the more thorny “research path” (p. 9). Following the steps of FAA’s initiative 
for Dulles International Airport, Herb Godfrey, HCAA’s executive director, agreed 
with Leigh Fisher that a certain methodology was needed to study the alternatives and 
support the possible solutions. Thus, the original contract signed by all parties asked 
for a thorough “analysis of major airports in the United States today and a definition of 
                                                
5 As in social construction of technology (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). 
6 Although historically, I argue that the airport as a planning problem has reached only temporary 
closure and until now, it remains open. 
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the basic problems created by current terminal operational concepts” (HCAA, 1965, p. 
7). 
Nonetheless, the operational problems were visible to everybody in the 
industry, although they were not identified using specific terms that could make them 
understandable until Brink Coridan labeled them and those labels diffused. The first 
part of the contract, though, demanded a large-scale comparative study, just like the 
one Saarinen conducted to justify his concept at Dulles. 
I argue in this section that the methodology’s main objective was the 
construction of credibility rather than the provision of valuable information that could 
inform either planners or designers of new potential solutions. In spite of the 
tremendous traffic growth pressures on HCAA’s airport management and the original 
target date for occupancy of 1966, the team had to face rising planning costs and a 
two-year minimum delay for research purposes. I deduced that LF&A was very 
confident, hiding a tentative solution in their pocket, before pushing their client to 
undertake a path where “the dangers of miscalculation and unfavorable repercussions 
from the community if the transition from time to the present terminal to a new facility 
was unduly extended” (HCAA, 1965, pp. 5–6). In this regard, Gene Lewis recalls the 
following: 
The technical committee from the airlines that was involved, we had the airport 
planning consultant, which is Leigh Fisher Associates, the majority game was 
Leigh and Marge Brink, ’cause she did all the studies. And then you have the 
airport director, two successful airport directors. The key one was George 
Bean, who was the airport director during the final stages, and most of the 
stages of the planning. . . . Godfrey was involved initially. And the engineering 
firm Grinder, which is now URS, they had already designed the improvements 
to the airfield and kind of a general layout for the apron area, where the aircraft 
would park, kind of . . . And there was a scheme of conventional pier plan, you 
know, finger plan . . . which had been designed based upon on what had 
already been done, for airports of the size of Tampa, with few exceptions . . . 
so when someone along the line . . . they decided, Leigh and the director and 
everybody, except the airlines, it was suggested to the airlines, we won’t 
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explore these other concepts . . . They decided to make Tampa the most 
convenient, passenger-friendly and efficient airport they could possibly think 
of . . . and that’s when they got into . . . when Marge did that survey, the 
pictures I’ve showed you on the wall . . . Marge did a survey on all the airports, 
in the United States, not all of them but the most significant ones in terms of 
the broadest possible range of different kinds of concepts . . . you know, the 
flights at the gate . . . etc. (Personal interview, E. Lewis, March 9, 2008) 
The “other concepts” Lewis mentions were in fact the landside–airside early 
hypothesis. In agreeing on a method, the participants in this project gained something 
that, building on Bijker (1997), could be called problem framing or a problem 
construct. In my view, this phase follows inevitably after posing a problem, or in other 
words, after launching a design hypothesis, which is necessarily semantic. In framing, 
a problem will be simply put in context. As there is no such a thing as “scientific 
truth” in design or planning matters, certainty must be reached by consensus. Thus a 
design hypothesis could be framed by comparisons and analysis of one or more of the 
following: 
• Current styles (conventional designs, new design trends, etc.) 
• Historical performance (measured levels of efficiency in previous, similar 
cases) 
• Risk (comparative success/failure rate among historical innovations) 
In the case of Tampa, these three aspects are fully covered in the document 
Study of U.S. Airport Terminal Buildings as a Basis for Planning New Terminal 
Facilities at Tampa International Airport, a report by LF&A in April 1963, that 
consists of two volumes,7 including a table of contents, which divides the studies into 
                                                
7 It is in fact somehow confusing that the two report-books have been labeled volume I & II, while they 
differ in title and contents and their publications are separated by three months. On the other hand, 
volume I contains the “basis for planning” and volume II the “planning criteria” itself, forming in a way 
a single integrated study all together.  
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subsections. In my view these subsections address the three aforementioned categories 
in the following manner: 
• Current styles are analyzed in the “Evolution of terminal building design.” 
• Historical performance is addressed by the larger analysis of selected U.S. 
airport terminal buildings and a special section devoted only to provide a 
critique of Dulles International Airport. 
• Risk is analyzed in the evaluation of current types of operational plans, 
which also includes comparisons between investment and revenue among 
different airports. 
LF&A’s “framing of the problem” concludes by showing “evidence” that 
definitely supports their initial hypothesis: the landside and the airside must be split. 
The document, which is over two hundred pages long, reports partial findings per 
section, being either diagnostics, comparative results, critiques, or evaluations. A 
thorough analysis of the report provides many traces of the LF&A team’s process of 
thinking after interpreting the data. In the following section, I discuss and summarize 
the team’s findings associated with the construction of the “Landside Airside 
Concept.” 
For LF&A the nature of the airside is variable, and the nature of the landside is 
constant. A paragraph in the report addresses this issue: 
. . . the length of the curbside of the terminal building has remained relatively 
constant over the years, irrespective of increasing passenger volumes and 
aircraft activity. As a matter of fact, the entire “land side” structure has not 
changed to a great degree over the years, regardless of the amount of passenger 
traffic. The reasons for this evolution in terminal building design are clear. 
Twenty years ago, terminal sprawl did not exist simply because air traffic was 
nominal. Ten years ago, with the air traffic volumes rising sharply, the need for 
expanded facilities was beginning to be recognized, but airport-financing 
ability was generally lagging behind the increasing demand for air 
transportation. (LF&A, April 1963, p. 3). 
	  172 
This idea unfolds the strains between the two sides of the airport. It speaks of 
different speeds of change, programmatic requirements, technologies used, and 
congestion. According to LF&A the landside has remained immutable, and the airside 
is under pressure to cope with increasing demand. According to my interview with 
Brink Coridan, terminals have “evolved” in a way that is contrary to passengers’ 
convenience. The comfort of passengers has been historically neglected. A report 
titled A Study of Transportation Means Between Airports and the Metropolitan Areas 
They Serve (Nordle, 1961), prepared by Human Sciences Research, Inc., for the FAA 
in 1961 states that surveys of the travel market characteristics in certain areas of the 
U.S. have indicated that “comfort” has been given as second only to “less time” as the 
reason for choice of transportation mode. Comfort, as defined by Human Sciences 
Research, is the degree of physical and mental ease experienced by a traveler. 
Elements relating to mental ease may be considered to include wait times, speed and 
ease of check-in, ease of locating flight departure room, and any factor that contributes 
to the comfort or discomfort of the passenger. G. W. Stallibrass, England’s Director of 
Aerodromes, in a 1959 article titled “Trends in Airport Planning,” said, “A recent 
IATA document rightly points out that internal design of the terminal building ‘should 
reflect a concern for the convenience of the passenger.’ Maybe convenience should 
not stop at physical progress, but at ease of mind as well” (quoted in Nordle, 1961, p. 
4). Airport terminals in the late 1950s suffered from several problems that were 
analyzed by an FAA planning group before the Dulles planning phases. LF&A’s 
group of experts “evaluated existing passenger handling systems,” as follows: 
1. The conventional (ground loading) systems make the passenger walk rather 
long distances in the fingers and additional distances to the plane, exposed 
wind, rain, aircraft noise, blast, etc. It often requires two changes in levels. It 
requires long and intricate aircraft taxiing, but does not demand precision 
positioning of the aircraft at the gates. 
	  173 
2. The loading bridge system involves a long walking distances in the finger, 
although all on one level, and it keeps the passenger sheltered at all times. It 
requires long and intricate taxiing and demands precision positioning at the 
gate. 
3. The bus system, in use today in London, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, etc., cuts 
down passenger walking distances. It requires changes in levels and although 
the passenger is sheltered getting on to the bus, he is exposed to weather, noise, 
etc., in the transfer from bus to plane. The high steps, narrow aisles, inadequate 
hand-baggage space, etc., of conventional busses add to passengers discomfort. 
The bus system allows the aircraft minimum taxiing distances and demands no 
precision positioning at the gate. While the bus system (European), as we 
know it today, does have disadvantages and problems, the very fact that it 
solves the walking distance problem, and at the same time minimizes taxi 
distances, makes it the most promising of the passenger handling systems and 
one that merits extensive study. (LF&A, April 1963, pp. 34–35). 
As I emphasized earlier, it is clear that the justifications for not following 
conventional airport schemes are fully based on improving passenger comfort (other 
reasons regarding aircraft are secondary). A maximum walking distance should be 
determined and agreed on. The LF&A (1963) study notes that, according to the “Port 
of New York Authority, a maximum walking distance should not exceed 1,250 feet,” 
and although this has been the reference for years, of the airports studied by LF&A, 
Dulles International Airport has only 160 feet of walking distance, which is the lowest 
minimum walking distance for an originating passenger to the nearest gate from any 
airport in the U.S. In contrast, the highest maximum walking distance to the farthest 
gate is 1,735 feet (O’Hare International Airport) (LF&A, April 1963, p. 9). 
As stated by LF&A (1963), revenue is a rising aspect of modern airport 
planning. The first volume of the study concludes that “the modern terminal building 
should be designed to maximize revenues from concessions. Hence, the emphasis on 
the ‘forced feed’ principle of terminal design—whereby passengers are ‘forced’ 
through concession areas on their way to gate positions” (p. 6). The report shift its 
argument and critiques Dulles Airport. Certainly, Washington’s international airport is 
a paradigmatic case, but several issues were overlooked in its commercial planning. 
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For Brink Coridan the capital’s airport “was designed specifically to reduce walking 
distances—and has done so—to a usual maximum of no more than 200 feet” (as 
quoted in LF&A, April 1963, p. 13). The airport is certainly a “significant step in 
recognizing the problems of terminal planning and, as such, provides a necessary 
catalyst to provoke original thinking in terminal building design” (p. 39). However, 
although the mobile lounge has reduced passenger walking distances in the terminal 
building in most instances, it has also introduced certain new problems, as described in 
the report (p. 39): 
1. An additional vehicle has been added to airport ramps. Apron maneuvering 
is delicate because of the size of the lounge. 
2. Trickle loading of an aircraft is impossible. Once aboard the mobile 
lounge, the passenger must wait from 15-30 minutes before departure to the 
aircraft. Passengers are in effect held in “limbo” in the mobile lounge until 
they get to the aircraft—once aboard the lounge, they cannot take advantage of 
concessions. 
3. Congestion at the boarding gate is increased. Passengers who have 
been accompanied by friends tend to cluster at the doors for last minute 
conversations. 
4. The moving of passengers as a group results in “bunching” of 
passengers, thereby creating unusual peaks at escalators, circulations points, 
etc. 
5. Passengers tend to queue up in the lounge as it approaches the 
aircraft. 
6. Loading steps are still required for crew, service and connecting 
passengers. 
7. The handling of connecting passengers is inconvenient. (LF&A, 
April 1963, p. 38) 
In conclusion, the problem framing furnished HCAA with convincing elements 
in order to undertake and finance the mammoth task of reinventing the airport. As 
stated in the progress report, the new concept is not a melding of the features of other 
major air terminals, but a “totally new concept of moving passengers from their 
ground transportation to their airplanes” (HCAA, 1965, p. 2). Based on LF&A’s 
conclusive study, Director Godfrey asked the Authority’s members “to abandon the 
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avenue of normal procedure and strike off into unexplored territory—where amid a 
tangle of risks the real answer might be found” (HCAA, 1965, p. 3).8 Officially, just 
two years after the inauguration of Dulles, the airport needed to be reinvented, and 
thus the problem was finally constructed. 
V. Problem Solving 
Although an airport terminal may be somewhat analogous to machines or artifacts, it 
would be more accurate to say that the airport as a whole is a technical system within a 
technical system. Surprisingly, the history of airports shows that when designers are in 
control of the invention-innovation, the system builder approach by Hughes (1983a) is 
an appropriate method of analysis. But when planners are in control of the invention-
innovation, Bijker’s (1997) technological frame fits better as a methodology for 
understanding both the “creative process of invention” and technological change (p. 
123).9 This makes more sense if we think of these processes as strictly different in 
nature: designers must often impose designs (objects) that will determine how users 
behave; on the contrary, planners will impose plans (not objects), and suggest in a 
non-material way how problems may be posed (verbalized), framed (contextualized), 
and later negotiated (agreed upon). 
Tampa’s gestation process is a good example of the above. Even when 
planners may be right in terms of identifying problems and solutions, they will 
                                                
8 The cited Progress Report: A New Approach to Jet Age Air Terminal Development, 1961–1965, by 
the HCAA, was based on LF&A’s previous studies (Volumes I & II). This document served the HCAA 
basically as a way to persuade the Board of the Aviation Authority, who would have the last word on 
the new scheme.  
9 See footnote 4 in the Introduction, where I refer to the fact that both methods of analysis may be used 
indistinctly, although I have decided to use them deliberately in the way I describe above simply 
because they work better as research tools when applied to designers (centralized power for invention or 
innovation) and planners (inventions or innovations need to be negotiated among many actors). 
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invariably have to face the ultimate frontier: the negotiation. In these terrains, planners 
must be equipped with solid arguments if they are to resist the critical path awaiting 
them. Two central questions arise: By whom was the landside–airside boundary 
negotiated in Tampa, and how? 
The members of the relevant social groups that participated in these 
negotiations “involved all the major stakeholders,” according to Dunlay (personal 
interview, March 8, 2008). For the HCAA (1965), all actors were “brought into the 
picture at the outset of the Terminal Design team’s meetings” (pp. 1–2). The various 
governmental agencies involved include the FAA, the mass communication media, 
users of the airport, particularly the airlines, and the members of the design team: 
HCAA, headed first by Director Godfrey, and later by his successor, Georges Bean; 
the engineers J. E. Greiner Company, from Baltimore; the architects H. Leslie Walker 
& Associates, from Tampa; Thomas Sullivan, First Deputy Director of Aviation with 
New York Port Authority—who acted as an architectural technical advisor; J. Van 
Ingen & Company Inc., of New York and Miami, who were fiscal advisors; and the 
airport planners and main technical advisors Leigh Fisher and Associates, of San 
Francisco. 
Unlike its predecessors, the boundary was encapsulated in one monolithic idea: 
Brink Coridan’s “Landside Airside Concept.” Consequently, and for the first time, the 
negotiation process was apparently reduced to a simple acceptance or rejection of the 
concept. Brink Coridan responds categorically to this effect: 
It wasn’t negotiated. The concept was an airside–landside separation to reduce 
walking and improve passenger convenience; thus nobody won. The 
consequences were that the airlines were scared and the authority members 
thought it was wonderful. But the airlines had good relations with Leigh 
Fisher, so it became the basis of a prototype. (Personal interview, M. Brink 
Coridan, March 8, 2008) 
	  177 
Brink emphasizes that “Leigh Fisher could sell anything” and that the engineer 
was a real visionary, a man who tested every idea and had a lot of integrity. “When he 
presented the concept to the authorities and the airlines, they simply validated it,” she 
ends. Although Brink Coridan is right in assuring that perhaps the planning concept 
did not find much opposition, the records show that this may have been one of the 
longest negotiation processes ever in the history of airport design. 
For Alistair Sherret, negotiating landside–airside boundaries comes down to 
congestion and delay. During the interview, Sherret responds as follows when asked 
about the difficulties found in the process: “The tension in the planning process is the 
bias for the airport to emphasize service to the passengers from the bias on the part of 
the airlines to minimize their cost and maximize their operating efficiencies.” This 
speaks of opposing interests from opposing stances: the airport at the landside and the 
airlines at the airside. Sherret believes that ideally those two would be in perfect 
balance, thus ensuring enough capacity and therefore no delays. “But in practice there 
is always an imbalance.” He remarks, “From the perspective of airside: the passengers 
in the airplanes are the top priority and responsibility of the airport. To put it oddly, 
the airlines cares a lot about the airside objective: minimizing delays. However, they 
are not as concerned about delays on the landside unless it affects their airside 
operations. This lack of common goals creates an everlasting tension between landside 
and airside” (personal interview, A. Sherret, March 8, 2008). 
According to Gene Lewis, the negotiations at Tampa were held in a context 
very different from that of contemporary airport design. Commercial airports were in 
their early stages, and less than 3% of the world’s population had flown on a plane. At 
the time, airlines were very powerful, but airports were, too, because they were 
strongly supported with taxpayers funds. Gene recalls that LF&A avoided developing 
the “safe” scheme that perhaps “would have been easier.” Instead, they opted for the 
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Landside Airside Concept, although, according to him, “the airlines were not big fans 
of the scheme”; but, to their advantage, both Fisher and Brink Coridan were very close 
to all the airline presidents. As Lewis mentions, they would call them personally and 
ask “why don’t you do this?” and “why don’t you do that?” or “I thought about this; 
what do you think?” The key argument for selling the concept was that the client (the 
airport) “[doesn’t] have to build these concourses.” And with respect to the 
mechanized transportation, it was also the airlines who, implicitly, “would pay for the 
ride system.” Lewis goes deeper in the conversation and reveals one of the secrets of 
the negotiation: 
And the basic idea was that we don’t have to build these concourses that would 
pay for the ride system. They [the client] could make much compact little 
buildings at the end, instead of all these corridors, that would pay for the ride 
system . . . And substitute a horizontal elevator, automated, so you wouldn’t 
increase the personnel cost. It had never been done before but it was worth 
thinking about. So they [the client] were just not interested in doing the easiest 
scheme to design. In fact, one of the planning processes was that nobody was 
allowed to bring a scale, a hard line drawing to a meeting because they were 
talking about concepts, not hard line drawings. So the engineers and the 
architects were prohibited, in the early stages of the planning, from bringing 
any hard line drawings. This is the way we did it in Philadelphia, and this is the 
way we did it in Kansas. We weren’t allowed to do anything . . . everything 
had to be rough, freehand, conceptual sketches. And that was one of the ways 
they stopped people from saying we can’t do this because we don’t have ten 
feet there, or we can’t do that. (Personal interview, E. Lewis, March 9, 2008) 
It is clear that since the early conception of the airport, the HCAA (perhaps 
encouraged by Leigh Fisher himself) sought large-scale innovation. However, that was 
only one part of the equation, because they had (as a team) to persuade those who 
were hesitant about the daring idea of testing a new airport scheme. Thus I find 
fascinating the methods that this quote reveals, and it does make me think of the 
strong differences between the negotiations that I have been speaking of in the 
previous two chapters. Gene’s description of these meetings resembles more a creative 
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think-tank or an experimental group than a meeting between experts trying to 
determine the feasibility of a project. However, the gestation of the landside–airside 
boundary has a common thread during the past decades: it needs to be set in a very 
conceptual environment. 
VI. After the “Landside Airside Concept” 
In the three previous sections, I used a slightly modified version of Bijker’s (1997) 
tentative list of elements of a technological frame. I have found along the way, 
particularly after analyzing the interviews, that there are three main levels to the 
gestation process of LF&A’s “Landside Airside Concept.” The first may be called 
“problem posing,” which is strictly semantic. It is here where the relevant actors need 
to fix terms in order to identify complex problems and make them intelligible and 
manageable. Those terms may be either newly coined or existent, but new meanings 
must be agreed on. (Within the “posing” process, words in disuse were dusted off and 
put back into practice.) This is similar to the problem of music and color discussed by 
Wittgenstein, in which, for example, melodies may be “blue” in tone and sentiment, 
and thus the word “blue” does not necessarily represent or communicate the idea of 
the color “blue” as we see it in a clear sky. If we speak of colors, a sad, melodic “blue” 
may resemble more the color “gray.” 
Thus, the first agreement among the relevant social groups at Tampa, which is 
represented by actors and hierarchies during the early design process, launched a 
dialogue. I suggest that it is here and now that the group “posed” the problem 
(interestingly, no hypothesis has been formulated yet). In the case of Tampa’s airport, 
the problem is posed at Jim “Jonesy” Jones’s basement in 1963, where the planning 
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team coined the terms “landside” and “airside.”10 The internal agreement made based 
on the definition of those terms is, in itself, the problem. 
The second stage I found in this atypical case may be called “problem 
framing” and is mainly methodological. At this stage, definitions become the main 
element of communication between the members of the different relevant groups. In 
order to achieve this sort of rhetorical proselytism it is necessary to outline a method 
or define technical procedures to take a course of action. As a procedure implies 
putting into practice, the establishment of such methodology could result in a sort of 
task-driven force that will become the group’s bonding material. In the case of Tampa 
International Airport, it is Herb Godfrey, the HCAA Executive Director, who adopts 
the Landside Airside Concept by LF&A, and it is George Bean, his successor in the 
post, who finally agrees and imposes a procedure. Bean’s purpose is evident; the 
stakes were so high with the innovative concept that the methodology had to be 
directed to dispel any doubts from the relevant groups. Thus the outcome was to 
arbitrarily fix a comfort standard (750ft. total walking distance) and prove all other 
airports in the country wrong. The simplest method, direct comparison, was the one 
employed. 
At this point there is a problem and a method, but no visible solution. I suggest 
that the third stage of this story could be called “problem solving.” Assuming that not 
all actors are yet fully advocating either the problem or the method (or one only), 
planners team up one last time and, based on the procedure’s outcome data, brainstorm 
an integrated solution to the problem. The solidity of the final plan relies thus on the 
following points: 
                                                
10 As I have shown in chapter one, this is historically imprecise. The first usage of these two terms dates 
back to the late 1930s, and later they fall into disuse around the 1950s. This would explain their feeling 
of “coining” new technical terms.  
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• How forcefully the new layout will address the problem, which is defined 
by the initial terms. 
• The scheme’s capacity to respond to suppositions. 
• The level of consensus reached, among the relevant groups. 
In problem solving, planners must gain enough support on all three points 
mentioned above in order to materialize the plan. 
In the case of the airport, it is the “Recommended Planning Criteria” (or the 
airport scheme master plan) that will provide cohesion. Once LF&A has proselytized 
experts and sub-consultants in private, the firm is now ready to start the negotiation. 
The plan will be presented and discussed, or “sold,” in the words of Brink Coridan. 
LF&A is well prepared with Leigh Fisher at the top; he had the unique ability to make 
the “unpalatable palatable” (Brink Coridan, 2006). In response to their interests, actors 
(or participants in common terms) will take their positions. How did the plan respond 
to the aforementioned points? 
• The problem was addressed semantically and asymmetrically, assigning the 
characteristic of “variable” for the airside, and the feature of “invariable” to 
the landside. The plan is consistent in responding to the historical issues of 
experienced by each entity, and thus a split is proposed. 
• The major supposition is that it will be technically and economically 
unfeasible to reconnect passengers within short times. Westinghouse sees 
an opportunity, competes with the less flexible Chrysler’s “Mobile 
Lounge,”11 and proposes the versatile “People Mover.” 
                                                
11 As criticized in the first volume of LF&A’s study, the “Mobile Lounge” was not flexible enough to 
cope with technological changes such as larger aircraft with higher passenger capacity or the 
passengers’ uneasiness in case of long waits due to traffic delays. 
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• High level of consensus is reached from most actors. The hardest 
negotiations come from the airlines, who were lobbied by HCAA’s 
members Norm Stallings and Sam Bucklew, and eventually persuaded, 
thanks to the personal relationships that both Fisher and Brink Coridan 
wove with them through the previous years of joining the firm. 
All three cases that I have addressed so far—LaGuardia, Dulles, and Tampa—
contain elements of Hughes’s “reverse salients.” The creation of a new airport model 
for Tampa shows how not just airport standard designs were triggering the alarms—
particularly among users—but even the so-called revolutionary Dulles was showing 
early symptoms of failure. Landside–airside boundaries are unresolved conflicts, 
which grow over time until they create serious bottlenecks and produce, almost 
cyclically, these “reverse salients.” And as Hughes sustains, radical innovations are 
required to reverse for correction. For example, once the airport has been reinvented, 
the protrusion disappears and the system returns to normal mode: in other words, back 
to a safe zone, where planners and designers assume standard or conventional designs, 
which form a sort of long, linear design progression. This continuum line acts as a 
stabilizing pattern. In the case of airports, this linear development is what later 
planners, architects, engineers, manager, and developers will call conventional 
designs. The classic representation of this technical idiosyncrasy is when airport 
designers and planners reach an apparent consensus on a perfect airport. This 
rhetorical closure stabilizes and allows further developments until a new “reverse 
salient” or series of bottlenecks operates and prompts another questioning of the whole 
model. In the following years, several airports including Charles de Gaulle, Orlando, 
and Atlanta followed the “Landside Airside Concept.” In the case of airport planning 
in the postwar period, atypical cases, such as Tampa, became pressure valves, in 
which the system was questioned from top to bottom and the critical bottlenecks of 
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standard models were finally addressed. These pressure valves are what I have been 
calling here “reverse salients,” although the final airport design has become now a 
historical “rupture” within the accepted, standard airport model’s time line. 
However, in spite of the “Landside Airside Concept’s” influence, most plans 
for new airports around the world tended to return to the standard model in order to 
reduce the risks involved with the innovation. Two issues were central in rising 
uncertainty. First, not all airlines were happy with the idea of paying to have their own 
terminals—this forced them to fill out all the necessary slots, thus reducing business 
when not at full operation. Second, not everyone agreed with the idea of having to 
purchase, operate, and maintain light trains (people movers) and depend on this 
technology in order to function. In the end, the opening phrase of the final LF&A 
report of 1963 freezes on one side and predicts on the other what awaited airport 
planning in the next few decades: “The analyses of U.S. airport terminal buildings 
presented in Volume I of this report indicate conclusively that the basic reason for the 
tremendous size and complexity of U.S. airport terminal areas today is the conflict 
between landside/airside requirements” (LF&A, July 1963). What happened after the 
first terrorist attacks in Israel, just three years after the opening of Tampa’s airport, is 
where we turn next. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: “Are Landside–Airside Boundaries Cultural Mirrors?”: 
Reinventions, Innovations, and Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Rehearsing a traditional serenade, typical in Mexican welcomes, even after 
short trips. Uncredited photo “Musicians entertain travelers in Mexico City Airport” 
reproduced from Time-Life Magazine, 1958, retrieved from http://travel-eat-
sleep.com/treasure-trove-of-travel-photos/ 
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 . . . the essence of technology is by no means anything technological. 
—Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology (1949), p. 279. 
Are boundaries repeatable pieces of a mechanism, or are they autonomous entities, 
subject to absorbing cultural practices? Before I tackle this question, I would like to 
draw the line between airport reinventions and airport innovations, and thus help the 
reader by dispelling any blurriness on this matter created by the previous case studies. 
In the second half of this chapter I argue why these boundaries are capable of 
reflecting society. 
More widely, in this chapter I argue that airports are not clones, or even 
repeatable copies. I support this claim by showing that the frontier between the airside 
and the landside captures many cultural differences that single out each airport 
through history. These singularities produce a mirror effect that reflects either local 
customs or the way these local forces react to foreign or global models. Toward this 
end I speak of three topics: causes and legacies of airport reinventions, the process of 
landside–airside boundary innovation, and how these boundaries add transparency and 
allow us to glance at the cultural mirror. 
In the first section, “Airport Reinventions,” I discuss how congestion can be 
highlighted among the causes that prompted full airport reinventions. I also comment 
on the consequences of my previous three case studies: LaGuardia, Dulles, and 
Tampa. The second section, “Airport Innovations,” speaks of historical changes, 
departing from what is commonly known in airport planning as the “linear model.” I 
present two iconic cases that introduced airport layout ideas that were perceived as 
new: the 1974 Terminal 1 in Paris’s Charles de Gaulle Airport, and the 1960 Pan Am 
Terminal 2 in New York’s Idlewild Airport (later known as JFK). Last, in the third 
section, or “Cultural Mirrors,” starting off from the notion that all airports seem to be 
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different, I argue that landside–airside boundaries may reflect cultural practices and 
customs, and show how that led me to maintain that airports, as technological systems, 
are socially constructed. In addition, I address the differences between planning new 
airports and expanding them in phases, and, finally, I compare boundaries at regional 
and international airports. 
I. On Airport Reinventions 
Sociologist Everett Rogers defined technological reinvention in 1962 as “the degree to 
which an innovation is changed or modified by user in the process of its adoption and 
implementation . . . [and] re-invention as the degree to which an individual’s use of a 
new idea departs from the machine version of the innovation that was originally 
promoted by a change agency” (p. 17). Thus, I argue that to set the right conditions for 
reinventing technologies, first there should be agents of change that push innovators to 
learn from the previous model and launch them into the task of redefining a whole 
new concept for that artifact, product, or design. In the previous chapters I have 
introduced these agents of change in each of my case studies.  
Likewise, if we use Hughes’s (1983a, p. 62) approach, for him inventors can 
be divided into conservative or radical. A radical invention is one that inaugurates a 
system, closer to the full breakthrough of the cases that I have presented. Hughes 
suggests that inventors often speak of their inventions as metaphors or analogies, as 
with the Skywalk, the Mobile Lounge, or the People Mover.  
Hughes also predicts that preexistent and new systems will enter into 
competition. So how can we evaluate these three case studies in competitive terms? 
There are two contrasting ways to answer this question. On the one hand, all three 
cases tell stories of technological failure because they did not bring a definitive closure 
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to the problems that originated them. In the case of LaGuardia Airport, the planned 
capacity reached its peak just a few years after its opening, making the investment 
obsolete to the point of demolition. Unfortunately, demand at the terminal and room 
for expansion were seriously underestimated. Plans to consider a new airport for New 
York were undertaken just a year after the airport’s opening and even during the 
Second World War, leaving aside the ideas of William Delano and embracing William 
K. Harrison’s futuristic and pragmatic vision of planning an airport city, rather than 
just another airport. In the case of Dulles Airport, despite the fact that the new airport 
system designed by Saarinen, Chrysler, and the FAA was widely promoted and 
adopted worldwide, airports gradually decided to return to the old system of jetways 
and were forced to send their expensive and bulky Mobile Lounges to the junkyard. 
Because of some minor miscalculations in the system’s model, Dulles’s scheme could 
not cope with the pressures of growth. Planes at the huge apron were subject to delays 
and overlapping, so in the absence of large hold rooms the terminal building became 
saturated, and passengers were forced to wait for long periods on board both planes 
and Mobile Lounges, making the aircraft turnaround service slow and inefficient. Last, 
Tampa’s airport responded to an ownership model, according to which airlines 
developed their own terminals at their own cost, that did not last for long. In addition, 
the layout’s radial geometry obliged the construction of oversized aprons, which 
required at the same time enormous extensions of land. This did not scale well to 
smaller airports that were looking for less-expensive models for expansion. Last, 
Tampa fell at the opposite extreme of Saarinen’s TWA terminal in New York and 
Yamasaki’s Lambert Terminal in Saint Louis: Florida’s terminal lacked any 
monumentality or architectural taste, making it one of the all-time least-favorite public 
buildings in Tampa Bay. 
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On the other hand, few airports have ever been more influential than the ones 
studied here. As I commented earlier, LaGuardia made the significant contribution of 
separating not just passenger flows, but the entire airport activity in vertical levels. 
This has remained the norm throughout the years, particularly for international 
airports, and certainly marked a radical new way to deal with the landside–airside 
relationship. Separating arrival and departure passengers proved to be a good way to 
speed up drop-offs and pickups at the curbside; inside the building it facilitated the 
handling and recovery of luggage, preventing people from flowing in opposite 
directions through narrow spaces. It also simplified the way passengers were 
distributed towards the airside, allowing for shorter, roofed walkways at the apron. 
Even the Skywalk was listed in the requirement program of other airports or 
expansions, such as Washington National Airport (1941) and Zurich International 
Airport (1946). 
In the case of Dulles, Saarinen proved that aviation is a business plagued with 
externalities, so there is a high level of risk if an airport is turned into a precision 
clockwork. However, Dulles’s Mobile Lounge became an instant option for already 
congested airports in the 1979s such as JFK, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Montreal, 
Tokyo, Mexico City, Jeddah, and many others that wanted to increase the number of 
operations at remote positions—without making many changes to their existing 
buildings and sacrificing much in terms of passenger comfort. This way of adding 
capacity through shared, insufficient hold rooms provoked a direct relationship 
between delay and incredibly crowed spaces. Thus designers also learned that it is 
very hard to uncouple the number of enplaned passengers from the dimensioning of 
the terminal buildings. As every story has its moral, many officials learned that 
experimentation in airport design comes at an incredibly high cost. 
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Finally, of the three reinventions of the landside–airside, Marge Brink’s vision 
for Tampa has been the most influential. Why? Because it founded the basis first for 
Orlando and later for Atlanta international airports; and because up until the time of 
this writing, only Georgia’s capital airport is thought to be a viable model for growing 
massive, hublike international facilities. What many of Marge’s talented disciples did 
was to replace the spiked-like layout with a “tablet”-like arrangement of conventional 
linear terminals linked by rapid ground transport. 
So we may consider that Tampa added one of the key features of new hub-
airport planning: the mechanized connection between satellite terminals. Among the 
facilities that have embraced and adapted this model are Stansted in London, Denver 
in Colorado, and the forthcoming London Oxford Airport in the UK and, 
paradoxically, the recent SOM’s1 re-conception of Dulles Airport in Washington. 
The planning legacy of these three case studies is rather unusual. None can be 
necessarily described as historical turning points because their importance was right at 
the core of how landside–airside boundaries were conceived; and as I have argued in 
this dissertation, the boundaries were not even verbalized as planning conflicts until 
Brink Coridan did so. Although they certainly have had an impact, at least in the way 
the history of airports has developed, planners still have not agreed on how to deal 
with the airport as an entity of constant and onerous change. 
One last aspect that should be addressed is the common cause that triggered a 
radical reinvention of the airport. All three cases, LaGuardia, Dulles, and Tampa, are 
justified first and foremost as countermeasures in response to congestion. This 
phenomenon is sensitive to favorable economic conditions where taxpayers are more 
                                                
1 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, which, since the postwar period, has consolidated into one of the 
largest architecture and engineering firms in the world. Its airport division has been led by two key 
individuals: Airport Planner Tony Vaccione and Airport Designer Marilyn Jordan Taylor. 
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prone to travel and spend; but inversely proportional to boosting airport income and 
revenue, facilities become rapidly overcrowded and insufficient. 
These issues are intricately linked, from the airspace slot availability to the 
lack of parking or curbside space, thus creating an incredibly complex maze of 
problems when capacity becomes swamped. In the aforementioned cases, only 
politicians and institutions (such as Mayor LaGuardia, the FAA, or the HCAA) were 
hierarchically capable of driving a total reconceptualization of the airport. 
Fortunately, not all airports need to be reinvented when they face a saturation 
crisis; however, most airports need to implement their own program of innovation (or 
at least preferably) in order to cope with potential growth. I discuss this aspect at 
length in the following section. First, however, I explain why congestion has become 
one of the strongest forces driving the continuous change of the landside–airside 
boundary. 
As through spaces, transportation terminals should facilitate the flow of 
passengers. If, according to IATA (International Air Transport Association), “the 
essence of air transport is speed, then it is essential that delays on the ground are 
avoided. Passengers who are subjected to congestion, inconvenience or delay tend to 
blame the carrier for any shortcomings . . .” (as quoted in Brancker, 1977, p. 22). This 
congestion must to be predicted based on the previous experience of consultants and 
airport administrators, and thus will inform the dimensional-requirement program of 
airport facilities, in order to guarantee minimum speed patterns. As a result of market 
fluctuations, airports are subject to handling an increased number of planes and 
passengers, which often overwhelms the capacity of their infrastructure. 
Technically, saturation is measured in peaks and delays; these figures usually 
feed back the minimum standards written in codes and the so-called levels of service 
(LOS). These minimum levels of comfort are set by IATA and are dictated by the 
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maximum allowable human density per square meter. It is measured on a scale of 
letters, ranging from a high LOS of A for a comfortable 1.4sqm per person to a low 
LOS of E for 0.6sqm per person, for example, in customs queuing (Poh, 2007, pp. 16–
18). Thus, much airport planning activity revolves around the application of analytical 
tools and methods to construct prediction models. Besides calculating growth 
volumes, forecasting may prevent airport jams in the future. However, the reasons we 
travel are impossible to predict with high accuracy; society as a whole becomes an 
externality in the model. When passengers are affected, they usually externalize their 
criticisms and complaints. Historically, congestion has reached several high peaks that 
eventually led to management crises. 
Some of the most famous critical peaks in history are the saturation levels in 
the late 1930s—most probably caused by the gradual recovery from the Great 
Depression and the generalized excitement of flying; the explosion of commercial air 
traffic and airliner development after the Second World War from 1945 on; and a new 
striking peak unleashed with the introduction of jetliners in 1954 wherein travel times 
and costs were significantly reduced. Airport congestion became a serious problem 
during the 1960s when, after the general airline de-regulation, a sort of war for aerial 
slots was triggered (Levine, 2008, pp. 56–58) (see Figure 4.2). However, a closer look 
at saturation shows that it is not necessarily linked to technological innovations; for 
example, comparative statistics on travel from the 1960s until the 1990s reveal 
passengers’ motivation for personal travel: “In the 1970s the specific reason that 
showed the most dramatic gain was sightseeing and resort use, followed by people 
flying to visit friends or relatives” (Goodman, 2000, p. 28). 
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Figure 4.2. Photograph showing uncomfortable, swamped, postwar-period hold rooms 
during the late 1950s’ congestion peak. From Winnipeg Tribune Photo Collection, 
1958, Winnipeg International Airport, retrieved from http://www.umanitoba.ca/ 
libraries/units/archives/tribune/photographs/display_photo.php?id=4274 
According to Goodman’s (2000) report, leisure travel grew faster than business 
travel during those years; flying for personal travel purposes, even internationally, 
became increasingly popular. Congestion detonated debates over the technical and 
managerial capacity of airport experts and authorities to deal with saturation and the 
consequential lack of comfort for users. This has moved the landside–airside boundary 
into the arena of discussion. As congestion implies delays—thus making passengers 
experience longer waits—assigned spaces for holding, eating, shopping, or service 
areas such as lavatories or circulations become physically insufficient. Congestion has 
directed pressure towards the boundary in very different historical contexts, as the 
limits of control and surveillance have changed throughout the years, preventing 
passengers from wandering around terminals and, on the contrary, forcing them to 
remain in contained zones. As I discuss later, overcrowded hold rooms became fish 
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tanks of anxiety; thus planners, designers, and managers were forced to attend to this 
matter and address these issues at the negotiation table. 
II. On Airport Innovations 
In this section I first sketch a very brief history of the “linear airport,” which, as the 
reader may infer, is the simplest way to grow an airport terminal. In this sense, I also 
suggest that most innovations sprouted from a problem-solving conjunction related to 
this simple, more standard design. Further ahead, I interlink the basics of innovation 
theory with airport changes, and I draw the differences between airport innovations 
and reinventions. Last, I analyze in more depth two cases of paradigmatic landside–
airside boundary innovation. So, what went wrong with the so-called “linear scheme”? 
Let us imagine first a huge rail terminal station, where trains that are more than 
one mile long—four times the standard—are standing at a hypothetically long 
platform, ready to be boarded. This length would be comparable to twelve to sixteen 
city blocks. Most likely passengers would not feel very happy to step on in at the few 
last cars, especially after a long walk sliding their luggage and shopping bags. This 
imaginary analogy captures one of the most basic landside–airside conflicts: airplanes 
requiring more “building front” versus passengers hating the long walks. Perhaps 
Callon or Latour would have claimed here that aircraft, just as many other 
technologies, have performed some degree of actorship.2 True, planes, just as other 
artifacts, give rise to physical demands; however, all these demands have been pushed 
ahead by human means and thus can hardly be considered autonomous.  
                                                
2 Referring to S&TS’s controversial Actor-Network Theory (1986), wherein inanimate objects may be 
“actants” or things made to act and thus present some degree of actorship. 
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After many years of UK and German predominance in modeling early 
symmetrical Art Deco terminals such as Liverpool Speke (1938), Dublin (1937), or 
the more functionalist Hamburg-Fühlsbuttel (1928) and Stuttgart-Echterdingen (1939), 
the French became the strongest promoters of the linear airport. After the emblematic 
extension of the old Le Bourget airfield in Paris by George Labro in 1937, the 
rationale of linear schemes prevailed. The French architect responded to aircraft 
demands and imagined one long building, centrally divided by a core, expandable at 
both ends. Although the structure ended up being a quarter of a mile long, it became a 
paradigm and thus the more common way to grow existent airports worldwide even 
after the Second World War. Linearity remained a preferred option—even during the 
1960s’ and mid-1970s’ intense period of airport questioning and innovation, mainly 
because following the steps of Dulles, Tampa, or Charles de Gaulle implied 
prohibitive costs and investments. (Remember that in addition to the new terminals 
and transportation systems, they all required massive aprons, which came at a high 
cost.) 
But even Le Bourget’s terminal linearity was no match for the more radical, 
1945 longitudinal scheme by Paul Gerhardt, for Chicago’s Midway Airport. The 
visionary city’s architect proposed a lengthier low-cost terminal, capable of parking up 
to fifteen planes in front of the building’s façade. Surprisingly, the plan remained 
unbuilt (see Figure 4.3). 
Just when the first professional airport planners were trying to revolutionize 
layouts and systems, Henri Vicariot, an architect-engineer from Ponts et Chaussées, 
designed for ADP the ultramodern, legendary, and Miesiean-like3 Paris Orly 
International Airport. The flashy 1971 terminal privileged aircraft, as it was disposed 
                                                
3 Miesian is a term often used by architecture historians, when refering to the bare, unadorned, 
distinctive style of German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. 
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in a long (660 feet), rectilinear way, parallel with both the apron and the runway, thus 
facilitating the perpendicular parking of planes. The terminal certainly captured the 
spirit of modern architecture, as it was dressed under an austere glass skin layered out 
by flat, concrete slabs. Orly instantly became a cultural fetish, dragging endless 
number of artists and filmmakers to its grounds, seeking futuristic and abstract 
backdrops (for example, the airport is superbly portrayed in the cult-classic film La 
Jetée, from Chris Marker). Gradually, linear airports became an easy way to cope with 
an increasing demand for simultaneously servicing multiple aircraft, although this 
convenience came at a price. When an airport terminal’s footprints extend along a 
line—be it buildings or piers—passengers’ walking distances will increase 
proportionally, but so will technical systems and, in particular, segregated circulations. 
Hence, since the 1970s designers and engineers have developed mechanized 
alternatives, such as people movers and automatic luggage systems, which help to 
alleviate the transport of passengers, supplies, and bags along extended distances. 
 
Figure 4.3. An early linear airport scheme for Midway Airport. Photo of Municipal 
Airport (Midway), 1945, by Paul Gerhardt, Jr., from Chicago Historical Society.  
It is pertinent to clarify first that most authors refer to “linear” terminals as 
straight buildings. From an architectural point of view this usage is correct; however, 
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in terms of planning, the linear terminals are the ones parking and servicing aircraft in 
a line or following a perpendicular angle to the building. That would imply that 
linearity is a way to refer a landside–airside condition rather than an architectural 
shape. Therefore, airports following a star footprint, such as Amsterdam Schiphol, or 
even curved, as Dallas–Fort Worth, could well be considered linear. This condition 
changes when we speak of satellites—which were very much in fashion between the 
sixties and the seventies—because the relationship between the airside and the 
landside has been strongly altered, or rephrased. 
But why is the airport’s linear scheme still used at present? The scheme offers 
two advantages: first, it privileges aircraft, making the parking simpler and the aprons 
shorter; and second, it is easily expandable—if the land provision suffices—explaining 
why this is the classic solution for new airports and terminals. Iconic examples of 
contemporary rectilinear terminals include the new Terminals T4 and T4S at Barajas, 
Madrid; Terminal 2 at Detroit, Michigan; Kansai International Airport in Osaka, 
Japan; and the huge Dubai International Airport in UE, underway at the time of this 
writing. These and all linear projects must deal in creative ways with the oldest 
landside–airside conflict: the walking distance. 
The aforementioned examples also share the use of mechanized systems in 
order to mitigate the long walks; for this purpose Kansai implemented the “Wing-
Shuttle,” Detroit the “Express Tram,” and Barajas its “People Mover.” Today, more 
than 40 airports use similar or identical models to the ones pioneered in Tampa, as I 
discussed in chapter three. In time, the “linear scheme” became a synonym for 
passenger discomfort and a professional target for airport planners and designers. In 
my view, this was one of the main reasons to produce relevant, airport layout 
innovations throughout the 20th century. 
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According to the influential sociologist Everett Rogers (1995), “an innovation 
is an idea, practice or project that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of 
adoption” (p. 14). Because of the complexity of airports, innovations are required far 
in anticipation of problems such as forecasted congestion, user complains, airline 
demands, or technological advancements in aircraft. Therefore, airport planning may 
involve high degrees of technological speculation and design, which occasionally 
result in innovative landside–airside configurations. I suggest that these changes 
exclude reinventions, because these last respond to a different decision-making 
process, whereby a huge amount of uncertainty is paired with an enormous cost. On 
the contrary, airport innovations seem to make good use of past solutions and 
schemes, thus introducing novelty in limited degrees, hence proportionally reducing 
risk. Among the numerous innovations that have been registered through airport 
history, two stand out as the more extreme and revolutionary. First I will speak of the 
1960 Pan Am Terminal 2 at New York’s Idlewild Airport (later known as JFK) and 
later of the 1974 Terminal 1 at Paris’s Charles de Gaulle Airport. Consistent with 
Rogers’s theory, landside–airside boundary innovations show a rate of adoption and a 
pattern of diffusion. In the case of Idlewild, the new model has been successfully 
adopted and adapted throughout the years worldwide; on the other hand, those who 
followed T1 at Charles de Gaulle have faced serious problems coping with both 
technological and social change. The following two examples are also representative 
of two different approaches: in the case of New York, the scheme is clearly open and 
adjustable; in the case of Paris, however, the layout is only repeatable but hardly 
expandable or flexible enough to respond to change. Next, I describe in more detail 
the case of Idlewild, or JFK, as it is better known today. 
During the formative days, say before 1937—when the extension of Paris Le 
Bourget was completed and the first linear terminal was born—all airports were 
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mostly speculating, or swimming in untested waters. A glimpse at the airport designs 
before this date may evidence how “architects were absent from the field of airport 
development,” as airport historian Geza Szurovy (2003) has argued, and that airports 
“continued to be an engineering problem—a viewpoint jealously guarded by the 
engineering community. Air terminals were expensive and, in the view of practical 
engineers who care little for marketing and customer service, added little value to the 
airport” (p. 57). In fact, both engineers and architects were pioneering what airports 
could be, and thus, it is undeniable that everyone involved learned much through trial 
and error. In this sense, by general consensus Berlin’s Tempelhof arises as the greatest 
of its era,4 although, paradoxically, it did not became a model for future airports. The 
relationship between its landside and its airside was perhaps the perfect fit for the era 
and the German culture. There was also the issue of the airport’s own DNA-duality, or 
a dilemma between being thought of as a civil or military facility. Not surprisingly, 
much of the landside–airside boundary layout and protocols at Berlin’s capital airport 
were designed specifically to accommodate the Führer’s requirements for hierarchy, 
security, circulation, and privileges of observation of the tarmac.5 
Thus I believe it is relevant to ask whether, beyond the case studies addressed 
in the previous three chapters, there is record of other cases of landside–airside 
boundary innovations after the Second World War. The answer is yes, because almost 
each boundary has been custom-designed since, so in a way, each is unique. However, 
this fact does not necessarily imply that each of these thousands of airports worldwide 
can offer technical innovations that may be extended to other airports and create a 
wave of influence. Nonetheless, I would highlight at least three additional cases that 
                                                
4 A system of circulations that would lead Hitler to his private observation balcony. 
5 Direct observation in a visit to Tempelhof, guided by the Berliner Flughäfen. 
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have proved to exercise a strong impact on other similar conceptions, all of them 
addressing landside–airside boundaries as their leitmotif. 
The first interesting case sprouted directly from LaGuardia Airport’s 
immediate saturation and eventual failure after investing $45 million in public funds; 
New York City required a much larger airport, and this decision now fell under the 
control of NYDOT (New York Department of Transportation) instead of the Mayor’s 
Office (thus leaving William Delano out of the contending). For NYDOT, rapid 
obsolescence was totally out of the picture, so after disregarding a 55-gate linear 
proposal and after expropriating land for over 150 million dollars, it was finally 
Wallace K. Harrison—an architect who enjoyed a close relationship with the 
influential Nelson Rockefeller—who became responsible for developing Idlewild’s 
final master plan at the turn of the 1950s. 
Harrison got the job done with great vision and accuracy, proposing what he 
called an “airport city” or, in economic terms, a new privatization model for the 
larger-scale airport. In this model, public funds would be responsible for financing just 
the landside facilities, and airlines would have to pay for their own airside buildings 
(see Figure 4.4).  
His airport city consisted of a central curved-shaped area holding parking bays 
and public spaces, edged outside by a multi-lane road, which at the same time 
organized many independent terminals sprouting perpendicularly from the center. 
According to this scheme, each terminal would be assigned to an airline, and airlines 
would be free to invest according to their own predictions of growth. As airlines have 
predicted, the air boom was unstoppable. Harrison’s innovation thus was to see 
through the landside–airside boundary an opportunity for new ownership and 
investment at a never-seen-before scale, which may now be considered the pioneer of 
today’s hub airports. 
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Figure 4.4. Concept for an airport city, in where the landside is magnified at an urban 
scale. Private collection of Lisa Milton Harrison (May, 1957). New York Idlewild 
Terminal City. Reproduced with permission of the owner. 
A decade later, and curiously at the same Idlewild, Walther Prokosch, co-
author of the first airport planning manual (Prokosch & Froesch, 1946) and one of the 
first airport planners in the U.S., was commissioned to design—along with his firm 
Tippets Abbet McCarthy Stratton and architects Ives, Turano and Gardner—the so-
called Worldport, Pan Am’s iconic Terminal 2. This complex was planned as a 
multilevel triangle facing the road and crowned, at the opposite end, with a huge oval 
roof facing the apron. Similar to the much older Tempelhof, the roof was in fact an 
overhang, which had become unnecessary since the growing use of jetways after 1959.  
But the Worldport terminal was meaningful as a landside–airside innovation in 
one specific way: it introduced a failed, but provocative, way to reduce the distance 
	  201 
for uploading and downloading passengers. The first triangle had a parking garage at 
the rooftop, and one flight below, the hold rooms connected to six contact positions. 
But the terminal designers literally chopped off whole sections of this building in 
order to allow each aircraft to insert its nose into the landside (at least at the first 
building). This radical move showed a strong concern for and commitment to reducing 
boarding distances and to increasing passenger comfort, as emplaning required only 
short bridges. 
Unfortunately, the final building did not feature this system, probably because 
it was not compliant with the minimum distances recommended in Annex 14 regarding 
the proximity of aircraft to built structures. It also required push-back from each 
aircraft, making it additionally slow for service turnaround. The learned lesson of the 
Pan Am terminal is that it is not advisable to overlap the airside with the landside. This 
principle remains valid, at least until some futuristic plans that will be discussed at the 
end of this chapter. 
The last innovation that I would like to bring forth is the first terminal at 
Roissy in Paris, later known as Charles de Gaulle International Airport. This airport is 
closely linked to the case of Tampa’s airport, as there are some striking parallelisms in 
the thinking processes; thus I will explain further—although the Parisian terminal is 
perhaps better known and more iconic—why Tampa International remains the last 
reinvention of the airport. 
Before the evident saturation of Orly and Le Bourget in the early 1960s, and 
after years of negotiations to build a new airport in the surroundings of Paris, it was 
Jacques Block, a director of planning and development for Aéroports de Paris (ADP), 
who was put in charge of the master planning of Roissy. However, the French 
administration was caught in the same conflicts as those at the FAA in the U.S., 
dealing with the endless passenger complaints about having to walk long distances and 
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bear long waits at congested concourses. Thus, before developing the airport zoning 
layouts, Block decided to challenge the newer airport layouts in the U.S. and set forth 
only the design of the first terminal (as if he were prototyping or experimenting). In 
the meantime, he would have time to negotiate the land provision for the larger airport 
plan, which needed to be pushed twenty-five kilometers out from the old city center 
(Block, 1971). In 1968, during a lecture at the Royal Aeronautics Society in London, 
Block assured that his model for “airport planning was influenced by aircraft 
developments,” thus setting the tone for the new designs. ADP denounced the 
American model of Dulles Airport, arguing that the revolutionary scheme failed to 
continuously feed passengers to aircraft, thus limiting its capacity. They also 
challenged the linear model at Orly and the recent addition of piers, or fingers, 
because they implied long walks for passengers. 
Finally, ADP showed interest in the first satellite terminals in Newark, 
although they (Block, 1968) argued against distances and a limited number of 
positions (Aéroports de Paris, 2004). As Jean-François Onnée (2004) wrote in his 
clever analysis of Roissy’s Terminal 1, “it was meant to reflect the French ‘savoir-
faire’ in civil and aeronautical engineering” (p. 7). Within ADP, it was Paul Andreu, a 
graduate architect and engineer from both the École Polytechnique and the École 
Nationale des Pons et Chaussés, who led the project as chief engineer of the company. 
In 1967, Andreu envisioned a multilevel, circular building at the center containing the 
parking and processing of passengers; this drum-like structure was surrounded by a 
huge circular air-platform, equipped with seven self-standing mini-terminals, radially 
spaced around the core. Tunnels and people movers physically linked both the 
satellites and the center, thus allowing the flow of passengers and luggage. 
Similar to Tampa but unlike any other airport, Roissy’s Terminal 1 
concentrated parking and shops on the first levels (1–3), followed by the check-in hall 
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level (3), then an intermediate connecting level towards the satellites (4), and finally 
topped by the arrivals hall (5). The building was completed and unveiled in 1974 
(Aéroports de Paris, 2009). In an article titled “Charles de Gaulle Terminal 1: The 
Hated Air-Terminal,” the weekly L’éclat noted that at Roissy’s first terminal “the 
lacking of character had largely contributed to the disaffection of the public.” The 
editorial added that “the poor choice of materials created a bad reputation among 
users” and finally declared it a “failed utopia” (L’ ECLAT rédaction, 2011, pp. 2, 4). 
In practical terms, the layout was so rigid that it did not allow for any 
expansion or adaptation, making it very uncomfortable especially after the rise of 
security controls. This gave the terminal a bad reputation, making it, through the years, 
highly unpopular among travelers. The unusual scheme certainly challenged its users. 
In his layout, Andreu only “extended” the frontier between the landside and the 
airside, which would explain why this division was never verbalized as a rupture. 
On the one hand Terminal 1 is, like Dulles, a building designed primarily by 
architects; aesthetically radical and spatially sound, it has been displayed in films and 
photographs as futuristic.6 (Who could forget the collage of Terminal 1’s atrium and 
its escalator tubes on the awesome cover of the 1977 I Robot album by the Alan 
Parsons Project!) On the other hand, there were too many flaws and contradictions in 
the way passengers used the building, and as Onnée (2004) criticized, despite its 
centralized vision,  
ADP’s concerns was [sic] to keep the walking distances for passengers as short 
as possible. The finger pier concept was criticized for its inefficiency in that 
respect. But this design did not actually prove to be efficient either. The overall 
walking distance hence turns out to be not negligible at all, not to mention the 
fact that passengers are constantly being disoriented and deceived by the 
                                                
6 As described in a 1974 journal video from ORTF, L’installation d’Air France dans le nouvel aéroport 
Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle. 
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circularity of the terminal and the fact that the different levels do not connect 
in an obvious way. (pp. 10–11).  
One more substantial difference between the two airports was the ownership 
model. Roissy remained a centralized facility owned by the state (through ADP), in 
contrast to Tampa’s model of independent satellite ownership per airline. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, I analyzed both projects not from 
an architectural historian perspective, but under the light of S&TS scholarship and 
through the eyes of the landside–airside boundary. In this regard I conclude that the 
main difference between Terminal 1 at Roissy and Tampa’s airport is that the first 
represents above all a meaningful architectural achievement and the second a socio-
technical reinvention of the airport. In Paris, the boundary has been stretched out to a 
maximum, while always leaving spatial continuity between both landside and airside. 
On the contrary, Tampa’s scheme splits the boundary in two, with landside on one 
side of a fence and airside on the other. The new relationship would be technologically 
negotiated by a machine (People Mover). This is what phrased the relationship in a 
new way, and what eventually served as the basis for Atlanta and other contemporary, 
large-scale airports. In short, the key to airport future expansion was Tampa’s divide. 
In conclusion, in the last two sections I drew the line between two kinds of 
airport layouts—or, more specifically, landside–airside boundaries: innovations and 
reinventions. I also commented on what lies behind these models or, in other words, 
factors that motivate change, such as congestion, the “linear airport,” and passenger 
discomfort. Finally, I used two compelling examples of airport innovation to illustrate 
how these new layouts may respond to external forces through time, evidencing thus 
how open or closed these systems are. Now I move on to analyze how local culture 
influences the formation of any landside–airside boundary. 
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III. The Cultural Mirror 
Even if airports seem to be similar or share certain common features, landside–airside 
boundaries are strictly unrepeatable. Yet in cases where designers tried to impose 
identical models at two different terminals, those boundaries would eventually be 
customized and individualized. This is the case of near-to-identical terminals in the 
Los Angeles and Dallas–Fort Worth airports, which, depending on a number of 
factors, may substantially vary as an individualized boundary. For example, in the case 
of Los Angeles, terminals handling flights bound for Australia or Asia have recently 
adopted zigzag ramps within a small area in order to process the very long lines 
produced by embarking hundreds of passengers to the oversized 747s. Also, in the 
case of Dallas–Fort Worth, where all five terminals are deceptively identical, statistics 
show that out of nineteen inspection points distributed along the five buildings, wait 
times may vary up to twenty-one minutes between the fastest and the slowest.7 
The landside–airside boundaries at Dallas–Fort Worth are contingent on how 
old the terminal is (A is oldest, D is newest)—because there are may be differences for 
each in their interior designs, the kind of equipment being used, the operating airlines, 
destinations and kinds of aircraft, the domestic or international nature of each wing, 
retail brands, security checkpoint layouts, and in particular the personal stamp of 
administrators, officials, employees, and users. Surprisingly, even in this type of 
airport, no two boundaries are the same. 
So, why are all landside–airside boundaries different? I suggest that there are at 
least three main reasons to make each landside–airside frontier singular. First, there is 
a contextual (physical, political, managerial, economical) difference between planning 
new airports and expanding existing terminals. Second, there are two basic kinds of 
                                                
7 “Dallas DFW Security Wait Times,” TSA historical averages reported in 2010, retrieved from 
www.ifly.com. 
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airport boundaries: domestic frontiers and international borderlines. Third, landside–
airside boundaries have become representations of cultural expressions. 
The main difference between planning new airports and expanding existing 
terminals is the degree of freedom in the hands of designers, architects, and planners 
to come up with solutions that respond to the specific needs of an airport master plan. 
In the case of expansions, designers must adjust existing terminal buildings and 
aprons, which are often seriously constrained in terms of room for modifications and 
additions, and are typically congested. 
If the activity of negotiating, designing, and implementing changes to older 
terminals is not complicated enough, decision makers must also deal with preserving a 
continuous operation scheme. In airport planning this is usually referred as phasing. A 
representative example of an airport expansion that became incompatible with the 
airport’s landside–airside scheme could be Tampa: After “the attacks in Rome and 
Athens in 1973, the American Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) imposed new rule 
narrowing the points of control that were established at the “throat” of each 
concourse” (Salter, 2008, p. 13). Bill Dunlay, an engineer with Leigh Fisher since the 
1970s, remembers how the rise of security immediately affected Tampa’s Landside 
Airside Concept, particularly on the first airports that followed the same scheme: 
Security was at the hold room right before going into the plane. That’s how 
airports were built long before security. When Orlando was first open (same as 
in Tampa), I believe security was on the airside building, but later security was 
a known function. Everywhere else the security is in the landside building, 
rather than the airside. So it became a major factor in the United States, for that 
function that didn’t exist before and hadn’t been planned for before. (Personal 
interview, Bill Dunlay, LF&A, March 8, 2008) 
At both Tampa’s airport and its predecessor, Orlando International Airport, there was 
simply no available space to install landside security checkpoints. The functional 
scheme was fully locked up with Leigh Fisher’s “Landside Airside Concept”; the 
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connectors between the airside satellites and the landside central building ended up on 
a small, mezzanine level. Furthermore, after the events of 9/11 this situation was 
pushed to the limit; airport authorities had no option but to protrude oversized security 
checkpoints and their queuing lines into the smaller vestibules at the transfer level, 
resulting in an overcrowded, uncomfortable area for passengers. Paraphrasing Salter, 
if, in general, boundaries were pushed to the terminal’s throat, in the case of these two 
airports it almost choked them. 
In contrast, when designers have the chance to lay out new airports from 
scratch, the task of shaping landside–airside boundaries turns into a rather complicated 
negotiation under a rain of ideas, interests, and restrictions. While additions or 
upgrades to already-built terminals face several constraints, these same limitations act 
as negotiation plotlines, in which there is less room for imagination. But in the case of 
laying out new airports or terminals, the possibilities are certainly expansive. 
I have participated in such negotiations from at least three different angles. 
First, as a designer for Toronto’s International Airport in the late 1990s; second, as an 
architect and project leader for Monterrey’s International Airport from 2006 and on; 
and, finally, as planner for Mexico City’s Toluca International Airport since 2012. As 
one might expect, these three projects were conceived, developed, and decided on the 
basis of very different negotiation platforms. Why? Perhaps because for each 
decision’s group there was a rather different leadership profile, often representing 
highly opposing interests and ideas. In addition, there were a number of concerns, 
clearly representative of their time, flying around all the time. 
In the case of Lester B. Pearson in Toronto, the more heated debates spin 
around the design of an efficient segregation system—airport officials were worried 
about the U.S., Canada, and all other nationalities’ triple separation. I recall that the 
long discussions between us, the designers (Moshe Safdie and Associates), and SOM, 
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our airport expert partner, ended up in a project split: we would be in charge of 
designing the piers, and they would be in charge of defining the boundary, at the 
processor building. The outcome was an intricate bundle of segregated tubes and 
valves distributed into huge, monumental processing spaces for passengers. We aimed 
to guide passengers through light patterns and display artistically designed structures; 
however, a good deal of the final layout relied on complying with those migratory 
conditions that would allow the airport to compete commercially with its American 
peers. I also recall Miron Cohen (a project manager for Safdie’s Ben Gurion 
expansion project), who was brought from Israel to reinforce our young team, 
mentioning for the first time the expression fish tanks to refer to rooms where 
passengers remained isolated from others. Michael Guran, the project associate, 
became simply obsessed with producing endless zoning diagrams that could solve the 
puzzle-like challenge of the maddening circulation scheme. Lorenzo Matti, a brilliant 
architect who eventually led the design development, and I became gradually 
immersed in the task of physically shaping those incomprehensible diagrams. In 
hindsight, it strikes me that airport security was never at the forefront of our 
discussions. Within the context of designing this airport in the late 1990s, the debates 
on the landside–airside frontier ranged between making the long walking distances 
pleasurable and showing our understanding of the growing demands of customs and 
migrating-passenger processing. The aforementioned evidences how things were about 
to change in airport planning, although the big shift came in an unexpected fashion. 
Only a few years after 9/11, I had the chance to design the new international 
Terminal B in Monterrey, Mexico. My role as the architect-in-charge gave me a strong 
position during the formulation, negotiation, and approval of the project layouts. In 
this case, the general context could not be more different from Toronto; we were 
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forced to comply with the new international regulations—which were harsh with 
regard to security and the Mexican Federal Police force’s codes and criteria. 
The atmosphere was usually impregnated with security concerns and the 
insistent need to create new revenue sources. But it is perhaps thanks to this technical 
stage of uncertainty that the introduction of changes and innovative solutions was 
possible. In short, the boundary in Monterrey is quite different than in most 
contemporary airports today. Instead of following the conventional breaks—laying out 
horizontally public areas at the landside, fish tanks in between, and aircraft at the 
platform—and vertically overlaying departures (above) and arrivals (below), we opted 
to introduce a new area which we called the limbo. This new zone was under the main 
nave of the building, producing a rather dramatic and monumental space between the 
concourse (public areas) and the holding rooms (fish tanks). The purposes were 
simple: first, I wanted to balance the passengers’ experience at the arrivals (because 
the idea of airports being the gates of the city was a mere architectural euphemism; 
there is nothing worse than the chain of low-ceilinged, crowded rooms that await 
incoming passengers in almost any airport), so we broke that rule, and we opened up 
the baggage claim hall, giving it the same spatial hierarchy as the check-in hall. 
Second, we followed the same strategy with the always controversial security 
checkpoint. 
Instead of sticking it in a transitional low-ceilinged space, we pushed it out and 
into the limbo and displayed it. Just in making these two moves, we challenged too 
many norms and raised too many concerns. But in the end the result is fully 
comforting; passengers appreciate the new stressless, relaxed atmosphere below the 
cathedral-like roof. The third innovation that we fought for is a vertical division 
between the retail zone and the hold rooms. Typically in contemporary airports, 
shopping is laid at the same level and contiguous to the waiting areas, creating a noisy, 
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hectic, and congested environment for users. Thus we decided to split them vertically: 
retail and restrooms remained at a lower, open level; and the hold rooms and lounges 
were displayed above, next to the glass wall offering expansive views of the runway. 
We faced very strong resistance from everyone involved, but we managed to 
demonstrate that our scheme would work well in terms of retail standards. In all three 
cases, we broke the mold because we had a hidden design agenda: we wanted to show 
how we could bring higher levels of comfort to passengers through intelligent 
modifications that could be introduced at the landside–airside boundary without 
disrupting the governing mentalities of the airport. 
My third experience in designing new concepts for the boundary is through a 
new plan that I have named “Modernization of the Landside–Airside Frontier” at the 
alternate airport of Mexico City, better known today as Toluca International Airport, 
and perhaps soon as the new Metropolitan Airport. Again, the context is rather 
different from the aforementioned two. The new paradigm seems to be airport 
revenue. Many airports in many countries are experiencing indeed the rebounds of an 
economic slowdown, or the same crisis that led giants such as American Airlines and 
Southwest to file bankruptcy. 
Although this generalized concern has been driving most of the decision 
processes in the meetings, our team has managed to offset a new building at the edge 
of the existing terminals. Because we are pushing back the apron geometry and plane 
positions, this building had to be necessarily long, narrow, and vertical; however, it 
also gave us valuable flexibility to reconfigure both the flows and the organization of 
the frontier, without having to deal directly with the previous maze-like one-floor 
scheme. At the same time, Javier Garcia-Bejos, the newly unpacked airport director 
(who was borrowed from the private transportation sector) proved, besides bearing the 
commercial pressures, to be genuinely interested in adding to the passengers’ 
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experience. This is relevant because when actors negotiate changes at the landside–
airside boundary, it is only through the imposition of a clear vision that those changes 
may be agreed upon by committees and boards and in technical meetings. Like the 
previous two examples, the new boundary at Toluca becomes a snapshot of its 
historical context. Thus the cultural mirror does not refer to expressions of chauvinism 
or themed nationalism; instead, what I argue is that I have found in practice how, in 
the ways landside–airside boundaries are thought of, altered, or modernized, they 
attend to unique and particular social and cultural demands. 
 
Figure 4.5. Compare apron view of San Francisco’s landside–airside boundary (Figure 
2.6 in chapter two) with Mexico City’s boundary in the same year. Criteria are 
strikingly different because each boundary responds to different planning. At SFO 
jetways now connect directly to planes, and at MEX there are gardens and viewing 
rooftops within the landside–airside frontier. N/A. Photo “Mexico City International 
Airport” from Alberto Yonezawa Private Collection, 1956, retrieved from 
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=595779&page=600 
In sum, I have argued so far that landside–airside boundaries—whatever the 
planning story behind them—are custom-designed socio-technical artifacts that act as 
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cultural mirrors. Returning to the question of why all landside–airside boundaries are 
different (see Figure 4.5), I have suggested that the major contextual difference 
(physical, political, managerial, economical) between planning new airports and 
expanding existing terminals is the degree of freedom in the hands of designers, 
architects, and planners to come up with solutions that respond to the specific needs of 
an airport master plan. In the case of expansions, designers must adjust existing 
terminal buildings and aprons, which are often seriously constrained in terms of room 
for modifications and additions, and are typically congested. New airports represent a 
challenging degree of freedom in the hands of planners, although historically, only on 
three occasions has this opportunity been used to reinvent the airport system from 
scratch. 
In addition, I argue that there are two basic kinds of airport boundaries: 
domestic frontiers and international borderlines. Although many regional and 
international airports look the same at first sight, they are notably different, especially 
in operative terms. Even though all airports must be designed following international 
norms, regional airports face the opposite problem of congestion: discontinuous flows. 
These issues complicate the basic functioning of security, airlines, and retail because 
there are long, dead periods of inactivity. Many local and regional airports remained in 
single, one-story buildings that could not be connected directly to the planes. In 
addition, these facilities usually service narrow-body aircraft of smaller dimensions, so 
passengers are planed and deplaned directly at the apron. Thus this operative feature 
dramatically changes the user’s relationship with the landside and the airside. In 
contrast to the obsessive containment policies of large-scale airports—where 
passengers are treated as liquids that should not spill out—smaller, regional airports do 
allow open transit between the two realms. Even though airline employees are usually 
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watching, passengers may feel how the boundary fades off, and the experience of 
aviation becomes sensorial again. 
Third and last, landside–airside boundaries have become representations of 
cultural expressions. The permutations among the above-mentioned avert the 
existence of identical repetitions or transferrable models; therefore, each boundary will 
capture within its materiality the values, conflicts, emotions, or concerns of its time. 
However, because of boundaries’ constantly changing nature, this 
representation will always be only a snapshot of a very short window in time. There is, 
though, in the world of airports, a fascinating trend toward localizing or indigenizing 
many airport features. This is perhaps an escape from the boring, highly impersonal 
and repetitive place-less-ness so well captured and mocked in Jason Reitman’s indie 
film Up in the Air (2009) and sharply theorized by the French anthropologist Mark 
Augé. 
One may find in contemporary terminals an assortment of local products, 
regional information, and even the display of local art. In the end, the landside–airside 
boundary captures a mosaic of cultures, represented by the sale of Maybach cars at 
Dubai’s airport, the patch of rainforest in Kuala Lumpur International, the smoky taco-
stands at Mexico City’s airport, the generalized sale of household appliances—such as 
refrigerators and washer-dryers—in Cairo’s airport, the fountain-gardens at Changi’s 
airport in Singapore, the endless repetition of State products in all shops (including 
duty-frees) in Jose Martí airport in Havana, the massive foot-massage offer at Pudong 
Airport in Shanghai, or the hardwood, Viking-ship-like finishes at Reykjavik’s airport 
in Iceland. In spite of the unavoidable transnationalization of airports, local culture 
continues to add brush-strokes, mainly in the airport’s no-man’s land: the landside–
airside boundary. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: “The Liquid Airport”: Security, Permeability, and 
Containment in Airports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Cutting-edge technologies, such as metal detectors, are used for the first 
time in London’s main airport. Observe the gendered connotations of the device. Daily 
Telegraph. Photo “Security detectors used for the first time at Heathrow,” 1970, credit: 
Popperphoto/Getty Images.  
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 . . . “the door of arrivals” and “the door of departures” . . . “Between the two 
the meantime is all there is. It passes of itself.” 
—Allen Curnow (Poet), “Narita,” in Early Days Yet: New and Collected 
Poems 1941–1997, p. 32 
Are there any features that become visible only through the use of a landside–airside 
boundary as a lens? Before I tackle this question, I propose to structure my response 
with some methodological order. I will first introduce how the boundary may be used 
as a research tool, and how certain cultural features consolidate the same boundaries 
as independent and autonomous pieces of knowledge. 
Mindful of the fact that much of the evidence product of airport negotiations 
has remained vaulted for decades, I have sought alternate ways to bring to light what 
otherwise was forgotten in company and public records. Certainly, the main finding of 
this dissertation is the identification of the landside–airside boundary as a tool for 
opening those black boxes. In the previous chapters I have used landside–airside 
boundaries of new, reinvented airports as historical viewports. (I am borrowing the 
term from computation. A viewport is a bi-dimensional window in a three-
dimensional space.) Viewports have the property of revealing critical information that 
makes hidden decision-making visible. Similar to the way S&TS scholars have 
succeeded in opening black boxes through the study of crises, accidents, and 
catastrophes, I propose that the identification of technological viewports may be the 
first step in establishing a new category of S&TS analysis. 
Technological viewports are not just interfaces (or the physical devices that 
users employ to interact with machines) but windows on the intermediate spaces 
between humans and machines. MIT’s Sherry Turkle (1995) has written that in 
computer culture there are two kinds of expert users: those who inhabit the “obscure 
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world of computer microworlds” and those who “enjoyed the sense of nothing 
standing between them and the ‘body’ of the machine” (p. 32). In computation, at one 
end are users, who interact through interfaces and inhabit virtual realities—in-between 
spaces or software—and at the other end is the machine, or the hardware. In large 
technological systems we have created similar spaces of mediation, or “limbo zones,” 
which remain highly overseen by specialists. I argue that it is only through the use of 
viewports that these entities materialize and become subject to scrutiny and 
investigation. In the case of landside–airside boundaries, there are at least five 
epistemic features that suggest the consolidation of a technological viewport (see 
Table 5.1). In the next few pages I discuss each of them in independent sections. 
Table 5.1. The Five Epistemic Features That May Shape a Technological Viewport 
Epistemic feature Description 
Discursive Paradigm of security brings about rethinking what 
airports are. 
Normative New codes establish a new set of rules for drawing 
landside–airside limits.  
Object of knowledge A new literature addressing the landside–airside 
boundary appears. 
Transitory Boundary spaces are characterized as a sort of no-zone 
or limbo. 
Intangible Boundaries are significantly virtual and psychological.  
 
The concept of the viewport creates an artificial sense of reality, just like the 
three-dimensional environments described by Turkle (1995). Thus they become 
rapidly equipped and furnished with all sort of elements that give the idea of an 
independent micro-world. Users will enter those spaces and temporarily dwell in the 
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in-between. Just as computer users input a security password at the interface, airport 
passengers cross through the different thresholds of airport interfaces, such as the 
check-in counter or the security checkpoint. Once inside, they are in neither the human 
world nor the world of machines, hardware, or artifacts. These contained spaces are 
bounded by limits and restrictions that condition the transit of humans and products 
towards either the landside or the airside. 
Therefore, as users increase flowing globally, airports resemble liquid’s 
containers, which, depending on location and culture, may feature certain degrees of 
permeability. Metaphorically speaking, this fifth chapter discusses the growing 
relevance of the landside–airside boundary as a fine-grained filter that controls the 
density of airport terminals, and, eventually, the flows of those liquids that try to pass 
through. If it is true that passengers and employees need to flow through airports like 
liquids—in addition to the infrastructure’s natural porosity—designers who were 
increasingly pushed to look for separation and new strategies of containment started 
envisioning the airport as a system of control valves. 
As I present in the next sections, there is evidence that the larger discourse of 
society, particularly upon the rise of international security concerns in the mid-1970s, 
has had a tremendous effect on the way the landside–airside boundary has more 
openly become the main feature of airports. As internal and external need for security 
grows, so does the need to filter, sort, and split more efficiently and perhaps even 
more drastically. Paradoxically, the increased need to enforce strict filtering was 
accompanied by an array of devices and routines, ranging from non-invasive new 
technologies to the extreme of displaying a heavily armed military presence. 
As I have mentioned earlier, much of this chapter is framed around the 
challenging context of planning and designing landside–airside boundaries after 9/11. 
The huge impact of these events brought a strong critical response, which has been 
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thoroughly documented in a new literary production on airports, much more 
committed to a social, political, and legal agenda. I argue that most of this new body 
of literature spins around landside–airside boundary conflicts, and that most authors 
question the very nature of the airport and its limits, past and future use of 
technologies, the regulatory frames, and the rising pressures of retail. 
In a different sphere, I argue around the fact that the boundary has become a 
strong mechanism of public coercion and control, including the ways it materialized as 
physical requirements that had to be attached to—or often forced into—existing 
terminal buildings. But how permeable are these thousands of airport terminals under 
the new standards? In this sense, non-material technologies started playing a decisive 
role in compensating for those buildings’ physical limitations; thus the construction of 
an immaterial frontier was ominously imminent. I maintain that there are at least three 
new kinds of landside–airside boundaries: the psychological constructs, the 
informatics frontier, and the establishment of virtual mechanisms of control. In short, 
this chapter offers reflections on the benefits of making the invisible visible. So, to 
make history useful, what could the role of landside–airside boundaries be in thinking 
of airports of the future? 
I. Discursive Aspects: The Paradigm of Security, Rethinking What Airports 
Are 
The alarming rise of hijackings of the late 1960s reached a peak of 89 cases in 1969. 
But until then, most of the piracy had political purposes and was meant mainly to draw 
the attention of the press in order to gain publicity. Moreover, in 1972, blood was 
spilled for the first time in a massacre that led to the death of 24 people at Israel’s Ben 
Gurion International Airport. It was perhaps when Raphael Ron, BGIA’s head of 
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security at the time, declared “that terrorist attacks are carried out by people who can 
be found and stopped by an effective security methodology” (Khurana, 2009, p. 271) 
that airport security became the new paradigm at the airport. Since then, the boundary 
has been re-elaborated endless times within airport planning. The added complexities 
of security became such an exponential factor that throughout the following three 
decades, they would build a labyrinthine and massive apparatus of international 
jurisdictions, new technologies, protocols and procedures, identification standards, 
specialized agencies, and so forth. Paradoxically, the new security system was nested 
right at the landside–airside boundary. Thus, during the following years, just knowing 
what the boundary was, or even figuring out where it was, became increasingly a 
detective’s task.  
In the relatively encased history of airports, one major externality would once 
again reshuffle the relationship between airports, aircraft, and their users: the events of 
9/11. It was right at the landside–airside secure frontier of the airport where radical 
men equipped with a well-orchestrated plan showed the weak side of the system and 
turned civilian aircraft into military weapons. Thousands of innocent lives were lost. 
As a consequence, the airport immediately was put in the spotlight, thoroughly 
scrutinized, and re-regulated. Since then, romanticism has been replaced by discipline, 
and the airport has now grown into a living fortress. As time moves on, the haughty 
travelers of the past have faded away. Today at the airport we see only long lines of 
“docile bodies” (Foucault, 1977, p. 135) ready to queue and undress, separate from 
their belongings, follow martial instructions, and observe something that resembles a 
rhetoric of fear (see Figure 5.2). Sometimes the larger discourse of society reaches out 
to the farthest corners of technological change, but without a doubt, few paradigms 
have been so extensively influential in aviation, airports, and, finally, in shaping 
landside–airside boundaries. In the end, a “cost-benefit analysis of the interests of 
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multiple stakeholders engaged in aviation security offers some empirical insight into 
the stakes involved and the logic behind the border control” (Lahay, 2008, p. 78). 
 
Figure 5.2. Security screening at Denver International Airport. Photo by Dan Paluska, 
2010, Flickr. 
Pushed by the United States, most countries realized that airports were the new 
national borderlines, and that those border points may put their own national security 
at stake. The new criteria imposed by Annex 17 (ICAO, 1974) made its way to every 
single airport within the international network. Even small local airports were forced 
to follow the new tight regulations. What really cornered airports was the fact that 
their buildings, or infrastructure, not only were not ready to allocate the new 
requirements, but, furthermore, were sometimes playing physically against the 
implementation of those new rules. This condition unfolded the landside–airside 
boundary as a new physical and virtual barrier. 
But if there was ever any clarity in identifying landside–airside boundaries in 
airports after the terrorist attacks in New York and the emergency measures taken by 
the FAA, ICAO, and later the international community, the border became simply 
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fuzzier than ever. Thus, planning and designing airports and terminals became much 
harder. Even the adaptations at facilities that were built before the turn of the century 
made little sense on paper and far less sense in reality. Simply, most terminals around 
the world were not equipped to allocate the new improvised configurations of the 
boundary; hence, users’ discomfort again grew exponentially. 
But after terrorists used aircraft as military weapons, the security systems of 
airports were spotlighted and questioned. In the aftermath of the tragedy, many 
specialists started questioning the very nature of the airport. Writers, lawyers, 
sociologists, psychologists, intellectuals, and others who engaged in this topic, 
particularly in the aftermath of the tragedy, initiated a polemic around the meaning of 
airports, and started offering fresh visions of what an airport could be. 
As I discussed in earlier sections of this work, back in the days of New York 
LaGuardia or Paris Le Bourget, “airports thrived on being social and local rendezvous 
for plane spotting and air shows” (Gordon, 2004, p. 55). Airports were equipped with 
“observation terraces open to the public, the piers along which the great jets docked, 
along which, every Sunday, families would range themselves with picnics to spend the 
afternoon contemplating the movements of aircrafts” (Pascoe, 2001, p. 55). During the 
decades after 1930, “modernist architects influenced by Le Corbusier, wanted to create 
feelings of drama—an increased connection with the theatricality of flight would see 
airport buildings disappear into an overexposed space of glass” (Pascoe, 2001, p. 35). 
The best example would be the terminal at Orly in Paris,1 which incidentally 
may be considered the opposite of TWA. For David Pascoe, a professor of literature 
                                                
1 In late February 1961, DeGaulle opened the new terminal at Orly and this example would become key 
to understanding the planning and design philosophy of the new European era. “Orly’s architect, Henry 
Vicariot, created a terminal consisting of a massive rectangular box frame fabricated out of stainless 
steel over which, in order to absorb ambient sound, curtain walls were elastically suspended. For the 
first time since the war, Europe seemed, perhaps, to be capable of creating its own image of modernity, 
drawing on its native canons and interacting with the present on a more objective basis than, say, 
	  222 
and an author on the sociology of the airport, it was not until Reyner Banham’s 
“influential and prophetic article The Obsolete Airport” (1962, as cited in Pascoe, 
2001, p. 134) that planners and administrators realized that the changing nature of the 
airport was a complication for the future. For example, the broad adoption of wide-
body and stretch jets during the 1970s (between 100 and 300 passengers), drastically 
increased the number of passengers and proportionally the size of airport terminals. 
As Mark Gottdiener (2001), a sociologist interested in airports, argues, “their 
introduction (twenty) years ago necessitated the alteration of nearly every airport in 
the country” (pp. 64–65). Within this same line of changes, Anne Graham (2001), an 
expert on airport management in the UK, argues that during the 1980s “the airport 
industry was not immune to the quality revolution which was taking place—although 
it was rather late in adopting some of the principles. Structural changes such as 
commercialization, privatization and globalization, together with increased 
competition between airports, encouraged airports to place more emphasis on quality” 
(p. 72). 
Moreover, several added complexities to this constant of change shook the 
airport at its roots. For example, Mark Salter (2008), a researcher on political studies 
and an influential analyst of airport borders and identity processing, thinks that “new 
aviation security requirements and privatization have dramatically altered the 
management of global airports” (p. 22). This is perhaps true for every single facility in 
the world, and along this same vein, it has also altered the multiple ramifications that 
lay within. Thus, according to Salter, there may be “three major dilemmas within 
                                                                                                                                       
Saarinen’s TWA terminal at JFK. For Orly was, in effect, a massive vitrine: a window on the world, 
and a display case. This extraordinary terminal contained a new world consisting of a 300-seat cinema; 
several hotels; an exhibition space; a Michelin-starred restaurant; a chapel fitted out with marble 
detailing; a crèche strangely decorated with brightly coloured birds; and, of course, shops stocking 
luxury products from all over France and its colonies” (Pascoe, 2001, p. 54).  
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contemporary airport security: space, speed and sharing” (p. 12). In terms of space and 
speed, airports perform as “facilitators of movement; they act as tunnels or 
passageways that create clear and free-flowing routes to the aircraft” (De Neufville, 
1975, p. 23). Although the “airport terminal itself is striated by various impediments 
designed to shape and control movement[, t]his is reflective of the wider airport 
functionality of a machine for capturing and controlling flows” (Fuller & Harley, 
2004, p. 14). As buildings started to be designed or redesigned after 9/11, the 
“metaphor of the filter achieved material form in the shape of the airport terminal 
itself” (Adey, 2008, p. 156), though perhaps becoming gradually more disconnected 
than ever from the rail station and other predecessors. 
For some analysts, the new “terminal is organized to move passengers through 
to a boarding gate or lounge with simple and direct flows with little conflict or 
interruption” (Doganis, 2004, p. 139). The dual pressure of congestion and security 
created a paradox. If planners channel people’s movement and redirect them where 
authorities want them to go, necessarily many aspects will enter in conflict: for 
example, higher enplaning and deplaning delay, longer queuing times due to detailed 
scrutiny or interrogatories (as in when flying into Ben Gurion in Israel), passengers 
forced to follow consumption paths, and so forth. 
In sacrificing monumentality and passenger comfort, many airports have 
turned into “systems that are dense, fast, and contingent” (Salter, 2008, p. xiii). This 
density is “produced as a result of the combined activities of various different 
organizations such as airlines, handling agents, customs and immigration officials, 
concessionaires and so on” (Graham, 2001, p. 72). Managing security seems to 
involve a growing number of issues, ranging from political internecine wars to social 
debates on civil rights, debates on national security, and the exponential economic and 
financial complexities of keeping healthy balances without receiving subsidies. I argue 
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that this fragmented complexity makes it simply much harder to read the airport’s new 
processing demands. 
In addition, “the governance environment for any particular global airport is a 
combination of international treaties, national regulations and legislation, local 
bylaws, and management practices” (Lahav, 2008, p. 16). Thus, it is evident that 
airports work as links within a larger chain of actors and interests, reinforcing Deborah 
Douglas’s (1995) idea of airports as systems embedded within larger systems, or 
institutions dependent on global, socio-technical networks. Therefore, this threaded 
interconnectivity implies that the airport security system will always be tied to the 
least secure airport of the network, thus ensuring that under this condition airports can 
hardly be standardized. 
As I have argued before, there is a long and uneven relationship between 
airport users and multiple technologies—not just airplanes, which are centralized in 
terminals. As George Scullin, the author of the “International Airport” (1968) 
maintains, “in bringing together this ultimate collaboration between men and men, 
men and machines, one other source of power has always been in the forefront” (p. 
23). But as the airport is subordinated to larger political discourses, technologies 
appear as suitable mechanisms of social scrutiny and coercion. As Fuller and Harley 
(2004) suggest, “the question of path finding has become more pressing as terminals 
grow in size and complexity” (p. 127). 
This is especially true for airport designers. But who is really behind these 
initiatives? Are planners, government officials, and regulator bodies, perhaps? Salter 
(2005) has defined the airport as a “transient institution” that has “three spheres: the 
arrivals hall, where newly landed passengers sort themselves into citizens, foreigners 
and refugees; the ‘confessional,’ where the border agent inquires about your 
provenance and destination; and the passport check (also by the border agent). This 
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last sphere is the ‘hyper-documentation’ phase where the ‘body-biometrics-file-
profile’ is central” (p. 45). But I would like to point out that Salter leaves aside 
perhaps the most significant “sphere” of all: the limbo, or the zone of no transition. 
Salter perhaps overlooks that in fact passengers may change status basically 
everywhere in the airport, except within the limbo. Thus I maintain that although the 
processing of passengers is undeniably related and dependent on a complex legal, 
technological, and jurisdictional network, it is the controlled zone, or what I call the 
limbo, on which the airport’s future depends. Anne Graham (2001), a researcher of 
tourism and transport at University of Westminster, speculates:  
. . . at most major hubs there will also be passengers who spend a considerable 
length of time in the airside area. 
Various airports have developed some quite imaginative airside 
facilities and services which can be shared between these and local passengers. 
For example, Singapore’s Changi airport has a swimming pool, a sauna, a 
karaoke lounge and a putting green and, if the passengers stay longer than four 
hours, they can go on a bus tour of Singapore. Amsterdam airport has an art 
gallery and casino. Vienna airport opened its Wellness Plaza in 1999 where 
passengers can experience different massage techniques and make use of the 
fitness bar, solarium and showers. Bangkok airport offers head and foot 
massage, Frankfurt airport provides dental, optical, and foot reflexology 
services and a clinic which has become a specialist centre for laser operations 
to repair damaged shoulder and knee joints! (p. 129) 
I tend to disagree with Graham’s (2001) use of “airside,” because I believe she 
refers to the controlled zones, which mediate between the landside and the airside, and 
therefore are described in this work as the boundary, or the limbo. Nevertheless, and in 
spite of what I dispute, it is fascinating to see how the boundary becomes step-by-step 
more elastic through the years. Are we witnessing perhaps the birth of a new, 
Foucauldian kind of architectural genre? But if on the one hand the new security 
paradigm forced the physical containment of landside–airside boundaries, on the other 
hand it has pushed technical innovations in two directions: First, the construction of 
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“certainty,” or the development of precise and reliable equipment that could take out 
of human hands as much responsibility as possible, and second, the construction of 
surveillance systems, or the implementation of sophisticated devices for institutional 
vigilance. Hence, boundaries will carry on the added complexities of implementing 
sophisticated technologies in order to achieve the “public expectation for absolute 
security” (Salter, 2008, p. 1). And this is precisely why the meta-discourse of national 
security has relied on artifacts. The public perception of a safe terminal seems to be 
paramount in the post-9/11 environment; as the burden of guilt has been placed on the 
incapacity of security officers to identify terrorists at Logan Airport, institutions have 
bet on the public reliability on automated technologies. 
Even though the landside–airside boundary can be “drawn in terms of 
information” (Bennett, 2008, p. 4), it does not mean that the negotiation network could 
remain closed. In this sense, Gallya Lahav (2008), a researcher on political science at 
SUNY Stony Brook, argues that “the introduction of innovative technologies, 
biometric techniques, and new visa and passport procedures has extended the number 
of regulatory actors beyond national borders” (p. 88). This is especially complex when 
technologies are operated under different levels of skill and cultural background. 
Finally, the last technological outcome after 9/11 points towards the matching 
of databanks and physical characteristics of people. It has been documented that using 
“Disney’s expertise with biometrics, [. . .] at least one of its executives advised the 
Federal Aviation Administration on airport security after 9/11” (Harmel & Spadanuta, 
2006, p. T9). But this new technological strategy will unavoidably imply multiple 
questionings. Not surprisingly, landside–airside boundaries have become, since then, 
physically responsible for facilitating passenger sorting. In this sense, “contemporary 
concerns about the privacy of the physical person and its protection from various 
biometric devices are also centered on a notion of physical or spatial boundary” 
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(Bennett, 2008, p. 3). Thus, a more complex interrelationship between overlapping 
and parallel borders is foreseeable, although these new technologies are planned to be 
as removed as possible from users’ presence. Will high-tech scrutiny be contestable in 
the next few years? 
II. Normative Aspects: Coding a New Air World Order 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, deep institutional and regulatory reforms could 
not wait. For example, ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) issued both 
temporary and permanent amendments to its codes and regulations, and the U.S. 
reacted with the creation of a super-sized ministry, the DHS (Department of Homeland 
Security)—which came to be mainly in charge of screening and processing passengers 
at airports and other ports of entry to U.S. territory. But perhaps the most sound of all 
measures was Amendment 10 to Annex 17, which was adopted by the ICAO Council 
on December 7, 2001, in order to address challenges posed to civil aviation by the 
events of September 11, 2001. It became applicable on July 1, 2002. The amendment 
included various definitions and new provisions in relation to the applicability of this 
Annex to domestic operations; international cooperation relating to threat information; 
national quality control; access control; measures related to passengers and their cabin 
and hold baggage; in-flight security personnel and protection of the cockpit; code-
sharing/collaborative arrangements; human factors; and management of response to 
acts of unlawful interference. Among the myriad of new programmatic requirements, 
regulations, and recommendations, several new terminals grew immoderately. In this 
regard, “airlines have also found it necessary to sound a note of caution about the 
construction of new terminals which appear to be in excess of requirements because, 
although palatial buildings may enhance national prestige, the cost must ultimately be 
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reflected in the landing fees and other charges and thus influence the level of fares and 
rates.”2 In the early 1960s and until the mid-1970s, in most American airports, airlines 
were paid for their own terminals, especially in airports following the “Airport City” 
model of Idlewild. Although this practice decreased during the following decades, in 
the late 1970s, for IATA (International Air Traffic Association) it was the airlines who 
should establish some “general principles” in airports, although it was then an airport 
terminal advisory committee composed of airline experts who had effectively set out 
the important factors to be observed by the authorities concerned with designing and 
constructing new airports. 
It would be impossible to produce a design appropriate for every purpose and 
locality—each airport serves a different type of traffic and a different mixture of 
airlines, and must be specified accordingly—but the general principles are common, 
even if the needs must be met in a variety of ways. In consequence, the lack of private 
investment drastically slowed the planning of new terminals, and “among major 
metropolitan areas only Denver had managed to build a new passenger airport since 
the 1970s” (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, p. 279), and most airport projects consist of 
expansions to and remodeling of existent facilities. “Without in any way denigrating 
the expertise of the airport authorities, it is the airlines who are the essential users of 
airports and they are the people who face the major problems and ultimately pay the 
bills” (Brancker, 1977, p. 23). Thus, at the rise of security issues, IATA leaves clear 
that airlines will fight for regulations due to the impossibility of standardizing airport 
design. However, the new codes and additions will respond now, beyond listening to 
the key players in the industry, to the larger paradigms of societies who are part of the 
global aviation and airport system. 
                                                
2 IATA has produced an airport terminals manual (Lyon, 2007, p. 109). 
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In this sense, and at least on paper, ICAO was the only organization capable of 
launching global reforms. Among the major changes, Annex 14, Volume I, of the 
Chicago Treaty, has been subject to thirty-nine amendments since 1947, and “Annex 
17 in full has been revised twelve times since 1944 to adapt to new risks and 
challenges, shifting focus since the 1970s from hijacking to attacks on facilities, to 
sabotage, including the use of aircraft as weapons of mass destruction” (Salter, 2008, 
p. 17). In this regard ICAO needed to act fast and standardize as much as possible 
from current practices, but especially the ones related to passenger identifications. “In 
relation to the ‘war on terror,’ one of the most obvious signs of global surveillance is 
the agreement of the ICAO for its 188 contracted states to use standard machine-
readable passports” (Lyon, 2008, p. 44). These measures and requirements that frame 
“the efforts of a capable international body to develop technical standards with the 
potential to improve air travel safety seem laudable [see Figure 5.1]. Although legal 
scholars, such as Osieke” (Stanton, 2008, p. 257), have questioned the ICAO’s 
authority to set and enforce international policy, Salter (2008) has suggested that,  
in terms of secured space, airports are divided into public and restricted areas. 
Sterile areas are those public spaces that have been security screened. 
Restricted areas cover all nonpublic spaces for which authorization by the 
National Civil Aviation Authority is required. Landside operations refer to 
those within the terminal; airside refers to spaces with airplanes such as 
runways, taxiways, and aprons. However, airport security regulations have 
changed dramatically in response to terror attacks. (p. 13) 
It is interesting that the author implicitly holds that the divide between sterile 
and non-sterile does not correspond to the landside–airside boundary. 
For instance, after the attacks in Rome and Athens in 1973, the FAA imposed 
new rules: “narrow points of control were established at the ‘throat’ of each 
concourse” (Gordon, 2004, p. 13). This is the case with facilities such as Tampa, just 
to mention an example, where the terminal was not equipped with pre-filters or filters. 
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Within the new coding order, an endless number of airports had to cope with new 
demands such as having to deal with no room for expansion, reducing airport income 
due to recession, and dealing with new regulations, procedures, and new protocols. 
III. Constructing an Object of Knowledge: New Voices in Play Address the 
Landside–Airside Boundary 
In the twilight of the 9/11 events, a new social literature of airports gradually came to 
light. Airport coding after the terrorist attacks rapidly commanded the attention of 
experts on psychology, international relations, security, and national defense and 
intelligence, as well as journalists, social analysts, and lawyers. Planners and designers 
also started discussing more openly the different forms of material limits, and the first 
publications of this sort started to appear. This phenomenon is particularly important 
to consolidating the importance of the landside–airside boundary as a historical 
viewport. I argue that the public acknowledgment of the frontier formalizes its 
hierarchical importance as an airport definer. In fact, the lack of specialized literature 
and public criticism is what perhaps buried the boundary as a central aspect in airport 
design. 
The literature that I discuss in the next few pages comes from very different 
origins, including academics, experts, journalists, and others. I found at least three 
aspects at the center of the analysis that may represent the main lines of concern: first, 
the materiality and immateriality of the airport’s internal frontiers; second, the 
contradictions between the dynamics of transportation flow, and third, the slowness of 
filtering the national frontiers (not surprisingly, all three directly address the landside–
airside border). Now I move on to comment on those voices. 
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The most immediate reference that we may have as travelers is the physical 
existence of limits in airport terminals. In general, “the notion of border is very often 
considered a materialized line between two spaces” (Bigo, 2005, p. 52). In fact, 
physical borders “create a membrane or buffer zone separating an inside from an 
outside, while linking both in a particular way, projecting the imagination of a larger, 
encompassing reality on the ground” (Passi, 1996, p. 3). But in the case of the airport, 
the most important boundary is the one that divides national territories. In the book 
B/ordering Space in the Border Regions series, authors Van Houtum, Kramsch-Karsh, 
and Zierhofer (2005) refer to territorial border as a normative idea and even play with 
its linguistic structure, splitting it as b/order. They also argue that the frontier becomes 
“a belief in the existence and continuity of a territorially binding and differentiated 
power that only becomes concrete, objectified and real in our own everyday social 
practices” (pp. 2–3). 
Although it has been said that the “world is indeed becoming ‘liquid’ or 
‘borderless’” (Van Houtum et al., 2005, p. 2), perhaps “borders can be imagined as 
lines of difference and protection as well as representations of the crossing, the de-
fencing, the merging, the additional or the expectation” (Van Houtum & van der 
Velde, 2004, p. 100). Given the apparently contradictory spatiality of borders—which 
is perhaps best reflected in their capacity to articulate both transcendent closure and 
immanent openness—we may assert that bordered spatialities are partial, selective, 
and opportunistic both in their representation and in the interests they serve. However, 
the physical representation of boundaries is often charged with tangible and intangible 
messages from higher powers and institutions. Borders are often indicative, inductive, 
and sometimes invasive. Since 9/11, concern with small things, such as small knives, 
has been paramount, even to an obsessive degree (Lyon, 2008, p. 42). Unlike the pre-
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1980s control points, contemporary borderlines such as the security checkpoint have 
transformed into primarily material filters. 
Although borders and airports are clearly “meeting points of social systems 
that function as spatial mediators of often latent power and governance discourses” 
(Van Houtum & Naerssen, 1998, p. 129), those discourses materialize inevitably as 
objects and systems, which eventually require physical presence. But beyond its 
materiality, according to Peter Adey (2004), a human geographer from Aberyswyth 
University in the UK, the layout “of the space of the passport control area parallels the 
legal and psychic journey from being controlled and contained at the border to the 
comparative freedom of the safe domestic space” (p. 42). 
This speaks of a level of transformation between the physical and the non-
physical. Although for Salter (2006), “the effect is that the airport is rendered 
immaterial by the metaphorical abstraction of the filter—constituted by software and 
informational systems” (p. 147), the materiality of the physical processing of 
passengers demands equipment and infrastructure. In addition, the filtering and 
surveillance of things includes supplies, baggage, documents, aircraft, and so forth. 
But key in the understanding of borders is not only their material form but the degrees 
of representation and interpretation that they embody. As the French sociologist Bruno 
Latour (1993, p. 3) has said, “a key can transform a door into a border for some but a 
pass-through for others, in the same way that a wall may signify protection for some 
while for others it constitutes a political offence or merely an irritating graffiti board.”3 
Thus the frontier could be further explored in terms of invisible shapes, structures, 
values, or interpretations. 
                                                
3 Latour´s idea is intermingled with Ley and Cybriwsky’s. The first part belongs to the French 
sociologist and the second to geographers (Ley & Cybriwsky, 1974, p. 493). 
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Among the immaterial entities that shape today’s boundaries, we find data, 
human perceptions of space and information, human behavior, and decision making. 
Adey (2004, p. 42) makes an interesting claim, asserting that “the ‘border’ is not only 
virtual in the sense that airports are seldom at the physical edge of territory but also in 
the sense that processing often takes place ‘upstream’ of the actual location where 
documents may be checked.” For Colin Bennett (2008), a political science expert at 
the University of Victoria in Canada, “as the boundary can be drawn in terms of 
information, there are at least three overlapping dimensions of the problem: 
humanistic, political, and instrumental” (p. 4). Right at the crossroads of this 
multidimensionality, I suggest that users have also placed their intimacy. The 
landside–airside boundary is now featured by learned choreographies from passengers, 
in where users must yield to invasive security procedures that involve—among many 
other things—tactile, physical searches. For example, Bennett (1992) also argues that 
these “intimate issues can never be wholly private. Neither can the control of personal 
information. Whether drawn in spatial, behavioral, decisional, or informational terms, 
each of these boundaries is inherently flexible, contestable, and dependent on context” 
(p. 4). The issues on loss of intimacy, invasiveness, and passengers’ rights speak of the 
contradictory nature of the post-9/11 paradigm. 
Users are requested now to surrender their own privacy rights in terms of 
personal information and in order to give feedback to a larger, more Orwellian system 
of national/international security. This relationship is now conducted through a 
process that consists of verification (machines and devices) and verification plus 
interpretation (officials). After 9/11, the processing of embedded data in ID documents 
became the first line of national defense. One of the most influential new voices is 
David Lyon, a sociologist who is also the director of the Surveillance Studies Center at 
Queens University in Canada. Lyon is better known for his deep studies of global 
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mobilization and the strong challenges that this phenomenon has posed to personal 
identity. For the sociologist and lawyer, airport boundaries are becoming less physical. 
In this sense, Lyon has claimed that “one’s identity as a citizen is checked by these 
means and others, such as national or category-specific ID cards, which also bring the 
‘border’ to other locations than the ‘edges’ or territory, thus further virtualizing it.”4 
Hence, the de-materialization of boundaries creates an effect that places users not just 
at the edge of a nation, but at the edge of its integrity. Landside–airside boundaries 
have gained then, perhaps in different degrees, a military undertone. 
Mark Salter, whom I have cited several times before, is a professor of political 
studies at the University of Ottawa and perhaps one of the foremost visible scholars 
interested in building this new literature of airports. His book Politics at the Airport 
(2008) is becoming widely discussed in airport-related environments. For Salter, 
airports are organizations of constant activity and movement—wherein people’s 
mobility is always tied to “fixed institutions, such as territory borders, customs and 
border posts, traffic laws, infrastructure, and passports, the state also described 
‘normal’ routes of movement and acceptable modes of fixity” (p. xii). Both the 
internal and external pressures at the airport were reflected in “aspects of security, 
scarcity, profitability, accountability, and governance [that] create a dense, 
overdeterminated, chaotic, networked topology where dominant impetus is the 
management of speed” (Salter, 2008, p. 9). But in this sense, facilitating speed after 
9/11 is perhaps more based on the “segregated efficiencies of transportation planning 
                                                
4 (Lyon, 2008, p. 32). Travelers of all kinds are emblematic of these multiple mobilities, and their data 
are embedded in passports, visas, and other identifying documents; are read by machines and officials; 
and are passed from place to place the world over. One’s identity as a citizen is checked by these means 
and others, such as national or category-specific ID cards, which also bring the “border” to locations 
other than the “edges” or territory, thus further virtualizing it. 
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in general in which the grail is the separation of means and, thereby, of people and 
privileges,” as Lyon (2008, p. 40) has described. 
In reality, only a few privileged travelers flow faster through airports. The film 
Up in the Air (Reitman, 2009) poignantly portrays the rise of a new social class, which 
for one reason or another forms part of an elite of speeding-up airport processes. As 
shown in the film, surprisingly, this social group is somehow cohesive and does share 
an array of international practices for speeding up airport processing. But for the 
common traveler, living “in a fast-paced, mobile world, the idea of borders as barriers 
to movement is an unacceptable irritation, but in a fearful and unsafe world such 
borders make a lot of sense” (Lyon, 2008, p. 42). 
In the post-9/11 world, speeding up passenger processing is beyond necessity, 
a practical fallacy. The rising need to defend national frontiers passed from the 
territorial border to the room of customs. As Benedict Anderson (1983) portrays in 
Imagined Communities, a “nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of 
them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, 
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (p. 50). A paradox in practice, though, is 
that “spatially, one enters the border zone of the destination airport before leaving the 
departing airport,” as Salter (2008, p. 9) clearly describes. For Anderson, the 
“delocalization of international borders forces air carriers and foreign airports to be the 
front line of border control” (quoted in Salter, 2008, p. 9), which is true and applies 
directly in the way contemporary landside–airsides must bring in all the complexities 
of rethinking global frontiers. Nonetheless, “borders help us to understand the 
imprecise fit between nations and states” (Wilson & Donnan, 1998, p. 25). Finally, 
Salter (2007) argues that before the international laws, airports “are national spaces 
that connect to international spaces, frontiers are not at the territorial limit, and 
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grounded sites that embody mobility” (p. ix). The question is, are we truly leaving 
national grounds when we pass emigration?5 
Although this and many other questions may remain open, the open discussion 
that I have commented on this section truly benefits not only specialists but even a 
larger audience that is gradually more interested in fly-rights, consumer protection 
aspects, and airport usage in general. Not until the emergence of a post-9/11 literature 
on airports reached the far corners of sociology, international relationships, law, 
psychology, economics, and other sciences related to the humanities has the landside–
airside boundary become situated in the spotlight of the debate. 
IV. Transitory Aspects: The Airport Limbo 
Though, beyond the engagement of a social critique, few stories capture best the 
notion of placelessness and conflicts between the landside and the airside border than 
the case of Sir Alfred, or Mehran Nasseri (or the person who lived illegally for 18 
years in Charles de Gaulle’s in-between zone due to an immigration problem and 
whose story inspired Steven Spielberg’s film The Terminal). Speaking of Sir Alfred, 
Justine Lloyd (2002) from UTS in Sydney describes in Borderlands, a specialized 
journal, how “the legally-defined extraterritorial zones—in which the figure of the 
stateless person has materialised—are a sign of the need for global trade centres and 
airport cities. These ambiguous extraterritorial zones produce equally ambiguous 
extraterritorial subjectivities” (p. 1). The Australian author shows “how efforts to 
contain such extremes of transnationality within border zones have produces 
additional sites of statelessness and un-sovereignty” (p. 1). In her chronicle, Lloyd 
asserts the relevance of the boundary, even in the unfeasible or perhaps unimaginable 
                                                
5 “Emigration” is a standard procedure in Europe and other countries but not in the U.S. 
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case of a passenger living for more than a decade in what I define here as the airport 
limbo.6 With no doubts the best representation of this no-man’s-land and its inherited 
vagueness is the fact that this Iranian citizen survived for eleven years in Charles de 
Gaulle airport, between an electronics shop and a pizzeria. 
The limbo becomes a representation of what Marc Augé (1995)—the famous 
anthropologist—calls the ultimate “supermodernity.” For the French author, “If a 
place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space 
which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be 
a nonplace” (pp. 77–78). In fact, the airport limbo has produced its own segregated 
culture within its own little micro-cosmos, for example, cultural constructions such as 
airport food or airport literature. Bianca Leggett (2012) has claimed that “airport 
novels are designed to distract the reader from the boredom and discomfort of the 
airport itself, they provide an escape hatch into inner-space through sensational stories 
which help to combat the nullity of the non-place in which they are read. [. . .] 
traditionally the ‘airport novel’ is a place of refuge, the antithesis of the airport 
itself . . .” (p. 1). 
But beyond the public perception of this nonplace, in this section I argue that 
two basic aspects will characterize containment zones such as fish tanks, controlled 
areas or cleaned areas or transitional spaces: first and foremost an imposed, strong 
degree of security and surveillance; and second, the increased long wait times that 
may last hours and even full days. Within this new condition, airport officials, 
administrators, and eventually airport planners have undertaken several new initiatives 
wherein such placelessness becomes potentially profitable and thus priceless. 
                                                
6 I use the term limbo as a way to define transitional or intermediate spaces and places, and as its 
definition suggests, a place of uncertainty and neglect. 
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After the drop in the traffic indexes in the years after 9/11, the international 
airport system was forced to seek new sources of revenue, but the options were scarce 
and fell mainly into the hands of planners and architects who now needed to think of 
airport malls and commercial additions everywhere possible. For many scholars, “a 
key development in the evolution of the airport industry has been the increase in the 
dependence on non-aeronautical or commercial revenues” (Graham, 2001, p. 126). 
This is especially true in the aftermath of the tragedy and its eventual collapse, which 
hardly affected the industry not just in operative but in economic terms as well. During 
the following years and before the drop in the airlines’ demand, the rule of thumb 
became increasing revenue’s diversification at all costs. In consequence, Salter (2008) 
has commented that “airport architecture has moved away from the original layout of a 
railway terminus toward the style of a contemporary shopping mall” (p. 6), wherein 
“balconies, refreshment areas, and restaurants were separated from the main passenger 
flows” (p. 15). This strategy clearly responded to a new quantitative, statistic response 
from airport retail experts, wherein providing visitors and passengers with a retail 
offer more in accordance with their needs became less important than offering leasing 
space along the primary routes between check-in desk and the jetways. These 
measures obliged designers to channel passengers in order to increase retail exposure, 
and users were thus flow-forced to walk longer distances to their planes. The only 
available directionality pattern was clear: walk straight or walk back and start the 
processing all over again. 
The wave of expansion of the security paradigm, particularly after 9/11, has 
shifted not just our concept of the airport but the way we understand the landside and 
the airside frontier. For security reasons, and perhaps for the first time ever, 
passengers, visitors, and merchandise were contained in hold rooms for long periods 
of time. This policy of containment formed a sort of undefined zone that has 
	  239 
encouraged several hub airports to invest in retail, entertainment, hotels, and even 
churches, spas, and medical facilities. Finally, I concur with Salter (2008) when he 
argues that “the time spent on the ground at airports is not seen as ‘dead-time’ but 
rather can be quickly soaked up by the institutions of social and commercial life. In 
this way, airports can be seen as microcosms of society—although critical analysis on 
this point needs to be taken further” (p. 12). 
Placeless spaces are certainly priceless. Airport retail experts Rowley and 
Slack (1999) have shown studies in which the “seeming placelessness and 
timelessness of airports stimulates consumer spending” (p. 151). But it is in reality the 
idle time that has been constantly extended between check-in and departure time 
which needs to be filled in. In terms of retail, “security is an indirect benefit: 
passengers, airlines, and terminal retailers are chiefly interested in the processing time 
rather than security outcomes” (Salter, 2008, p. 11). 
This may well be one indirect stimuli product of slowing down passenger 
flows on behalf of security processing. This is what is called airport “‘dwell-time,’ or 
enforced waiting periods to create retail opportunities” (Lloyd, 2003, p. 94, as quoted 
in Salter, 2008, p. 11). In contrast to retail layouts of the 1970s and 1980s, according 
to which most if not all the leasable space was placed at the concourse, new retail 
schemes took advantage of passenger containment and flooded cleared areas of the 
terminal. At present, “shops and catering, if any, on the landside require a detour and 
an effort by the passenger to leave the normal flow routes” (Doganis, 2004, p. 139). 
This is logical if check-in time must be sped up to reach the waiting deadlines imposed 
by the airlines, wherein passengers must be at the gate at a certain time that is 
handwritten on the boarding passes. 
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Today most passengers will try to reduce the uncertainties and congestion of 
security filters, spending the least possible time at the concourse. In this regard, Anne 
Graham (2001), an expert on airport management, has said,  
admittedly it is difficult to determine entirely whether the raised expectations 
at airports have been caused by a genuine need or desire of the consumers for 
expanded facilities or whether an airport’s drive to maximize its commercial 
income by becoming a shopping centre has merely changed the expectations of 
passengers. It is also true to say that this increased emphasis on commercial 
facilities has not been welcomed by all the traveling public with significant 
groups of passengers, particularly those from the business community, often 
desiring a quick route through the airport as uncluttered as possible from the 
distraction of numerous shops and catering outlets. (p. 127)  
In regard to the new retail schemes used by architects, Adey (2008) opines that 
“it is important that these new layouts are not felt in a disruptive way or become an 
annoyance” (p. 149), although this is hardly possible in practice because most retail 
additions and reconfigurations needed to literally be squeezed in existent terminals 
worldwide. At least in spirit, the “principle is to avoid the psychological and physical 
separation between airport processing time and shopping/refreshment time” (Doganis, 
2004, p. 140), but in general this was not achieved in most airports. So at the turn of 
the 20th century, newer terminal retail layouts became sandwiched between landside–
airside boundaries and started to look suspiciously similar to large, anchor department 
stores. 
However, the newest developments in controlled zones indicate that the 
construction of a sort of micro-world, as described by Turkle (1995), is unavoidable, 
regardless of why passengers are staying longer and longer within the cleared areas of 
airports. This means that there seems to be a new, even larger opportunity for 
entrepreneurship at the limbo. The so-called no-man’s land of the airport is gaining 
popularity for many reasons: passengers may find now local shops, outlets, therapy 
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and spas, cinemas, hotels with swimming pools, art galleries, and gardens. All of this 
activity is happening between the secured filters. Although I do find fascinating the 
idea of stretching the limbo to the maximum, it is striking to think that users are very 
aware that they are spending time in one of the most heavily guarded places there is. 
Do the implicit connotations of spending leisure time under invasive surveillance 
indicate the possible reassignment of personal privacy? Is this voluntary, or subtly 
enforced by the state? 
As I mentioned before, technological viewports glance toward the in-between 
zones, which are sandwiched between users and their machines. In conclusion, I 
suggest that complex, historical socio-technical conditions have shaped the 
construction of this new undefined, unclaimed zone of uncertainty, which I call 
metaphorically across the chapters “the airport limbo.” Finally, the investigator is 
tempted to speculate on whether other technological systems also have their own 
mediating entities, and if these exist, whether they resemble limbo. The answer might 
be hidden in the three-dimensional space of computer virtuality, the sounds produced 
by DJs, automobile cabins, or mobile chat-rooms. Do we stand before a new 
technological dimension that has not yet been classified? 
V. Intangible Aspects: The Immaterial Frontier 
Non-physical boundaries have existed since the early days of airports. As I have 
shown in the previous chapters, the simplest devices that were used to separate people 
from aircraft created a psychological divide. For example, in LaGuardia’s airport, 
visitors, enthusiasts, and families were not just physically but emotionally distanced 
from the spectacle of flight. In the cases of Washington and Tampa—while the 
boundary was not yet subject to excessive security controls—designers relied much 
	  242 
more on physical or material solutions. In both cases, the autonomy for transiting 
between the landside and the airside has been removed. At Dulles Airport, passengers 
were drawn away from the apron, then isolated and contained; in the case of Tampa’s 
airport, and thanks to the People Mover, they became fully reliant on machines for 
transiting between the landside and the airside. Hence the immaterial frontier may be 
used as a category of historical analysis. But for the purpose of this section it is 
particularly interesting to see the exponential growth of non-physical limits right after 
the tragic events of 9/11. Thinking of landside–airside boundaries in the aftermath of 
the tragedy and beyond presented new planning challenges, such as when designers 
had to address the fact that a good chunk of the frontier has de-materialized or 
vanished. And it is precisely that—the added uncertainties of airport technology and 
design—which I analyze here. The phenomenon of virtualization became a true game-
changer for airport planners and designers on a global scale; nowadays, beyond the 
previous difficulties of laying out buildings and systems, these professionals need to 
understand, organize, and choreograph a new set of limits that were pretty much 
invisible. I argue, then, that it is nearly impossible for us to understand the current 
complexity of the landside–airside boundary without at least performing a 
taxonomical analysis. In this sense, I argue that the virtual manifestations of the 
landside–airside in the post-9/11 world could be catalogued as psychological 
constructs, informatics assets (pieces of data), and non-physical mechanisms of 
control. 
Imagining the borderline as a psychological construct refers to how users 
experience a variety of feelings throughout airport terminals, depending on the 
material representation of boundaries and the message that designers, architects, 
planners, the airport itself, or often a higher authority meant to express or enforce. In 
this regard, both the perceptions and the mindsets of users are directly interconnected 
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with the ways airports are planned at the outset. As the borderline becomes a cultural 
limit, the landside–airside boundary transforms into a neutral zone, where cultural 
expressions other than the culture of airports are suppressed. As J. G. Ballard (2006), 
the visionary Canadian fiction author, has said, “airports have become a new kind of 
discontinuous city, whose vast populations, measured by annual passenger 
throughputs, are entirely transient, purposeful, and for the most part happy. Above all, 
airports are places for good news” (p. 14). On the one hand, this is a true description 
indeed: we all have either greeted the arrival of a loved one or experienced a warm 
welcome from our significant others. But on the other hand, far from the optimism 
displayed by Ballard, contemporary “airports are sites of discipline, where passengers 
become passive subjects and bearers of the power relations that force compliance” 
(Bennett, 2008, p. 68). On a psychological level, airport terminals seem to work as 
large-scale thresholds of change. As passengers we are obliged to deconstruct our 
persona in separate pieces, or “vectors of flow” (Adey, 2004), and they will remain 
split apart until passing through the airport. 
Few would deny that airports post-9/11 are generally characterized by 
inconvenience and stress. For example, in Air Rage: Crisis in the Skies, the authors 
describe how the difficulties of expansion have resulted in “traffic jams, lack of 
adequate parking facilities, long lines at counters, crowded gate areas, poor restroom 
quality, and countless other inconveniences for travelers at the nation’s airports” 
(Anonymous & Thomas, 2001, p. 32). The sole experiencing of these conditions could 
change the mood of users, even without the added stress of living in urban contexts 
where traffic, passing through dangerous zones to reach airports, rushes in general. 
In addition, for many, arriving at the airport means that the stress path goes on. 
Salter (2006) has said that “traveling through the airport has become an adventure 
within itself—and the passenger hasn’t even left the ground. A micro politics of the 
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real physical architecture of the airport within which people spend long hours and 
make arduous journeys” (p. 167). But in this century, traveling by plane is a 
considerable odyssey involving physical and mental stoicism. Users are generally 
stressed upon arrival to the terminal, mentally biased to suffer mistreatments, long 
lines, and endless queues, to lose privacy, and to walk endless distances. Terminals are 
institutions of emotional transfer, and the landside–airside its mechanism of coercion. 
For users, the emotional condition that is exalted at the airport is a game of 
opposites. Although our experiencing of terminals may range from joy to anxiety, 
from sentimental containment to emotional amplification, or from awe to rage, it is 
perhaps “how feelings, sensations, and emotions are sorted out and filtered by the 
airport. I suggest that particular modes of feeling are limited and curtailed in an 
attempt to both profit from passengers while also making them be, and feel, more 
secure” (Adey, 2008, p. 150). But for others is the “lacking of understanding of just 
how these sites are experienced, not just by scholars and academics but by those who 
do so on an everyday occurrence” (Crang, 2002, p. 569). Architects and interior 
designers play a key role in shaping space in airport terminals. In spite of the complex 
programmatic interrelationships, successful designers sort out obstacles and create 
clear, airy, and often monumental buildings. Because they are singular in many ways, 
airport terminals are often surprising and unexpected; they feature their own level of 
expressiveness, and “by designing atmospheric and architectural triggers that allow the 
drama” (Edwards, 2005, p. 74), designers transform public spaces and add 
monumentality. However, not all emotions are the product of experiencing spectacular 
buildings; architects often advised by retail experts are capable of “remodulat[ing] 
passengers from a stressful, anxious, and panicked state into a more relaxed mood, 
susceptible to consumer temptation” (Adey, 2008, p. 152). This sort of emotional fine-
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tuning has become one of the critical, most debated aspects of defining landside–
airside frontiers. 
At the opposite end, airports can also be stressful places, labyrinthine, or 
simply hard to navigate, and in the worst case passengers may feel intimidated. In this 
sense I suggest out of the many different factors that have turned the airport into a 
fearful place is the extended idea that threatening and potentially dangerous people 
may infiltrate airport security. In this sense, fear can be experienced from two angles: 
the first is the fear in the face of scrutiny, and the second, racial/cultural profiling—the 
fear of the victim. “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions 
amongst peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural . . . 
People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, 
customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, 
religious communities, nations and, at the broadest level, civilizations” (Bain, 2006, p. 
139). But the sentiments of public fear in contemporary travels are directly linked to 
the leading security paradigms and “respond to questions of cultural diversity within 
states” (Commission on Human Security of the Government of Japan, 2003). In 
practice, the more accentuated moment of anxiety is perhaps when passengers start 
queuing for passport control examination and face governmental controls of personal 
identity. These “moments of departure anxiety [are] aggravated by the sense of being 
funneled up to another chute like a herd of cattle” (Gordon, 2004, p. 234). It is right in 
that moment of anticipation that the situation becomes usually tense. A situation that is 
artificially stressed dramatically and almost staged publicly: a loudspeaker is 
cyclically repeating messages, announcing alerts, and the everyday situation is 
classified as a state of emergency: yellow, orange, red. Salter (2003) has referred to 
the design of the space of the passport control area, saying that it “parallels the legal 
and psychic journey from being controlled and contained at the border to the 
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comparative freedom of the safe domestic space” (p. 124). This is often an illusion. 
The fact is that the landside–airside boundary is designed through a series of valves, 
and some of them remained constantly opened. It is remarkable that the reliability of 
this system rests on the assumption of scrutiny and strong surveillance, on the one 
hand, and the self-disciplined, almost docile conduct of users, on the other. At the 
passport control areas, there are no doors, physical limits, or anything that tell us 
implicitly that we cannot pass through; on the contrary, they remain mysteriously 
open, thus facilitating somehow the flow of people and confirming that the “default 
spatial assumption is that most travelers will enter the territory with a minimum of 
delay” (Blow, 1996, p. 142). 
Just as in Foucauldian discourse language expresses power relationships, 
landside–airside boundaries are charged with a martial subtext. For customs and 
border control officers, “to be a guard is to know all power and control” (Peterson, 
1996), and that aura is usually translated as a military imposition. In all security 
points, but particularly in the passport control room, immigration officers display 
power, showcasing military training looks and weapons, showing no emotions or 
compassion, and interrogating people behind thick glass. “There is common structure 
to passport controls (facilitated by design companies and architects) in which an entry 
hall is divided into lines (often drawn onto the floor) that lead to inspection booths” 
(Edwards, 1998, ch. 9). So in fact architectural gestures have not just organizing 
power but also complete theatrical scenes, human postures, and attitudes. Compared 
with the rail station “the airport, rather than being comfortably numbing, is a fearful 
place, while the aircraft itself has become a sanctuary, a blessed relief from the chaotic 
deluge” (Pascoe, 2001, p. 237). However, in the airport the representation of authority 
or power is the not only source of psychological distress. Terminals, airports, and 
aircraft are becoming more prone to witnessing extreme psychological responses that 
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are even studied and classified psychiatrically, as in air-rage syndrome. “Abnormal, 
aberrant, and abusive behavior on the part of thousands of airline passengers each 
year—known as air rage, is by far today’s greatest threat to safety and security of the 
flying public” (Anonymous & Thomas, 2001, p. 11). Air rage is usually fueled by 
multiple factors such as excessive frustration, alcohol or drug consumption, mental 
illness, nicotine cravings, claustrophobia, or fear. The institutional reasons that allow 
air rage chiefly “include the lack of a realistic definition of air rage . . . and the lack of 
consequences for the vast majority of air rage offenders” (Anonymous & Thomas, 
2001, p. 155). In addition, the definition does not distinguish between the different 
social groups; “passengers who commit air rage fall into every category of air traveler: 
male and female; young and old; first class, business class, and economy class” 
(Anonymous & Thomas, 2001, p. 155). Statistically, most of these critical cases 
happen right at the crossing of airport boundaries or during air flight. 
The next virtual manifestation of the landside–airside in the post-9/11 world is 
the rise of informatics assets. Succinctly, this phenomenon represents the 
dematerialization of the frontier into bits and pieces of information and, incidentally, a 
new added complexity to the conception of landside–airside boundaries, especially in 
large, international airports. In this section I am interested in showing how, after 9/11, 
the airport became a huge “data filter” and why it is now interconnected to the larger 
national and international systems of personal identification. 
These new policies greatly complicated the changing airport “status” of 
travelers according to their particular position on the physical grounds of the airport; 
even the coinage of new terms became necessary for this purpose (cleared, pre-
cleared, sterile, non-sterile, processing, hold, metal processing, profiling, etc.). As 
sociologist Manuel Castells (2000) said, “data-flows are essential to emerging modes 
of organization” (p. 31). As ground and air transportation caught on technologically at 
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the turn of the 20th century, both industries started occupying a niche within the 
information society. More specifically, the so-called information revolution was used 
in a timely way to fill in the gap created by the human and technological errors of 
2001. In the new reality of the information society, airports had to be rethought as data 
filters; travelers were now sorted by appearance and “scanned like barcodes” (Lyon, 
2008, p. 35). Those with dubious looks or backgrounds would now take longer to be 
processed, and those on watch lists not allowed to travel. The new, contradictory 
instruction is “to maximize but to regulate mobility” (Lyon, 2003, p. 13).  
After 9/11, the desperate need to reinforce airports as borders and to establish a 
more rigid passenger control was rapidly transformed into bytes and pieces of 
information; data became embedded in documents until the pulverization of 
information became the global standard. PAX, or post-9/11 travelers, became binomial 
to information as their individuality was now attached to passports, visas, and printed 
documents, which at the same time connected them to a local or international 
electronic database. In the light of high security and the airport world after 9/11, the 
landside–airside boundary became the ultimate international frontier. These 
visible/invisible edges would now interplay with national identity cards, stretching 
international borders into terminals and making them increasingly immaterial. 
The third virtual manifestation of the landside–airside in the post-9/11 world is 
the non-physical mechanisms of control. One of the more severe consequences of the 
9/11 aftermath is that the exercise of state control is now stretched to a limit, and in 
doing so, governments are getting dangerously close to violating privacy, free transit, 
and other basic civil rights. Under this new paradigm, the landside–airside boundary 
could be thought of as partly a mechanism of non-physical control that is contingent 
on international regulations on one side and on local practices and culture on the other. 
According to Orvar Löfgren (1999), an expert on national borders and a professor of 
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ethnology in Sweden, the airport is “a stress laboratory, a no man’s land between the 
nation and the world, a surveillance machine for automated bodies, shepherded from 
control station to control state” (p. 17). In many ways the central concern of the 
literature around airports, especially the attending problems of international 
relationships, government, and law, has focused on the growing relevance of airports 
as tools of societal control and surveillance. 
If contemporary airports mediate the relationships between citizens and the 
state, how are these non-physical mechanisms of control contingent on a reformulation 
of the boundary? The resulting policies of risk management and threat mitigation that 
were imposed by the National Security Agency (NSA) on the ICAO and IATA 
resulted in a domino effect on airports worldwide. Beyond following the new code 
emends that demanded new criteria for buildings, technologies, and procedures, 
designers faced the added challenge of dealing with non-physical strategies of control. 
But, as in all emergencies, some of these mechanisms or strategies were written and 
some were not, although most were learned with practice and use. Among the 
frequently used non-verbal actions are the idea of permeating a sense of permanent 
risk (collective paranoia); the availability of everyone for ID checks (scannablility); 
the imposition of a passive and docile attitude, especially on the part of passengers 
(passivity); the widespread notion that force will be exercised against suspicion 
(restrictiveness); the use of learned routines and patterns of conduct, movement, 
reaction, and so forth (mechanization); and, finally, the preparing of civilians to react 
to and intervene in potential threats (alertness). 
Thus, I argue that non-physical mechanisms of control are powerful links 
between the practice of airport design and the larger discourses behind politics, 
economics, or the state. This condition may allow designers to observe and register 
how users adapt or react to the new ideology. These are those tactical measures that 
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superseded political measures—often shielded in national security and border 
security—and that have seriously affected the way landside–airside boundaries were 
conceived after 9/11. 
Particularly in the U.S. and Europe, institutions spread a sort of collective 
paranoia wherein threats seem to be omnipresent. “Risk is then, mitigated, avoided, 
transferred, or accepted according to the abilities and environment of the authority. 
Risk management is the identification, analysis and elimination (and/or control to an 
acceptable level) of those hazards, as well as the subsequent risks that threaten the 
viability of an organization,” according to ICAO (2005, section 5:3). Potential risk is 
present in any landside–airside boundary design because each material, surface, or 
route must be thought out in terms of a worst-case scenario. Indeed, threat and risk 
management is one of the governance keystones of our time. 
After 9/11, measures were implemented to render people scannable. Adey 
(2004) has said that “airports are perhaps the most stringently surveilled sites in terms 
of the means of movement and of identification” (p. 34). But in terms of control, the 
Orwellian eye behind the mirror is the pure representation of institutional superiority 
and mental voyeurism. In practice, everyone must show sufficient identification, and 
as airports become cultural limits, racial and religious profiling becomes an edgy 
aspect of the virtual borderline. Federal and local authorities have imposed a 
written/non-written conduct code that implies important degrees of passiveness from 
the user’s end. Passengers are restricted from taking photos, making jokes, using their 
cell phones, talking loudly, or even sitting down to rest. For Salter (2003), “the 
sovereign, taxing power of the state and the docile, self-policing nature of the citizen 
are reinforced immediately” (p. 127); but on the other side, the state imposition of 
emotional control implies a sort of new designed or planned ideological social order, 
like the one James C. Scott discusses in his book Seeing Like a State (1998). 
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There is a widespread notion, be it true or false, that the airport is an incredibly 
restrictive place. “Airports are sites of discipline, where passengers become passive 
subjects and bearers of the power relations that force compliance” (Bennett, 2008, p. 
68). Governments are represented in many ways in an airport, but basically they have 
physical presence in order to exercise punitive actions or control the population. Thus, 
the intersection between the entities involved, be they users, authorities, or 
technological artifacts, is normalized by written and non-written codes that go beyond 
the Law in cities, for example; and potentially the use of force (weapons, physical 
force, strategy, etc.) will ensure compliance. 
Similar to the regulatory features implemented by modern states in order to 
control population discussed in Seeing Like a State (Scott, 1998), contemporary 
institutions have choreographed—through highly technified designs—mechanized 
patterns of movement. Passengers have learned to perform certain routines in an 
automatic fashion, as in the case of a six-year-old girl who reacts to an inspection, 
performing and behaving like an adult (IRBMW, 2011). In regard to how 
contemporary landside–airside boundaries are thought of, confinement operates at 
subconscious levels, especially in the immigration hall and customs, where no 
physical barrier seems to obstruct the flow of people. 
Post-9/11 immigration halls are governed more by attitudes and signage than 
by architectural gestures or imposing spaces. In the end, everyone at the airport must 
remain alert. Many routines performed by the airline and security personnel, signage, 
posters, video projections, and, particularly, announcements through loudspeakers 
have as their mission to remind all visitors and passengers to remain attentive and 
distrustful of strangers. The state goal was clearly to expand its presence and vigilant 
force to the side of civil society, but in doing so it strengthens the imposed ideological 
order that, at least today, governs the airport. 
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Finally, beyond the control policies of the state, it is the growing interest of 
governments and other international regulatory bodies that these “Checkpoint 
Charlies” of today share information, allow interagency controls, impose arbitrary 
policies, divide nations, cultures, and even religions, because we seem to be entering 
into the “transnationalization of bureaucracies of surveillance” (Bigo & Tsoukala, 
2008, p. 14). 
VI. Conclusion: Boundaries and Beyond 
Airports have served many purposes other than being huge parking bays for 
airplanes. In the past, airports such as LaGuardia or Tempelhof became vehicles of 
political propaganda; during the early-to-mid-twentieth century Lambert Field and 
TWA became the new urban cathedrals, and Orly revealed itself as a monument to 
modernism and modernity. A decade later, airports became huge water-tank-like 
containers, as at Charles de Gaulle T1 and Tampa International. After the first terrorist 
attacks in the early 1970s, Ben Gurion became a living fortress and the archetypical 
airport-bunker; in the following decades Heathrow and Schiphol evolved into air-
conditioned malls. The post-9/11 world turned Atlanta-Hartsfield and other hubs into 
sort of martial “Safety States” (Lyon, 2008, p. 30), while the contemporary Changi 
accommodated parks, fountains, swimming pools, hotels, and entertainment within the 
landside–airside stretch. 
The airport of the future will perhaps explore and exploit more intensely what I 
have called here the limbo, the in-between, or the contained zones in the landside–
airside boundary. Even other kinds of viewports might be found in other technological 
systems. With its high degrees of personal control, tax-free policies, jurisdictional 
vagueness, target-consumers’ buying power, and consumers’ insatiable thirst for retail 
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and entertainment, and while operators can keep them secured as prisons, the limbo 
will probably remain the favorite spot of governments and companies. And although 
seeing what is next is not the purpose of this work, the paradigm of security represents 
a continuum that will take many years before it is subject to any changes that may ease 
the original post-9/11 policies. It is thus foreseeable that identification control and 
passenger scanning and people containment will remain game constants; it is therefore 
also reasonable to think that biometrics will play an important role in mediating bodies 
and boundaries. 
In the coming years the state will be perhaps more interested in biometric 
control and the resulting databases than in airport security. It is not ludicrous to think 
of airport terminals as fully clean zones, where the ID and security screening has been 
pushed outwards, towards the incoming roads. In the near future, passengers may be 
sorted using scanning devices that track body features, way before they reach the 
terminal building. Throughout this chapter I have used the metaphor of liquid airport 
because the designing of airport terminals since the rise of security issues in the early 
1970s has become, more and more, an activity of flow containment. As I have shown 
in the previous sections, passenger contention and flow distribution is achieved 
through a complex set of devices, decisions, technologies, walls and partitions, 
routines, and invisible mechanisms that I have defined in general as viewports, or the 
boundary between the landside and the airside.  
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CONCLUSION 
Limbo is basically a metaphor, anyway . . . it’s this place where you’re neither 
here nor there . . . and so many people live that kind of life. 
—John Sayles (2009), Limbo, A Condition of Unknowable Outcome 
Perhaps it was after my first contact with one of the most obscure books ever written 
on transportation technologies, the strange, but always fascinating Aviapolis: A Book 
About Airports, by Gillian Fuller and Ross Harley (2004), that I became concerned 
about this topic. I use the word concerned because the boundary, at least in the context 
of the book, is ominous and grim. Aviapolis throws a fastball to the airport 
establishment of glamour and majesty thanks to its diagrammatic formatting, un-
retouched photographs, and coldly descriptive texts. Toned with bare realism, most of 
the book follows the tracks of where things get divided in an airport, generally without 
explaining really why or how. But it was right then that I was provoked by the idea of 
coming up with a better explanation for why the landside–airside boundary is the 
defining element of the ways airports look and function. It was certainly at that point 
when I started weaving my expertise as an airport designer and my research as an 
S&TS scholar. The initial result of my inquiry filled me with questions, but I decided 
to focus on answering just two basic ones: Can we challenge the way we have written 
the history of airports and the form in which we understand them today and perhaps 
tomorrow? Can we prove that the landside–airside boundary is the single most 
important feature that shapes an airport? The answer to the second question is yes, we 
can, today. The catch of this simple answer is that the landside–airside boundary is not 
necessarily an essential part of the airport. It is a socio-technical construct, though, 
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that we have complicated until there is no other way to think of an airport today, 
except in terms of the boundary itself. 
To the first question, it is much harder to provide a convincing answer. I 
maintain in this dissertation that airport planning and design have moved along a 
straight line for more than a century. This pattern of linearity has been supported by 
what planners call “standard airport design,” and it basically consists in learning from 
what is established1 as modestly successful (airport typology) and in introducing 
small, superficial changes to the selected scheme (finger, satellite, pier, unit, etc.). 
Although the historiography of the airport is most often pictured in terms of 
spectacular achievements, mostly architectural and spatial, this interpretation could be 
deceptive and misleading. Why? Because most airports are based on the same standard 
airport layouts of the past (sometimes almost a century old). Furthermore, the airside 
has shown few changes since the Wright brothers took flight (Stover, 2003, p. 31). 
This linear process of thinking has privileged the demands of aircraft (dimensions, 
technological features, turnaround time, etc.) and airspace (slots, frequency), leaving 
aside the needs and expectations of passengers. It has also adjusted the landside of the 
terminal for the automobile. Therefore, I have decided to introduce the landside–
airside boundary here as a research tool, a lens, more specifically, that in hindsight 
provides a different perspective of airport history. 
So, can we challenge the way we have written the history of airports and the 
form in which we understand them today and perhaps tomorrow? In conclusion, I 
argue that it is in fact possible, but only through the observation and understanding of 
landside–airside boundary changes throughout the years. In the previous chapters I 
presented testimony that shows why the airport, as a technological system, faced at 
                                                
1 “Established” by experts and administrators, not necessarily by users. 
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least three bottlenecks throughout its history. Each of these specific moments of crisis 
pushed for a sound, potent “rupture” that eventually could lead to a new process of 
invention.  
Cyclically, airports have fallen behind and have been phased out as efficient 
technological objects; designers have tried hard to correct the standard models, but 
have failed in their intent. Thus the problems (delays, congestion, passenger 
complaints, etc.) mounted and turned out to be so radical that the government pushed 
for the creation of a new, competitive system. These atypical cases, all three 
exceptional, may be also understood through the use of other S&TS concepts. 
LaGuardia, Dulles, and Tampa shared the basic characteristics and structure of SCOT, 
or social constructivism, meaning that in these three cases, there is interpretive 
flexibility, a problem faced by relevant social groups, a process of stabilization and 
rhetorical closures. In addition, I have analyzed, in more detail, Dulles under Hughes’s 
model for large technological systems and Tampa under Bijker’s model of 
technological frames.2 
LaGuardia—or the first reinvention of the airport—illustrates from one angle 
Scott’s criticism of how the State enforces control over citizens through plans, 
artifacts, or policies; and from the other, how Mayor LaGuardia succeeded in 
reinforcing his political power while at the same time remaining in good standing with 
his fellow airport enthusiasts and voters. In this sense it became a soft transition, and 
not a drastic one, as many visionaries predicted, and the Skywalk patented that 
assertion. LaGuardia Airport can be considered a monumental techno-political device 
and one of the biggest triumphs of the “American Sublime” (Nye, 1994). Its gestures 
                                                
2 See footnote 4 in the Introduction and footnote 9 in chapter three, where I describe more the 
interchangeability of these models; although in order to make more clear the interests of actors in each 
case, I have thought convenient to use them separately in this order.  
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and unprecedented features were indeed revolutionary at the time—such as the 
separation of departures and arrivals on two levels—and also set the basis for the new 
relationship between users and aircraft. 
Dulles—or the second reinvention of the airport—which was intended to be 
the new seed for a super-system of airports, represented a radical departure from 
standard airports, although it entailed an enormous risk therein. I recounted how faith 
in technology at the turn of the 1960s built up the idea that the Mobile Lounge was the 
ultimate solution for the modern airport, and eventually a vehicle of social progress. I 
paid special attention to the formation of relevant groups, actors, and their interests; I 
tried to unveil the internal (experts) and external (boards) negotiation processes that 
explain why the reformulation of the airport is based solely on rethinking the 
landside–airside boundary. I have also made an account of the postwar period 
environment to plan airports, the jet-air boom, and the congestion of international 
airports at the turn of the 1960s. I also commented on how the establishment of the 
airport planning profession fueled the momentum of new airport thinking. 
Tampa—or the third reinvention of the airport—brings the first opportunity for 
airport planners to rethink an airport from the ground up. I have used a slightly 
modified version of Bijker’s tentative list of elements of a technological frame model. 
I have found along the way, particularly after analyzing the interviews, that there are 
three main levels to the gestation process of Brink Coridan’s “Landside Airside 
Concept.” The first may be called “problem posing,” which is strictly semantic and 
where the relevant actors need to fix terms in order to identify and make complex 
problems intelligible and manageable. The second stage may be called “problem 
framing” and is mainly methodological. At this stage, definitions become the main 
element of communication between the members of the different relevant groups. The 
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third stage could be called “problem solving.”3 Planners will team up one last time 
and, based on the procedure’s outcome data, will brainstorm an integrated solution 
that becomes the basis for a rhetorical closure. 
Yet this is only half the story. Although I could have gone on endlessly 
speaking of the boundary—simply because it is not a thing or a phenomenon but a 
category of analytical research—I decided to write two more chapters that answer two 
more key questions: Are boundaries repeatable pieces of a mechanism, or are they 
autonomous entities, subject to absorb cultural practices? And are there any features 
that become visible only through the use of a landside–airside boundary as a lens? 
Each question is developed and responded to separately. 
I intuited that the differences between airport reinventions and airport 
innovations might intrigue readers. In conclusion, there is one basic difference 
between the two: an airport reinvention requires that a higher entity commissions a 
third party to develop a new concept for an airport without limitations in terms of 
organization, technology, or structure. However, the new airport must adequately fit 
within the higher system in the chain of transport as Debbie Douglas has pointed out, 
in this case, aviation. In the case of innovations, change is introduced more gradually, 
because many traces of the previous standard solution remain. Perhaps the more 
relevant finding in this regard is to observe that either strong innovations or 
reinventions happen only when the relationship of the landside–airside boundary is 
modified. As I have shown in this chapter, during a reinvention process, designers 
need an unusually high degree of freedom from their client. Clearly this condition 
proportionally sparks multiple degrees of uncertainty and risk, thus making the 
reinvention of airports in the future significantly less probable. As designers gain 
                                                
3 Assuming that not all actors are yet fully advocating—either the problem or the method (or 
individually).  
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decision control over the emerging airport system, they gradually resemble Hughes’s 
characterization of a system builder. Finally, I ask myself if landside–airside 
boundaries are cultural mirrors, and the answer is yes. Airports speak much of local 
cultures, and these expressions are unexpectedly present in any landside–airside 
boundary.  
Last, I respond to this inquiry: Are there any features that become visible only 
through the use of a landside–airside boundary as a lens? In trying to answer this 
simple question, I bump into some interesting methodological speculations. First, the 
identification of these boundaries opens an imaginary window that may be described 
as a technological viewport (a term borrowed from the culture of computers). These 
portals allow us to see the in-between space, which is usually otherwise inaccessible 
and which marks the territorial border between us and the hardware of technological 
systems. Second, I have also found that in order to make visible what has remained 
hidden within those contained boundaries, viewports should meet some conditions. At 
least in the case of airports, I have found at least five features that characterize these 
portals. Viewports should be discursive, normative, the object of knowledge, 
transitory, and intangible. 
As I have shown in “The Liquid Airport,” passenger contention and flow 
distribution is achieved by a complex set of devices, decisions, technologies, walls and 
partitions, routines and invisible mechanisms that I have defined in general as the 
boundary between the landside and the airside. I have explained why these boundaries 
have been mentioned only intermittently in the available literature of airports 
(corporate and public), how they become evident when we use them as a category of 
historical analysis, or, furthermore, as a filter that helps us look for, in hindsight, a 
new version of why airports are the way they are now. I have also argued, perhaps in 
too much detail, how landside–airside boundaries are shaped in very unusual forms 
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and out of a very wide array of factors. They also can be considered cultural mirrors, 
because each boundary, regardless of its degree of achievement, is a living version of 
a diversity of large-scale conditions such as the political or economic discourse of the 
time, nationalism or the greater concerns of society, and so forth. 
In the previous investigation and analysis, I have also suggested that it is only 
through the meticulous pondering of the many events that take place between the 
conceptualization and the operation of boundaries that they become identifiable, 
intelligible, and modifiable. In this regard, I have addressed multiple material aspects 
such as innovation, geometric configurations, congestion, cultural idiosyncrasy, 
security, codes, literature, and retail; as well as non-material aspects such as 
psychological constructs, informatics, the state control over users, and so forth. The 
analysis made for this last chapter may be situated right at the intersection where the 
landside–airside is negotiated; I opted for this strategy because each of the subsections 
represents in itself a specific window through which to observe and understand how 
the boundary is finally formed. But, in the end, so much complexity pays off, because 
the invisible becomes visible and the landside–airside boundary finally rises as the 
seed that gives genesis to all airports. 
As a short postscript, I would like to end this dissertation with a summary and 
evaluation of my own use of S&TS concepts and methods in order to unthread and 
understand this complex topic. In general, the work throughout the chapters is framed 
by social constructivism, meaning that I do not take for granted the notion that airports 
are the result of technological change, such as in aircraft, systems, and security. 
Starting off from that position, I have investigated why we have not built an alternate 
history wherein social forces are rightly credited. In parallel, I have identified what I 
have called “standard airport design,” a simple but effective and highly 
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technologically deterministic4 idea that has eased the way aircraft operate at the 
airside, somehow subordinating the airport to aviation and, in a secondary role, 
subordinating the landside to the requirements of the automobile. Designers and 
planners have lived comfortably within this superstructure, producing refried versions 
of old models, cloning most airports in essence but wrapping some of them in gold. 
Nonetheless, right at the underbelly of the airport, things have started to heat up since 
the late 1930s, when contingency showed up and passengers started to fight back, 
congestion turned airports into time bombs, and traveling became a painful adventure. 
These “standard airport designs” may be seen as a linear path of development, wherein 
some irregularities (social responses) have protruded, forming what Hughes defines as 
“reverse salients” or bottlenecks. As an outcome, new airport designs were born, 
creating large-scale “ruptures” at the historical timeline of airport planning.  
These super-scale technological bugs have impeded the triumph of the airport 
as a machine. That is basically how I realize that those three lonely trials of 
reinventing the airport from scratch were immensely relevant. It is impossible to 
visualize and understand the caliber of these cases without the aid of Hughes’s model 
and some other small ideas that I have added to his theory.  
Once these reinventions were mapped, other meaningful innovations became 
visible and interconnected. All together formed a sort of anti-establishment network 
linked by strong changes in the way the frontier between the landside and the airside 
was thought of. My initial reaction was to see these frontiers as a variation of Star and 
Griesemer’s (1989, p. 393) “boundary objects.” My disappointment came later in my 
                                                
4 I claim that “standard airport design” is simply a technologically deterministic formula because it 
favors and sometimes forces airport layouts, and more specifically landside–airside boundaries to 
accommodate technologies such as aircraft, security, and systems (baggage handling, etc.). Despite 
several efforts against, the human relationship with the airport has been mostly driven and determined 
by technological forces.  
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inquiry, because I found that the concept of the landside–airside boundary was not 
necessarily immutable or integral among expert communities. So I had to come up 
with my own terms and define landside–airside boundaries as technological viewports. 
These entities are described further in chapter five. 
Throughout the body of the dissertation I make specific use of three ideas, each 
of which supports the analysis of one case study and thus one chapter. For LaGuardia 
Airport I based the construction of the chapter thinking of Nye’s (1994) idea of the 
technological sublime, because regardless of the success or failure of the airport, it 
instantly became a true model of American selfhood. In the case of Dulles Airport I 
used Hughes’s model of large technological systems to show how airports form 
systems, and how they gained momentum between the 1950s and 1960s. I also 
discussed the coincidences between the system builder and Eero Saarinen. In other 
sections, I use two concepts from Madeleine Akrich (1992), first her idea of the 
“heterogeneous technical object,” which I apply in the case of the invention of 
jetways, and second, “imprinted objects,” for studying the implications of finding 
routines and patterns in the Mobile Lounge.  
Last, in the case of Tampa’s airport, I used Pinch and Bijker’s theoretical 
concept of the technological frame to explain why these processes comprise social, 
material, and cognitive elements as well as to understand the interactions among the 
relevant social groups. Finally, in SCOT’s terms, I argued that in all three reinventions 
of the airport, authors reached only a rhetorical closure. This idea has been incredibly 
valuable to my understanding of how the relevant social groups have “accepted” the 
new airport layouts; and why until the adoption process has been stabilized, the birth 
of a radically new airport is pompously and proudly announced (applicable to all three 
cases). 
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In all chapters I have also paraphrased some of Scott’s ideas regarding how the 
vertical powers of the state and other institutions prostrate social interests—as in the 
case of many of the ideas that govern the mentalities of airport planning. Chapter four 
shows the differences between reinvention and innovation, much in the spirit of 
Rogers (1995) and Hughes (1989). In the second part I bring out the cultural 
implications of designing landside–airside boundaries, which is a way to demonstrate 
how these entities are resistant to standardization. In chapter five, I propose the idea of 
technological viewports and structure the way this theoretical concept can be 
identified and consolidated as autonomous pieces of knowledge. 
Finally, in hindsight, my analysis of landside–airside boundaries suggests 
perhaps a new analytical category in S&TS. Therefore, the modest contribution to the 
S&TS body of knowledge that this work may provide is surely the possible 
identification of other similar landside–airside boundaries, or viewports, as I now 
generically refer to them. However, certain conditions must be met. I suggest that 
these spaces exist only in-between users and machines, but not necessarily at the 
operable interfaces or hardware controls. Of the first examples that come to my mind 
is the virtual reality space in computers, which is surprisingly similar to the airport’s 
limbo. It in fact meets all the conditions or features that I mentioned before: it is 
discursive (I think of Paul Edwards’s The Closed World), normative (Internet Privacy 
Act), an object of knowledge (a vast body of literature is available), transitory (by 
nature it is a through space), and, last, intangible (although it is mostly virtual, it is 
already modifying our real world). 
Speculating, the algorithmic environment of the computer seems to be also an 
“in-between space” that needs portals of access and egress; it also plays with its own 
set of rules, and in the end it also challenges the legal system and awakens a 
compulsive need for control and surveillance. Programmers, just as planners and 
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designers, have also negotiated long hours to shape them. Just like in the airport 
boundary, the virtual reality’s space gives the illusion of independency and autonomy. 
These viewports are spaces (not places) that have been paused, because they will 
never reach closure and probably will forever remain unresolved. Strangely, we will 
be “dwelling” inside these viewports at an increased rate that we may not be able to 
imagine, and we are already spending much of our time and money just there. In 
conclusion, in both cases viewports could tell a new tale wherein technologies have 
been changing based on the closed negotiation between humans and machines, rather 
than responding just to the interests of either side. Can we find more landside–airside 
boundaries in other technologies? If we do, we may be before an alternate way to 
understand how certain technological systems are built—in a rather different direction 
from Hughes’s model.  
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